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ABSTRACT
Rosch, Stephanie D. PhD, Purdue University, December 2015. Why Don’t SmallScale Producers Supply French Bean Export Markets in Kenya?. Major Professor:
Steven Y. Wu.
In this dissertation, I explore some of the issues which could explain why smallscale producers do not supply French bean export markets in Kenya. The main
result from these essays is that Kenya’s French bean market has structural features
- including imperfect contract enforcement and partner search frictions - which may
deter small-scale producers from participating in the market.
In the first essay, I examine the role of imperfect contract enforcement as a barrier to entering the market and potential explanation for exit decisions. I find that
imperfect contract enforcement deters entry, complicates exit, and reduces land allocation on the intensive margin. I also find that cost factors do not deter market
participation, but help sort entrants into different market segments.
In the second essay, I examine the role that partner search frictions play in conjunction with imperfect contract enforcement to serve as a barrier to entry and potential
explanation for exit decisions. I find that search frictions are present in the market
which primarily limit farmers’ abilities to match with potential buyers and not vice
versa. I also find that search frictions are a potential barrier to entry for the fresh
submarket and may be a factor in farmers’ exit decisions from the processed market.
Lastly, I find that search frictions are a potential barrier to market in areas where
buyers are more reliable on average, suggesting that there may be a trade-off for
policymakers depending on whether they design an intervention to target contract
enforcement or search frictions.

xii
The results are relevant for policy-makers who want to improve on existing programs to connect small-scale producers to French bean export markets in Kenya.
This dissertation also makes several methodological contributions to the empirical
contract and search literatures. First, I introduce a choice experiment design that is
capable of assessing the effects of imperfect contract enforcement on the intensive and
extensive production margins, and also of assessing the degree of imperfect contract
in a market. Second, I demonstrate the efficacy of a geographically-nearest neighbor
algorithm, which has low data requirements to implement and ensures that matched
pairs experience similar market conditions. Third, I introduce a novel method for
measuring search frictions based on variations in the local spatial density of firms
and farmers in the market. These contributions should be helpful for research on
the design, adoption, and use of contracts in a variety of intra- and inter-firm applications where it is otherwise challenging to disentangle the effects of unobservable
heterogeneity and endogenous matching of agents to contracts.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Why don’t small-scale farmers in Kenya grow for horticultural export markets?
Approximately 75% of the Kenyan workforce are farmers, of which the majority are
small-scale, subsistence producers. Yet estimates from Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture suggest that just 200,000 small-scale producers grow fresh fruits or vegetables,
and only 80,000 participate in export supply chains [Mithofer et al., 2008]. Other
estimates suggest that the number of small-scale producers who participate in export
markets is even less - on the order of 12,000-16,000 [Asfaw et al., 2010].
This mystery is particularly troublesome for the French bean export market. In
Kenya, French beans are one of the principal agricultural export crops. They are
exported as both fresh and processed beans. They have a short maturation period,
and are grown using low capital, labor-intensive means. These characteristics often
fit well with the needs and capabilities of small-holder farmers.
French bean farming for export markets has been shown to be a profitable enterprise for poor, small-scale producers in Senegal [Maertens and Swinnen, 2009] and
Madagascar [Minten et al., 2009]. French bean farming has even been shown to be a
profitable enterprise for small-scale producers in Kenya. Farmers who adopted French
bean production under a marketing program targeted at small-holder producers saw a
33% boost in income compared to the control group who received no program services
[Ashraf et al., 2009].
Historically, small holders used to supply the majority of Kenya’s French bean exports. Since the 1990’s, they have steadily lost market share as exporters have shifted
to sourcing from mostly larger-scale and vertically integrated enterprises [Dolan and
Humphrey, 2004]. Small-holders share of the market had decreased to 50% of the
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French bean market by 2004 [Ashraf et al., 2006] and further decreased after the
EurepGAP requirements came into effect in 2005 [Ashraf et al., 2009].
Requirements for export quality French beans have changed substantially since
the 1990s. A myriad of private, public, and voluntary standards - such as EurepGAP,
GlobalGAP, British Retail Consortium, Ecocert, Mark & Spenser’s Field to Fork,
Tesco’s Natures Choice, etc. - have been developed to limit the quality of exported
horticultural products along various different credence dimensions in order to meet
consumers’ changing preferences for food safety, environmental quality, farmworker
treatment, and other social welfare objectives. “The common trends in these public
and private standards are three-fold: controls over processes rather than products, the
maintenance of identity and traceability, and a whole chain approach.” [Humphrey,
2006, p. 577].
As quality standards have changed, exporters have placed increasing weight on
formal supply contracts with outgrowers and farmer cooperatives to ensure that the
farmers use production processes that meet these new standards and guarantee produce traceability. In the interest of promoting all horticultural export crops, the
Kenyan government enacted laws to reinforce this trend. Today, Kenyan law requires
a written contract for all horticultural outgrower programs, and the contract must be
registered with the regulatory authority.1 Enforcement of these contracts is, however,
imperfect and a signed contract between an exporter and a farmer is not a perfect
guarantee for either party that a trade will occur at harvest time or at the price
specified in the contract.
In this dissertation, I explore two issues around French bean contracting which
could impact its attractiveness to potential French bean producers. In the first essay,
I look at the role of imperfect contract enforcement as a potential barrier to entering
the market and motivation for exit. In the second essay, I examine how partner search
frictions interact with imperfect contract enforcement to impact farmers’ likelihoods
of receiving contract offers, farmers’ reservation prices for contracting, and actual
1

The border of registering contracts falls on the exporting firms. However, agents of the Kenyan
regulatory authority report that they are often involved in the negotiation of the contracts as well.
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prices transacted in the market. In both essays, I find that the structural features of
Kenya’s French bean market - including imperfect contract enforcement and partner
search frictions - are potential explanations for why small-scale producers are deterred
from participating in this market.
The data for these essays comes from a 2013 survey that I designed and conducted with support from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
(CIMMYT) in Nairobi, Kenya; Kenya’s Horticultural Crop Development Authority;
the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture, and the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute
(KARI). The survey sampled matching pairs of contracted and non-contracted farmers in a case-control design [Schlesselman and Stolley, 1982]. Matched sampling is
a technique commonly used in epidemiology and evaluation of medical programs to
reduce the influence of confounding factors and improve the statistical power of the
design [Rubin, 2006, Rose and van der Laan, 2008].
The survey included instruments to measure household characteristics, food security, social capital, farm assets, production efficiency, marketing decisions, French
bean market perceptions, contract preferences, and contracting experience. In each
essay, I test for systematic differences across pairs in their responses to one or more
of these instruments. If pairs do systematically differ in their responses, then that
difference identifies a potential explanation for why some farmers do not participate
in the market. If pairs do not systematically differ, then I can conclude that the issue
could not have impacted farmers’ decisions to participate in the market.
This dissertation makes several methodological contributions to the empirical contract and search literatures. First, I introduce a choice experiment design that is capable of assessing the effects of imperfect contract enforcement on the intensive and
extensive production margins, and also of assessing the degree of imperfect contract
in a market. Second, I demonstrate the efficacy of a geographically-nearest neighbor
algorithm, which has low data requirements to implement and ensures that matched
pairs experience similar market conditions. Third, I introduce a novel method for
measuring search frictions based on variations in the local spatial density of firms
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and farmers in the market. These contributions should be helpful for research on
the design, adoption, and use of contracts in a variety of intra- and inter-firm applications where it is otherwise challenging to disentangle the effects of unobservable
heterogeneity and endogenous matching of agents to contracts.
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CHAPTER 2. DOES CONTRACT ENFORCEABILITY ACT AS A BARRIER
TO ADOPTING FRENCH BEAN PRODUCTION IN KENYA?

2.1 Introduction
Why do relatively few smallholder farmers produce for Kenya’s French bean export
industry? French beans are one of Kenya’s principal export crops. They have a
short maturation period, and are grown using low capital, labor-intensive means.
These characteristics often fit well with the needs and capabilities of small-holder
farmers. French bean farming for export markets has been shown to be a profitable
enterprise for poor, small-scale producers in Senegal [Maertens and Swinnen, 2009]
and Madagascar [Minten et al., 2009]. French bean farming has even been shown to be
a profitable enterprise for small-scale producers in Kenya. Small-holder farmers who
adopted French bean production under a targeting marketing program saw a 33%
boost in income compared to the control group who received no program services
[Ashraf et al., 2009].
In Kenya, French beans are produced solely through contracted outgrower operations. Only contracted farmers produce French beans, and these beans are produced
solely for export markets. Farmers without contracts grow alternative crops such as
tomatoes, bananas, or maize. There is limited domestic demand for French beans.
Previous studies have shown that few Kenyan households in the capital purchase
French beans for consumption [SNV, 2012]. Experts from the Ministry of Agriculture
and Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA) report that few households
outside the capital consume French beans, and that the majority of French beans
available for sale in traditional markets and supermarkets were originally produced
for the export market. Thus the farmers’ decisions to participate in this market are
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crucially linked with their ability and willingness to produce under contract with
export buyers.
Previous research [Dolan and Humphrey, 2004, Mithofer et al., 2008, Ashraf et al.,
2009, Asfaw et al., 2010] has suggested a variety of potential barriers to participating in this market, meaning exogenous factors that may be deterring farmers from
entering or remaining in the market. Some of the barriers suggested include factors
that would affect farmers’ costs of producing French beans, such as lack of irrigation
or lack of access to credit. Other suggested barriers focus on the transactions costs
for marketing French beans, including the cost of export certification, unreliable contracts, and lack of information on market prices. These factors can influence farmers’
expectations about the profitability of entering the market. They can also disadvantage small-holders when competing against other larger scale suppliers in the market
over the long term [Dolan and Humphrey, 2000].
As yet, the literature has not reached a consensus on the exact combination of
problems that deters small-scale producers from entering this market. Without knowing the correct causal barriers to market participation, policymakers may find it difficult to design cost efficient and effective programs to support farmers. For example,
programs to expand agricultural output in developing countries often include subsidized credit in the bundle of services offered. However, evidence from Kenya [Ashraf
et al., 2009] and Ghana [Karlan et al., 2014] shows that liquidity constraints may not
always be a limit on agricultural production, even for very poor households.
Because contracts should be endogenously designed in response to barriers to
market participation, we can look to the choice of who has contracts and how those
contracts are structured to inform us about these barriers. For example, theory predicts that markets with imperfect contract enforcement may have different patterns
of trading [MacLeod, 2007] and/or different degrees of vertical integration [Klein
and Murphy, 1988] compared with markets where contracts are perfectly enforceable.
Thus imperfect contract enforcement can impact the decisions of both firms offering
contracts and farmers receiving offers, potentially affecting which farmers receive con-
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tract offers, the types of contracts offered, and/or farmers’ preferences over the offers
they receive.
Unfortunately, the empirical literature on contract theory is sparse, with little
guidance as to what methodology to use to test for causal barriers to contracting.
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard approach for measuring
the real-world effects of a known cause. However in settings like this when multiple
theories seem to fit the existing evidence, it may be costly and time consuming to
use RCTs to eliminate incorrect theories and identify the correct causal mechanism
relevant for policy making. This is particularly true for RCTs conducted as part
of program evaluations, where a program may impact multiple causal mechanisms
simultaneously and little data may be available before the evaluation to help isolate
the most promising causal mechanisms to test (for examples see [Barrett and Carter,
2010]).
Because contracts involve decisions made by two parties, it is challenging to empirically identify causes for why some farmers have contracts and others do not. In
this paper, we will consider the simplest possible case: a barrier to contracting affects
only a farmers’ willingness to accept the contract offers they receive and makes them
less likely to accept any contract offered. This scenario is analogous to the problem of
identifying barriers to adopting a technology. We observe two populations: one group
who have adopted the technology (i.e. accepted a contract), and one group who have
not adopted the technology (either not offered any contract or rejected all contract
offers). Just as in a standard technology adoption problem there is a potential for
externalities across the population of adopters as one farmer’s experience contracting may influence another’s beliefs about adopting contract farming. Conditional on
both groups making choices over the same set of alternatives, a factor is a barrier to
adopting the technology if that factor makes one group less likely to adopt than the
other group.
There are many standard methods used in the literature for studying barriers to
technology adoption, which differ principally in how they model the selection process
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and counterfactual scenarios which lead one group to adopt the technology while the
other does not. In this study, we introduce a new approach that combines three
commonly-used empirical techniques which have not been previously employed together to study problems of technology adoption. The combination of these techniques
allow us to observe individuals’ selection decisions under a variety of controlled counterfactuals, which gives clear identification of the effect of causal factors on adoption
decisions, and to link differences in these decisions to observed differences in adoption
status.
Our approach relies on a case-control design, a technique common in the medical
and epidemiological literatures. We recruit matched pairs of farmers, one adopter
and one non-adopter, using the geographically closest neighbors available to ensure
that pairs have similar market access and farming conditions. Our matching strategy
uses only geographic proximity to select matches, ensuring that pairs are similar on
dimensions unrelated to the contracting problem while allowing for differences that
arise endogenously in a dynamic contracting problem. We then administer the same
choice experiment to both subjects. The choice experiment measures farmers’ preferences to adopt contracts for the full set of contracts used in the market. Assuming
that barriers to market participation only impact farmers’ preferences and not the
contract offers they receive1 , then differences in preferences across matched pairs reveals whether or not a factor could be causing differences in observed contract status.
Our approach cannot positively determine that a factor is causing the observed differences in adoption decisions. It can, however, be used to screen potential barriers by
identifying likely factors for future testing using field experiments or RCTs, and ruling
out factors which cannot be causing differences in adoption patterns under the maintained assumption. We anticipate this approach could be useful before conducting
an RCT to reduce the likelihood of null experimental findings, and/or after program
evaluations to identify the specific mechanisms impacted by the intervention.
1

To test for barriers to adoption which can impact both the firm’s and farmer’s decision-making
requires additional analysis which we reserve for future work.
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Using this approach, we test whether imperfect contract enforcement acts as a
barrier to participation in this market. We also test whether factors that cause
aggregate differences in cost functions can explain farmers’ lack of participation. We
focus on these two issues because previous research has implied that differences in cost
functions are not likely to explain farmers’ lack of participation [Ashraf et al., 2006,
2009], but that imperfect contract enforcement might [Okello and Swinton, 2007]. We
also use the outcomes from two interventions that have already been implemented to
encourage small-scale producers to participate in this market to validate the results of
our study. We examine the effects of contract enforcement and aggregate differences
in cost functions on farmers’ decision to accept a contract, which we will refer to as
the extensive production margin, as well as the amount of land allocated to French
bean production under contract, which we will define as the intensive production
margin.
Summary of findings. We find that farmers with and without contracts differ
in how they value buyer reliability (a proxy for exogenous contract enforceability).
For exports of fresh beans, these preferences impact the extensive supply margin by
deterring entry or sparking exit from the market, and reduce the amount of land
allocated to French bean production on the intensive margin. Although these populations do have some underlying heterogeneity in their costs to provide high quality
French beans, this heterogeneity does not impact the overall decision to enter into
export markets. Instead, differences in cost functions help determine whether the
farmer enters into the fresh or the processed export market. These findings parallel
the outcomes of development interventions conducted in these markets.
Key contributions. The key contributions of this study are:
1. Introduce a new approach to rule out barriers to technology adoption, using
the case-control method familiar to the medical research literature but rarely
applied in the social sciences;
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2. Present a choice experiment design for assessing the effects of imperfect contract
enforcement which is theoretically consistent and capable of measuring impacts
to both intensive and extensive production margins; and
3. Demonstrate the efficacy of a geographically-nearest neighbor algorithm, which
has low data requirements to implement and ensures that matched pairs experience similar market conditions.
Related literature. There is a long tradition of using case-control studies in the
medical and epidemiology literatures [Schlesselman and Stolley, 1982], although this
methodology alone is not sufficient to establish a positive causal link between an observed effect and a postulated cause [Rubin, 2006]. There is a more recent literature
[Imai et al., 2011, 2013] on establishing positive causality in experimental and observations studies by focusing on specific causal mechanisms or pathways. To the best
of our knowledge, this study is the first to combine these approaches in a protocol to
screen for causality.
Our work complements the growing body of research that estimates the benefits
of contract farming on participants [Neven et al., 2009, Maertens and Swinnen, 2009,
Bellemare, 2012, Michelson, 2013, Narayanan, 2014]. They find welfare gains for
adopters compared to farmers who do not adopt contract farming, as well as gains
compared to day-laborers engaged in the same supply chain. Our study differs from
these in that we seek to understand what conditions are necessary for farmers to
believe would they benefit from adopting contract farming, and whether differences
in these beliefs can explain why only some farmers choose to adopt.
Finally, our work contributes to the very small body of empirical literature on
contract enforcement. Although there is a large theoretical literature on relational
contracting and reputations, as yet there have been few empirical studies published
(see discussion in [Lafontaine and Slade, 2013]). However, a number of case studies
have suggested that imperfect enforcement of contracts may adversely impact farmer
participation and profitability for a wide variety of developing countries and com-
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modities [Barrett et al., 2012]. Additionally, laboratory experiments [Brown et al.,
2004, Wu and Roe, 2007] confirm that the degree of external enforcement of contracts
has a large impact on the welfare of the parties involved.
We are aware of only two other papers which specifically test for the impact of contract enforcement on the intensive margin of supply: a field experiment conducted in
Vietnam [Saenger et al., 2014] and a choice experiment conducted in Thailand [Schipmann and Qaim, 2011]. Both of these studies found that lack of exogenous contract
enforcement mechanisms impacted the intensive supply margins for these two markets. Farmers prefer to supply to trusted buyers, and trust is improved through
introducing third-party verification of quality. Our choice experiment design differs
from that of Schipmann and Qaim in that we calibrate our design to correspond
to standard theories of relational contracting under imperfect contract enforcement,
and measure the effect of relational contracting compared to both perfect enforcement and no enforcement cases. Additionally, the Schipmann and Qaim and Saenger
et al. studies considered the impact of contract enforcement on only the intensive
production margin. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that looks at the impact
of contract enforcement on both the intensive and extensive margins of production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on
Kenya’s French bean market. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the theory and
evidence on how contract enforcement impacts the intensive and extensive margins
of production. Section 4 describes our methodology, including the use of matching
to assemble the case-control pairs, the design of our choice experiment, and our
econometric estimation strategy. Section 5 describes our data, and section 6 presents
our results. Section 7 presents a series of robustness checks. Section 8 compares our
findings with benchmark development interventions conducted in this market. We
conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of this study.
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Table 2.1. French Bean Acreage For Top 10 Producing Counties
2010-2012 (source: HCDA figures)
County
Kirinyaga
Murang’a
Machakos
Meru
Nyeri
Laikipia
Narok
Kiambu
Kajiado
Embu
Total

Ha
1968.00
381.00
480.00
112.00
179.00
235.00
120.00

2010
Qty (MT)
26216.00
2336.00
1324.00
710.00
740.00
2850.00
480.00

Ha
2029.00
760.00
279.00
395.00
141.00
244.00
74.00

2011
Qty (MT)
27325.00
2557.00
993.00
3339.00
610.00
2434.00
296.00

127.00
4388

280.00
36108

120.00
4797

360.00
38946

Ha
1857.10
627.10
340.40
311.00
212.50
202.00
147.50
131.50
88.00
71.00
4126.1

2012
Qty (MT)
10965.00
18944.60
2303.80
2905.00
791.00
1796.00
1723.80
2284.30
587.50
804.00
44137.3

2.2 Background on Kenya’s French Bean Market

2.2.1 Market Structure
French beans (Phaseolus vulgaris) - also known as green beans, snap beans, or
haricot verts - have been one of Kenyas major horticultural export crops for several decades. French beans are produced in many regions of Kenya (see Table 2.1),
although the majority of acreage comes from Kirinyaga County. They are one of
Kenya’s most important agricultural export crops by value. Table (2.2) shows FAOSTAT figures for the volume and values of French beans exported from 2004-2011, as
well as how French bean exports ranked by value compared to all other agricultural
exports.
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Table 2.2. French Bean Exports from Kenya 2004-2011 (from FAOSTAT)
Year
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004

Quantity
(tons)
37,517
18,935
12,447
15,371
15,635
18,949
31,734
32,578

Value
(1000 USD)
132,983
55,843
34,403
42,347
50,193
58,707
85,623
85,238

Rank by Value Among
All Kenyan Agricultural Exports
3
6
9
9
6
5
4
3

French beans are exported as either packaged fresh produce or as processed (frozen
or canned) beans. Horticultural Crop Development Authority2 (HCDA) records show
84 different firms exported at least one shipment in 2012. The processed submarket is
composed of a single firm, Frigoken. All other firms export fresh beans. Nonetheless,
processed bean shipments make up a significant fraction of total exports, approximately 13% of total volume exported in 2012, and 12% in 2011. Although the fresh
submarket is composed of a large number of exporting firms, it is highly concentrated.
In 2001, the leading three firms controlled 51% of export volumes and the top ten
firms controlled 95% of the market [Jaffee, 2003].
Aside from the export market, there is limited domestic demand for French beans,
most of which comes from domestic supermarket chains operating in major urban centers. Previous studies have shown that few Kenyan households in the capital purchase
French beans for consumption [SNV, 2012]. Conversations with experts from the Ministry of Agriculture and Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA) suggest
that outside of the capital, few households consume French beans, and that the majority of French beans available for sale in traditional markets and supermarkets were
originally intended for the export market.
2

The Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA) is the government agency charged with
promoting and regulating Kenya’s horticultural export industries.
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In Kenya, small holders typically farm less than 5 acres. Medium-scale producers
farm between 5 and 10 acres, and a large-scale producer is a farmer cultivating 10 acres
or more. Interviews with exporters in 2001 revealed that Kenyan exporters sourced
largely from large-scale farms (42%), their own farms or leased land (40%), and
the rest from smallholder producers (18%) [Dolan and Humphrey, 2000]. However,
Frigoken, the sole firm which exports processed French beans, sources only from
small-scale producers.
Suppliers of supermarkets do not usually overlap with export markets, with the
exception of high-value commodities like French beans and avocados. Supermarkets
usually source their highest volume produce (kale, tomatoes, and bananas) largely
from farms located within a 100km region around Nairobi. The farms that supply
this produce are typically 9 -18 hectares on average, irrigate a large portion of their
crop, and 90% own some type of motorized transportation [Neven et al., 2009].

2.2.2 Use of Contracts
By Kenyan law, exporters are required to have a written contract with each farmer
or group of farmers that they use to source horticultural produce. Contract terms
must include price, quantity, and quality specifications, and typically include provisions for contract renewal, termination, and dispute resolution. Quality specifications
usually establish grades for delivered beans based on length, size, and appearance.
Quality specifications also typically require specific production practices such as
schedules for planting, chemical application, and harvesting; which seed varietals may
be planted and types or brands of chemicals applied; and sometimes approved vendors for seeds and inputs. There are multiple varieties approved by the Kenya Plant
Health Inspectorate Service with differing growth cycles and mature bean characteristics. Varieties which are preferred for fresh exports are generally not preferred for
processing [Ashraf et al., 2009], and some exporters have sole rights to use certain
approved varieties.
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Farmers typically retain ownership of the French beans until they have passed
an exporter’s quality grading assessment. The costs of any inputs provided by the
exporter - such as credit, chemicals, and/or proprietary seeds - are deducted from the
final price paid to the farmer for delivered shipments. The farmer’s main production
costs stem from soil preparation, planting, weeding, irrigation, and harvesting.
In Kirinyaga county, farmers often hire additional labor to complete these tasks.
This additional labor is usually at the farmers’ own cost, although some exporters
provide credit explicitly to help their farmers manage cash flow during harvesting.
Laborers are paid at the end of the day, while the contracted farmer receives payment
for delivered beans two to four weeks after harvest. According to extension agents for
the Ministry of Agriculture, the key factors which separate export quality beans from
non-export quality are skillful plant spacing, pest monitoring and correct pesticide
applications, and harvesting and quality control of harvested beans.
Domestic price data is not collected for French beans. Experts at the HCDA
estimate that the market price for export-quality French beans in Nairobi fluctuates
throughout the year from around 80 Kenyan Shillings (Ksh)/kg to upwards of 120
Ksh/kg. Most contracts with outgrowers fix prices for the duration of the contract.
Contracts registered with HCDA in Kirinyaga County and signed between October
2012 and August 2013 included fixed prices of 30 Ksh/kg for the processed submarket,
and ranging from to 45-70 Ksh/kg for fresh submarket buyers.
Although the fresh and processed submarkets are nominally one market, with
farmers free to switch between them, the strong preference between varietals appropriate for canning and varietals appropriate for fresh exports effectively segments the
market. The processing firm has greater latitude to set prices for contracts in the
processing market than any of the firms which buy for the fresh market. According to interviews with representatives from Frigoken and the Ministry of Agriculture,
the firm targets prices for the processing market near the minimum average cost for
French beans in this region.
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According to HCDA records for Kirinyaga county, all contracts with Frigoken are
identical in terms of prices, production and quality requirements, and enforcement
provisions. In the fresh submarket, however, contracts vary by exporting firm but do
not vary substantially across the suppliers for any given firm. Quality requirements
for delivered beans, as recorded in the written contracts, did not differ across the set
of suppliers for any given buyer.
The most common difference within any given exporting firm’s set of contracts
was the delivery location. Most suppliers (for all buyers) delivered to local collection points near their farm. A small number of suppliers were contracted to deliver
their beans to more remote locations; prices in these contracts included a 5 Ksh/kg
premium to cover transportation costs.
Although the HCDA has taken steps to improve contract enforcement after 2012,
contracts are still imperfectly enforced. A Kenyan extension officer reports:
Prior to planting, an exporter and farmers agree on a specific price and
volume of beans. When the crop is in flower stage, it [the exporter] sends
a verbal message through its truck loader to farmers that the price will
be lower because the “market is bad.” At harvest, the exporter sends
another message with even lower price. At this time, the green beans
must be picked and sold, hence farmers have no choice but to take the
price. If they dispute the price offered, the exporter leaves the area and
goes to buy in another region. I see this often during peak production
season when there are plenty of beans. [Okello and Swinton, 2007, p. 279]
Price modifications also sometimes occur indirectly through “rejections”. Because
quality is not independently verified at time of delivery, exporters have discretion to
adjust the share of a shipment which is deemed to be high quality so as to reduce the
total payment to the farmers. This has been identified as a source of friction between
exporters and small-scale suppliers of pineapples in Ghana [Suzuki et al., 2011]. Other
tactics used by exporters which reduce the farmers’ realized total compensation from
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the contract included reporting shipments as underweight, and delaying or refusing
to provide payments for delivered produce.

2.3 Theory
In this section, we present the theory for how causal mechanisms can reveal barriers to adopting a technology, and review the theoretical connection between contract
enforcement and supply preferences.

2.3.1 Causality Model for Technology Adoption and Contract Farming

2.3.1.1 Identification of Barriers to Contract Adoption

Figure 2.1. Events Required for Contracting

As in any technology adoption problem, a farmer must prefer adopting contract
farming over not adopting in order to have the observed outcome of having a contract.
According to standard contract theory, the minimum set of events that must have
occurred was that someone offered the farmer a contract, that the contract fit within
the set of contracts that farmer was willing to accept, and that the farmer accepted
it (see Figure 2.3.1.1). A force acts as a barrier to adoption if it changes any event
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in the minimum set of events necessary to contract such that farmers’ are less likely
to contract.
For example, suppose imperfect contract enforcement is a barrier to adopting
contract farming and that it impacts both the set of contracts farmers’ are willing to
accept and the types of contract offers farmers receive. Impacts to the sets of contracts
that a farmer is willing to accept includes both preferences over contract enforcement
and preferences over how contracts are endogenously structured in response to imperfect contract enforcement. Here, we are focused on impacts in a comparative static
sense. In other words, we consider heterogeneity in farmers’ willingness to accept
contracts across a population caused by imperfect contract enforcement, holding an
individual farmer’s willingness to contract over time stable.

3

We could identify the effect of imperfect contract enforcement experimentally by
randomly dividing a population of farmers into two groups: a treated group that has
their contracts perfectly enforced within the experiment, and a control group that has
no change to their contract enforcement regime from the experiment. Provided the
contracts are not perfectly enforced for the control group, we would be able to observe
the impact of contract enforcement across the treatment and control groups in three
ways. First, we would see a higher share of contracted farmers in the treatment group
than in the control group. Second, we would observe a different set of contracts offered
to both groups. Third, if we measured the range of contracts that farmers in both
groups would be willing to accept, we would observe that farmers in the treatment
group would be willing to accept a broader range of contracts than the farmers in the
control group. This is because the imperfectly enforced contracts have an additional
source of risk that doesn’t occur when contracts are perfectly enforced.
Observing different contract sets offered and/or different ranges of acceptable
contracts across the treated and control groups is a necessary condition for observing
3

Whether an individual’s preferences are stable or evolve is a matter of ongoing investigation [Stigler
and Becker, 1977, San Miguel et al., 2002, Caplan, 2003, Brandts and Charness, 2000, Andersen et al.,
2008]. Our research design does not allow us to identify changes in individuals’ preferences over time,
so we treat preferences as fixed for individuals for our analysis.
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different shares of contracted farmers in the treatment and control groups. If contract
enforcement wasn’t a barrier to adopting contracts, then we would still observe differences in contract sets offered and/or ranges of acceptable contracts but we wouldn’t
observe differences in share the contracted farmers across the treatment and control
groups. As long as there are differences in the shares of farmers contracting between
the treatment and control groups, then we know that contract enforcement must
have changed either the set of contracts offered or the set of contracts farmers were
willing to accept, or both. The sets of contracts offered and preferences over those
sets of contracts serve as the two mechanisms that transmit the effect of contract
enforcement on observed contract status.
Now consider the reverse problem. Suppose we observe a group of farmers with
contracts and a group of farmers without a contract. The farmers without contracts,
we observe only that they don’t have a contract. They may not have contracts
because:
1. They were not offered any contract.
2. They were not offered the same set of contracts as the individuals in the contracted group.
3. They were not offered any contract that they were willing to accept.
4. Some combination of the above.
We need to know something about which of these cases occurred and also what
caused that case (e.g. they received different sets of contract offers because of differing levels of imperfect contract enforcement). The state of having no contract does
not provide enough information to distinguish between these potential underlying
differences. This is a problem of reverse causal inference, or “the search for causes of
effects” [Gelman and Imbens, 2013, p. 2]. However, we know that if contract enforcement is a barrier to adopting contracts, then on average there must be differences
in either the set of contracts offered to both groups and/or the set of contracts the
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groups were willing to accept. If we observe systematic differences in either of these
mechanisms between the groups, and the differences in mechanisms are consistent
with an effect caused by imperfect contract enforcement, then we can begin to say
something about whether imperfect contract enforcement is acting as a barrier to
adopting contract farming in this context.

2.3.1.2 Causal Model for Technology Adoption and Contracting
Figure (2.3.1.2) summarizes the causality process for adopting contract farming.
This is a model of technology adoption framed in the contracting context. In this
model, a treatment is an exogenous force that could impact a farmer’s decision to
adopt contract farming such as a production technology, information about prices,
certification, contract enforcement, etc. A barrier to market participation is therefore
a treatment that acts to deter farmers from entering the market or from remaining
in the market over time.
We assume barriers to contracting have no direct connection on a farmer’s contracted status. Instead, barriers act through two indirect causal mechanisms:4 the set
of contracts available to the farmer and the set of contracts that a farmer is willing
to accept.

4

A causal mechanism is a “process through which the effect of a treatment on an outcome comes
about.” [Imai et al., 2013, page 5]. This can include direct effects and intermediate effects, where the
impact of the treatment is transmitted to the outcome measure through one or more intermediary
steps[2011].
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Figure 2.2. Casuality Model of Adopting a Technology
Adapted from Figure 1 in [Imai et al., 2013].

Assumption 1:

Barriers to market participation cannot directly impact

a farmer’s observed contracted status, but only operate through changes
in the events necessary for contracting.
To see why this should be the case, consider a hypothetical experiment where some
farmers are exogenously certified as high quality French bean producers. The act of
being certified would not directly cause the farmers to have contracts per se, but it
might change the set of contracts offered to the farmers and/or the set of contracts
the farmer was willing to accept. It is the combination of these changes which causes
the farmers to have a different contracted status than they would have without the
exogenous certification.
Studying the effect of forces through different causal mechanisms is particularly
helpful for program evaluations. Consider the four possible outcomes from this hypothetical experiment summarized in Figure (2.3.1.2). For the evaluation to show a null
result (i.e. no treatment effect), this must mean the treated and untreated farmers
do not differ for either mechanism. This is shown in the left panel of the figure. If the
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evaluation shows a treatment effect, meaning there are average differences in contract
status caused by average differences in exogenous certification, this can happen in
one of three ways: by changing which contracts are acceptable to farmers, changing
the set of contracts available, or changing both. Differentiating between these cases is
vital for generalizing the program to different locations. A program that only affects
the sets of contracts that farmers are willing to accept may not reduce barriers to
market participation in an area where the key problem is in the sets of contracts
available.

Figure 2.3. Causality Model with Experimental Treatment
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For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that a barrier to contracting only
acts to change the sets of contracts that farmers are willing to accept.
Assumption 2: Barriers to market participation operate only by reducing
the set of contracts farmers are willing to accept.
Assumption 2 is a strong assumption and implies that all farmers select from a
common set of contracts. In practice, the sets of contracts offered to farmers’ varies
greatly across our sample. For this paper, however, we consider only this simple
case to identify barriers that may cause problems for farmers without taking into
consideration issues of endogenous matching and contract design5 .
We consider two possible barriers to market participation which are consistent
with previous empirical literature: an exogenous force that changes farmers’ cost
functions, and an exogenous force that changes farmers’ tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement. These are changes in a comparative static sense, such as a change
of production technology or shock to input prices. We assume that each force acts
monotonically to increase the probability of adopting the technology of contract farming6 .
Assumption 3: Reducing barriers to participating in the market acts
monotonically to increase the probability of adopting contract farming.

2.3.1.3 Causal and Reverse Causal Inference

Following the notation of Imai et al. [2013], let t be a binary treatment. Each
farmer i has a particular realization of t as either Ti = 1 if she received the treatment,
or Ti = 0 if she did not. Let Y [t, mj (t)] be the binary outcome of having or not having
5

We take up the issue of endogenous matching and contract design in future work.
This is the usual “no defiers” assumption required for instrumental variables to measure a treatment
effect.
6
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a contract, where mj (t) is the set of causal mechanisms that connect the treatment
to the outcome. For any technology adoption problem, the set of causal mechanisms
consists of J ∈ {choicesets, pref erences}. Because we allow for only one causal
mechanism in this analysis, we restrict J to be the singleton J ∈ {pref erences}.
mj (t) captures how the expression of the farmer’s preferences changes with treatment t. An individual then has a value for how their preferences are expressed conditional on the treatment, either Mij (Ti = 1) or Mij (Ti = 0). Likewise, they realize
a corresponding outcome, Yi = Yi [Ti , Mij (Ti )] conditional on the treatment and the
realized expression of their preferences. The key idea here is that the treatment
alters the causal mechanism mj (t) such that expressed preferences are different for
treated and untreated farmers, and that the differences in preferences make farmers
monotonically less likely to have observed status Yi = 1.
Define Wij as the set of relevant observable and unobservable farmer characteristics
that otherwise contribute to contracted status but are independent of the treatment.
The average total effect of the treatment is then:
X
τ ≡ E{
Yi [1, Mij (1)|Wij ] − Yi [0, Mij (0)|Wij ]}

(2.1)

j

Equation (2.1) says that conditioning on all other factors that matter for contracting status, the average total effect on the outcome from the treatment is simply the
sum of the contributions via each mechanism. The set of covariates to condition on
may differ for each mechanism. As long as all covariates that matter for any mechanism are controlled for in the research design, there will be no selection bias in the
estimate of the average total effect of the treatment.
A treatment which encourages the adoption of contract farming would have a positive average total effect. A treatment which acts as a barrier to adoption of contract
farming would have a negative average total effect. Note that the effects from each
mechanism are not required to have the same sign. For example if imperfect contract
enforcement made farmers reduced the set of acceptable contract offers but also more
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likely to receive a contract offer, then the aggregate effect from both mechanisms
would determine if imperfect contract enforcement was acting as a barrier to market.
If the positive contribution from increasing the likelihood of receiving a contract offer
outweighed the negative contribution from reducing the set of acceptable contracts,
then imperfect contract enforcement would be on net encouraging contract adoption.
For a single causal mechanism, equation (2.1) simplifies to:

τ ≡ E{Yi [1, Mij (1)|Wij ] − Yi [0, Mij (0)|Wij ]}

(2.2)

Equation (2.2) is the average causal mediation effect for the mechanism j [Imai
et al., 2010]. It looks similar to the usual definition of an average treatment effect. The
crucial difference is now that Yi depends on the realized Mij (Ti ). In the absence of any
treatment, a heterogenous population of farmers may have differences in preferences
which causes them to have different likelihoods of being contracted. But in order for
a treatment to have a causal effect, the treatment must increase7 these differences
such that:

Yi [1, mj (t)] − Yi [0, mj (t)] > Yi [1, m0 ] − Yi [0, m0 ]

(2.3)

where m0 represents the expression of preferences under the no treatment scenario.
If we observe no differences in how preferences are expressed, that implies both that
the treatment had no effect, and that preferences are not a causal mechanism to
explain contract status. In potential outcome notation, this is written as:

Yi ⊥ Mij (Ti ) | Wi ∀ j ∈ J
7

(2.4)

The strict inequality in equation (2.3) is due to Assumption 3. Without assuming a monotonic
effect on adoption, the left-hand and right-hand sides of equation (2.3) would not be equal, but we
would not know a priori which side would be larger.
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For causal inference, the statistical test is:

H0 : τ = 0

(2.5)

HA : τ 6= 0

(2.6)

For reverse causal inference, however, we want to work backwards. In our study,
treatment status is unknown. Thus we cannot measure either the average total effect
or the average causal mediation effect for any mechanism. We can, however, measure
differences in the mechanism itself across the populations with and without the outcome. If we observe individuals with outcomes Yi = 1 and Yi = 0 and Mij is the same
on average for both groups, then by Equation (2.3) the treatment cannot have caused
the difference in observed status. So instead of testing for τ , we test the mechanism
directly:

H0 : E{mj (t)|Y = 1} − E{mj (t)|Y = 0} = 0

(2.7)

HA : E{mj (t)|Y = 1} − E{mj (t)|Y = 0} =
6 0

(2.8)

Although reverse causal inference can still be applied, it cannot identify what
caused the differences in how preferences are expressed. It can only assess if differences
exist in a way that is systematically related to outcomes. Thus we will only be able
to tell if farmers differ in their tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement, not what
causes those differences. When used in conjunction with an experiment or RCT,
treatment status would be known and Mij (Ti ) could be measured post-treatment.
In that situation, we would be able to separate the effects of a treatment from any
other forces that might cause differences in the sets of contracts farmers are willing
to accept.
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With reverse causal inference, the interpretation of the null and alternate hypotheses is different. If we offer farmers with and without contracts a common menu of
contracts and they express different preferences on average over those contracts, then
the treatment may have a causal impact on contract status. If we see no average
differences in preferences between farmers with and without contracts when they are
presented with the same sets of contracts, then we can rule out that treatment as a
potential explanation for the observed pattern of outcomes. In other words, if farmers
with and without contracts express the same preferences about imperfectly enforced
contracts, then imperfectly enforced contracts are not posing a barrier to market.
It is important to note that rejecting the null hypothesis does not positively determine causality. It may be the case that individuals are born with a distribution of
preferences or that some other factor is causing the distribution of preferences that
we observe. Equation (2.3) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a causal
pathway [Imai et al., 2013]. Confounding factors may impact both the mechanism
and the outcome (arrows 5 in Figure 2.3.1.2). If farmers with and without contracts
do not differ in the set of contracts they are willing to accept, then differences in
contract preferences cannot have a causal impact on contract status. If, however,
farmers with and without contracts do have differences in the sets of contracts that
they are willing to accept, then we must conduct experiments to confirm the factors
that generated the differences in preferences and that these differences in preferences
also cause differences in contracted status.
Additionally, because we are using this technique to screen for barriers, false
negatives (type II errors) can have more important implications for policy making
than false positives (type I errors). Therefore it is critical to ensure that the study
design has sufficient statistical power to detect a reasonable average difference for
these populations.
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2.3.2 Contract Enforcement and Preferences to Supply
In this study, we consider two possible barriers to market participation: an exogenous force that causes differences in cost functions and imperfect contract enforcement. It is intuitive to see how forces that cause differences in cost functions can
be a barrier to market. Higher cost producers will not find it profitable to compete
against lower cost producers in a competitive market. It is less apparent, however,
to see how imperfect contract enforcement can be a barrier to market. We present a
simple model of relational contracting to highlight how the choice to adopt contract
farming depends on the actions and beliefs of farmers as well as the firms offering the
contracts.

2.3.2.1 Environment

Consider a model of principals and agents engaged in repeat trading where all
actions are perfectly observable but types are imperfectly observed for both principals
and agents. Principals and agents are characterized by parameters η ∈ {L, H} and θ ∈
{L, H}, respectively, which are both private information and constant over time. The
share of principals and agents with type (θ, η) = {H, H} is αβ, type (θ, η) = {H, L}
is α(1 − β), type (θ, η) = {L, H} is (1 − α)β, and (θ, η) = {L, L} is (1 − α)(1 − β).
Knowledge about the distribution of types is common to all exporters and agents.
Farmers have twice differentiable, quasiconcave expected utility functions, Uθ , where
U“

U“

H

L

the high types are less risk averse than the low types: − UH‘ < − UL‘ . Exporters are
risk neutral, and have expected utility functions, Vη .
Let French bean quality be a deterministic variable under the farmer’s control,
perfectly observable to an exporter offering the contract, and defined on the interval:
qθ,η ∈ [q θ , q θ ]. The farmer has a cost function for producing quality, T Cθ (qθ,η ), which
we assume to be twice differentiable, strictly convex, and T CH (q) < T CL (q) for all
q. The exporter earns a revenue Rη (qθ,η ) for each unit of green beans purchased,
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which we assume to be twice differentiable, quasiconcave, and RH (q) > RL (q) for all
q. Exporters’ revenue is subject to random shocks caused by external events such as
exchange rate fluctuations or changes in demand from downstream firms purchasing
the good from the exporter. We assume the distribution of these shocks is stationary
over time, and that shocks impact both types of principals in exactly the same way
(direction and magnitude).
Farmers and exporters are long-lived and trade within a large, decentralized market with no search or matching frictions. An exporter can contract with a maximum
of one farmer at a time. Let pθ,η ∈ [p, p] be the strictly positive, per unit payment
offered by an exporter to the farmer to produce quality qθ,η . Assume exporters have
all the bargaining power. In the first stage of the game, the exporter offers a contract
to the farmer with price pθ,η . The farmer then accepts or rejects the contract. If the
contract is rejected, both parties receive their respective outside options, π for the
exporter and µ for the farmer. Figure (2.3.1.1) summarizes the timing of all actions
taken by both parties in this transaction.

2.3.2.2 Equilibrium Under Perfect Contract Enforcement

To begin, assume that contracts are perfectly enforceable. In this case, each
exporter type solves the problem:

max Vη = Eη [Rθ (qθ,η ) − pθ,η ] ≥ π

pθ,η ,qθ,η

s.t.

Uθ [pθ,η − T Cθ (qθ,η )] ≥ Uθ [pθ,η − T Cθ (q θ )] ≥ µ∀θ

(2.9)
(2.10)

UH [pH,η − T CH (qH,η )] ≥ UH [pL,η − T CH (qL,η )]

(2.11)

UL [pL,η − T CL (qL,η )] ≥ UL [pH,η − T CL (qH,η )]

(2.12)
(2.13)
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where Vη and Uθ are the expected utility functions for the exporter and farmer,
respectively. In equilibrium with perfectly enforceable contracts, exporters will choose
a minimum value of pθ,η to be the price which exactly induces the farmer to produce q θ
while earning no surplus above µ. Similarly, they will choose an optimal value p? that
?
induces the farmer to choose the optimal quality qθ,η
≥ q θ while still earning no net

utility above µ. Because farmer type is private information, exporters offer a menu
of contracts to attract only the type that they desire. Because they are contracting
in a large market with no search or matching frictions, all exporters design contracts
to attract only θH type farmers, with ηH type exporters offering different terms than
ηL type exporters. Variation in utility functions across agents will not matter since
the problem is fully deterministic in this environment. Type θL farmers do not find
it profitable to accept any of the contracts and do not enter the market. The share
of contracted farmers in the market is γperf ect = α.

2.3.2.3 Equilibrium Under Imperfect Contract Enforcement

When we relax the assumption of perfect contract enforcement, the exporter has
discretion to deviate from the contracted payment when the French beans are delivered. Because the farmer knows that the contracted price may not be the final price,
the farmer who agrees to a contract will be unwilling to produce q > q (inefficient at
the intensive margin). If the exporter has latitude to deliver p0 < p, then the farmer
may not be willing to enter into the contract at all, creating a hold-up situation
(inefficient at the extensive margin).
In this environment, both parties can use long-term relationships in order to induce
each other to contract and enforce incentives to provide high quality. Variations
in utility functions (i.e. risk preferences) will now a factor in determining which
contracts are offered and the share of farmers who are offered contracts. Adopting
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the notation used in Levin [2003],8 the contract design problem is now to choose a
series of transactions over time such that:

Vη,t = (1 − δ)Eη {

∞
X

δ τ −t [dτ (Rθ (qτ,θ,η ) − pτ,θ,η ) + (1 − dτ )π]} ≥ π

(2.14)

δ τ −t [dτ (pτ,θ,η − T Cθ (qτ,θ,η )) + (1 − dτ )µ]} ≥ µ

(2.15)

τ =t

Uθ,t = (1 − δ)Eθ {

∞
X
τ =t

where δ is the common discount factor, and dτ indicates a decision to cooperate
with the contract terms in each period, τ . Contract terms may be stationary or
non-stationary. For stationary contracts, the terms do not vary across periods. This
means that dτ does not depend on the past history of play, but only on expectations
about the future value of trading. For non-stationary contracts, future contract terms
depend on current and past period actions for both parties as well as expectations
about future trades.9 Shocks to exporters’ revenue functions reduce the gains from
trade for that period. In each period, both parties choose whether or not to adhere
to the contract terms such that combination of outcomes over time is better than
8

Our environment differs from the environment modeled in Levin’s paper in four key ways. First,
Levin assumes that all agents are risk neutral. Our environment includes risk-averse agents and
risk-neutral principals. Second, Levin includes risk from an imperfect correlation between effort and
output as well as risk from imperfect contract enforcement. Our environment includes risks from
imperfect contract enforcement and shocks to principals’ revenue functions, but no issues of moral
hazard. Third, Levin allows for defections from principals and agents. We assume only principals
will have discretion to defect on contracts. Fourth, Levin focuses on stationary environments and
characterizes conditions where relational contracts generate no defaulting along the equilibrium path
of contract outcomes. We allow for the possibility of defections along the equilibrium path.
9
For risk neutral principals and agents with common discount factors, Levin [2003] shows that
an optimal stationary contract which allow for transfers in either direction between players can
generate the same outcomes as optimal nonstationary contracts. Nonstationary relational contracts
have been shown to be optimal when principals cannot observe agent type [Yang, 2013, Martimort
et al., 2014], when agents cannot observe principals’ outside options [Halac, 2012], and when agents
cannot observe principals’ discount factors [Kartal, 2014].
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not contracting at all10 . Increasing the gains from trade increases the incentives for
exporters to adhere to the contract terms and for farmers to enter into long-term
relationships.
The lowest cost type farmer is still θH , but now for an additional reason. This
type has lower production costs and smaller utility discounts for contract risk. All
exporters will prefer to establish relationships with this type of farmer and offer
contract terms that provide enough surplus to incentivize participation and delivery
of high quality. However, exporters of type ηH have higher revenue functions to cover
the cost of farmers’ risk premiums. Exporters of type ηL have lower revenue functions
and no longer find it profitable to contract in this market. The share of contracted
farmers in the market will decrease to γstranger = αβ.
As farmers and exporters continue to trade with each other within a long-term
relationship, each farmer can update her beliefs about the exporter’s likelihood of deviating from the contract terms and vice versa. As exporters apply more cooperative
strategies, this allows farmers to update their assessment of the risks of contracting,
apply smaller risk premiums, and realize greater expected gains from contracting.
This will also reduce the cost of incentivizing participation for a {θH , ηL } pairing,
bringing this exporter type back into the market. Although beliefs are common
knowledge and type θL farmers also reduce their risk premiums for contracting, they
never become cost competitive with the type θH farmers. Overall, we expect to see
γstranger ≤ γrepeat ≤ γperf ect .

2.3.2.4 Suitability of the Model to Empirical Setting

Relational contracting models are well-suited to the empirical context of Kenya’s
French bean market. Kenya, like most developing countries, has poor support for
10

The least forgiving strategy, a grim trigger, would terminate the relationship after a single deviation from the contract terms. More forgiving strategies could allow for multiple deviations before
terminating the relationship.
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contract law and judicial institutions [Mina and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006]. Smallscale farmers in many developing countries tend to be “present-biased” [Deb and
Suri, 2012, Duflo et al., 2009]. This means that they tend to have low discount
factors, equivalent to high discount rates for future incomes, which tends to limit
the range of incentives that can be supported through relational contracting in these
settings. Additionally, incentives for cooperation are stronger when the harmed party
can unilaterally act to punish the defecting party, rather than relying on a third-party
to impose punishment [MacLeod, 2007]. Kenyan farmers rely on the French bean
regulatory agency to impose damages or recoup unpaid sales costs from noncompliant
buyers, which further weakens the farmers’ expected gains from relational contracting.
Furthermore, the structure of contracts used in this market is not conducive to
mitigating the effects of imperfect contract enforcement. Gray [1978] demonstrated
that reducing contract durations reduces the likelihood of renegotiation or breech in
noisy environments. Kenyan law, however, fixes contracts for horticultural crops to
have one-year durations, and most exporters include clauses to automatically renew
contracts if both parties agree. Hart and Moore [1988, 2008] showed that ex-post
opportunistic behavior and hold-up can be avoided by using flexible contracts to
constrain both parties’ expectations for future gains from trade when outcomes are
not fully contractible on an ex-ante basis. In Kirinyaga county, the vast majority of
contracts are fixed-price contracts, as opposed to a flexible mechanism like indexing
or a price floor/ceiling. Furthermore, no contracts allow for flexibility in quality
standards, specifying narrow ranges for parameters such as bean length or pesticide
residue levels, with no pre-determined mechanism for adjusting quality parameters in
response to changes from importing destinations.

2.4 Methodology
A barrier to adopting a technology can manifest through one or both of two
intermediaries: contract sets offered and preferences over those contract sets. For this
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paper, we will examine only farmers’ willingness to accept certain contracts used in the
market (arrow 6 in Figure 2.3.1.2). We employ a case-control study [Schlesselman
and Stolley, 1982], commonly used in epidemiology research, to examine whether
imperfect contract enforcement is acting as a barrier to adopting contract farming.
We match pairs of farmers with contracts (cases) and without contracts (controls),
and administer the same choice experiment to both in order to measure how farmers’
preferences and input demand for land vary in response to various contract attributes.
We look at variations in these results across matched pairs to quantify the impact of
imperfect contract enforcement on the intensive and extensive margins of production.

2.4.1 Matching Design
Case-control studies cannot positively determine causality [Rubin, 2006]. They
can be effective, however, in testing for orthogonality and ruling out potential causes.
Observed status and contract set may be orthogonal if either:
• Farmers are homogeneous with respect to their preferences over contracts, or
• Farmers are heterogeneous in their contract acceptance sets but this heterogeneity is uncorrelated with observed status.
In order to test for orthogonality of contract status and contract acceptance sets,
we must compare farmers with and without contracts who are homogeneous in any
dimensions unrelated to preference which could impact contract status. For this problem, such factors might include rainfall and climate conditions, input factor prices,
outside labor employment opportunities, prices for competing crops, etc. Because
farmers tend to repeatedly contract over multiple years in this market, we must allow
to allow for heterogeneities across farmers for anything likely to be an outcome of
a dynamic contracting process such as incomes, household assets, production assets,
savings, etc.
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Consistent with the literature on evaluation of social programs [Smith and Todd,
2005], we rely on a matching design to create homogeneous groups of cases and
controls. We deviate from this literature, however, in two key respects:
1. Instead of independently sampling the control group and matching after all
data is collected, we use matched sampling to create pairs of farmers with and
without contracts and sample only those pairs.
2. Instead of identifying matches by constructing propensity scores, we use snowball sampling to identify the closest geographic neighbor.
Matched sampling vs independent sampling with ex-post matching.
Matching is used to create a non-experimental control group to proxy for unobservable, counterfactual scenarios. In the program evaluation literature in economics,
matching is typically applied after a data set has already been assembled and subjects are matched based on their pre-treatment characteristics11 . These matches are
often defined by calculating a propensity score12 to sort the subjects into two groups
who are most alike in one (or more) dimensions.
Due to budgetary and time limitations, we were unable to randomly select a
control group large enough to offer multiple potential matches for each farmer in our
contracted group. Instead, we randomly selected a set of individuals from the group
of farmers with contracts (cases), and used matched sampling to pair them with a
specifically-chosen non-contracted farmer (controls).
Matched sampling is a technique commonly used in epidemiology and evaluation
of medical programs [Rubin, 2006]. This technique is useful to reduce the costs of data
collection by avoiding sampling individuals who would not be suitable candidates for
matching ex-post [d’Agostino, 1998]. Matched sampling can increase the efficiency
11

In order to estimate a treatment effect from a non-experimental study which is on par with
the treatment effect from a randomized, controlled experiment, it is necessary to pre-process nonexperimental treatment and control groups to be as similar as possible in their pre-treatment characteristics [Ferraro and Miranda, 2013]
12
Other matching techniques include caliper, stratification, kernel, and difference-in-differences
matching. See Smith and Todd [2005] for descriptions of these strategies.
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of the sampling design provided the criteria for matching includes the confounding
variable(s) [Rose and van der Laan, 2008]. The main drawback, however, is that data
is collected from a limited number of matching controls. Thus it is not possible to
test the sensitivity of findings to the choice of the non-contracted farmers.
Nearest-Neighbor algorithm. In the case-control literature, selection of appropriate controls varies based on the type of disease or behavior being investigated.
When occupational exposure is a suspected cause of disease, researchers look for
controls employed at the same facility. When investigating genetic causes, research
look for close family members. Because we had limited information about potential matching farmers before the survey and because our research question involves
barriers to market participation, we chose matches who were similar along a single
dimension: geographic distance. We randomly selected a set of individuals from the
group of farmers with contracts, and then used snowball sampling to identify the
geographically-nearest neighboring farmer without a contract13 .
The principal goal of a matching algorithm is to “ensure that participants and
nonparticipants are compared in the same economic environment and the same individual lifecycle position” [Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, p. 17]. By focusing on the
differences between pairs of farmers with and without contracts who are geographically close neighbors, we create matches who are reasonably similar and also minimize
the likelihood of confounding forces impacting the pair in a heterogeneous way. By
using snowball sampling, we ensure that each non-contracted farmer knows his or her
corresponding with-contract farmer. Because the farmers are known to each other,
there is a better chance that they shared information with each other prior to making
their contracting decisions and have similar minimum relevant information sets for
decision-making14 than if the pairs were complete strangers.
13

In principle, geographically-nearest neighbor matching can be applied with independent sampling
of both cases and controls. Due to time and budget constraints, we used snowball sampling instead
of independent sampling for control farmers.
14
The minimum relevant information set is the information used by the subject to make her decision
ex-ante. If researchers do not have access to this information when selecting matches, estimates of
treatment effects may be biased [Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004].
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We expect that geographically nearest neighbors will be like each other in that
they should have similar farm characteristics, are likely to have been offered similar
contracts, and have similar information about market conditions. Additionally, farmers chose their locations prior to making decisions about contracting and distances
between pairs are not altered by contracting experience. Therefore the strength of
the match is based on ex-ante characteristics even though all sampling occurs after
contracting decisions have been made.
Potential for bias from matching design. Rosenbaum and Rubin [1985] list
four possible sources of bias in a matching design: failure of the strongly ignorable
treatment assumption, incomplete matching, inexact matching, and failure to obtain
representative samples of the population. The strongly ignorable treatment assumption states that given a set of observed covariates used to construct a match, any
unobserved covariates are unrelated to treatment status and the observable covariates perfectly capture the selection process. This assumption can only be tested using
a within-study design (for examples see [Buddelmeyer and Skoufias, 2004, Ferraro and
Miranda, 2013]).
Bias from incomplete matching occurs when some treated units cannot be matched
through lack of common support over the distribution of covariates between treated
and control groups. Because all farmers with contracts have a corresponding control
farmer without a contract, this component of bias is zero by design.
Bias from inexact matching stems from poor quality matching between treated and
untreated pairs. Because our matching algorithm is designed to match on exogenous
characteristics while allowing for variation on characteristics endogenous to repeated
contracting decisions, we have potential for this type of bias and include checks for
this issue as part of our robustness checks.
Because we use snowball sampling to identify matching farmers, they do not form
a representative sample of the general population of non-contracted farmers and we
cannot establish population weights for these farmers. As a result, we cannot create
sampling weights for each pair of farmers, and report results for the sample only.
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Since the purpose of the study is to understand the differences between adopters
and non-adopters, it is less important to characterize the overall population of nonadopters and more important to capture differences for the marginal non-adopters.
Assuming that the strongly ignorable treatment assumption holds, our sample of
matching farmers without contracts should include some portion of the marginal
non-adopter population.
Calculation of test statistic. We administer the same choice experiment to
all subjects, and then compare how the estimated individual willingness-to-supply
metric differs between matched pairs. We measure the average difference as the mean
of the distribution of paired differences. If the mean of the differences is statistically
different from zero, then the preferences of farmers with contracts differ from the
preferences of farmers without contracts.

2.4.2 Design of Choice Experiment
The use of choice experiments to study individual preferences and market behavior is increasing in development economics [Bennett and Birol, 2010]. While the
foundations of this empirical approach are rooted in consumer utility theory, recent
developments have adapted this methodology to the study of producer behavior and
farmer preferences for contract attributes [Roe et al., 2001, Schulz and Tonsor, 2010,
Ortega et al., 2014, Ward et al., 2014]. Due to non-separability of consumption and
production decisions in rural farm households, it is suitable to assess producer behavior using a utility maximization framework where farmers internalize profit maximization into their own utility criteria [Useche et al., 2013]. Choice experiments are
conceptually based on Lancastrian utility theory15 ; in the present context farmers are
assumed to choose a production contract whose attributes or characteristics maximize
their economic utility.
15

Lancastrian utility theory says that a consumer derives utility not from a good itself but from set
of characteristics embodied in the good [Lancaster, 1966].
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The choice experiment presented each farmer with a series of decisions between
hypothetical contracts. We calibrate the contracts offered in the experiment to mimic
the full set of contracts used in the market. This allows us to isolate the effect
of differences in preferences on contract status separately from the effect of actual
contracts offered. Contracts in the experiment included three attributes: contract
price, required quality, and type of partner proposing the contract.
Price. Price is the constant marginal revenue for the farmer per unit of output
under a given contract. The price attribute had three levels: low, medium, and high.
We used the range of prices offered in the contracts currently used by French bean
exporters to parameterize these values. The low price was set at 30 Ksh/kg, the price
used by the processing company. The high price was set at 50 Ksh/kg, which was a
common price used in contracts with fresh market buyers. The middle price was set
at 40 Ksh/kg, the average of the low and high prices.
Quality. The quality requirement is the quality that the farmer must deliver
in order to have his/her French beans accepted by the buyer. Increasing quality
standards represent a cost to the farmer. This attribute had four levels: standard
quality, specialty quality without a bonus, specialty quality with a 10% bonus, and
specialty quality with a 20% bonus. We include bonuses only with specialty quality
in order to control for incentive compatibility constraints that impact a farmer’s
willingness to supply high quality differently than their willingness to supply low
quality.
All bonuses were incorporated into the total price shown to the farmer. So if the
contract design called for a medium price with a high bonus, the farmer saw a total
price of 48 Ksh/kg:

40 + 0.2(40) = 48
The highest total price used in the choice experiment, 60 Ksh/kg was still within
the range of prices offered in current French bean contracts.
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Standard quality was defined as “the minimum requirements for size, physical
appearance, and tenderness.” Specialty quality was defined as beans “grown from
specified seed varieties; using specified chemical inputs; following a specified schedule
of planting, harvesting and pesticide application; and which meet minimum requirements for size, physical appearance, and tenderness.” Specialty quality thus represented an additional cost burden and loss of decision-making authority above and
beyond the minimum set of cosmetic requirements generally employed in this market.
Buyer Type. The partner is the type of buyer who is offering the hypothetical
contract to the farmer. This attribute had four levels: a complete stranger, an ideal
trading partner, their current trading partner, and the most reliable partner farmers
have ever traded with. Reliability was defined in terms of instances of price renegotiations and rejected deliveries. An ideal trading partner would never renegotiate prices
or reject a delivery of the correct quality French beans. For farmers who had never
grown or sold French beans, this was interpreted as the most reliable buyer for one of
their other crops grown. The most reliable partner was the most reliable French bean
buyer out of the set of all French bean buyers farmers had personally traded with.
The perfect partner type corresponds to exogeneous perfect contract enforcement.
The complete stranger type corresponds to exogenous imperfect contract enforcement
with no history to allow for relational contracting. The current trading partner type
corresponds to exogenous imperfect contract enforcement with history that could
allow for relational contracting. The most reliable partner type corresponds to exogenous imperfect contract enforcement with relational contracting with a buyer who
employs the most cooperative trading strategy available. These two types correspond
to endogenous contract enforcement, with potentially stronger endogenous contract
enforcement under the most reliable partner type than the current trading partner
type. We expect to see farmers most willing to accept contracts from an ideal partner, least willing to accept contracts from a complete stranger, and the willingness to
accept for the other two levels falling somewhere between the two extremes.
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Table 2.3. Allocations of Subjects to Choice Experiment Blocks
Pre-assignments
Final Tally

Block A
60
58

Block B
60
64

Block C
60
58

Block D
60
60

We specified a D-optimal experimental design16 , implemented in SAS, that allowed
for the estimation of the proposed effects. Our design resulted in 35 total choice
scenarios. To reduce response fatigue, we blocked the design into 4 groups with each
farmer evaluating at most 9 choice sets. Each farmer was randomly pre-assigned to
a block as shown in Table17 (2.3).
Every farmer was presented with a series of choice scenarios, each involving two hypothetical contracts and a third, no-choice option. A sample choice scenario is shown
in Figure (2.4.2). In this example, contract A was offered by a complete stranger who
asked for standard quality and offered a price of 30 Ksh/kg (corresponding to a low
price with no bonus attached). Contract B was also offered by a complete stranger
who instead asked for specialty quality and offered a price of 55 Ksh/kg (corresponding to a high price with a low bonus included). The third option was to choose neither
contract.
After each choice set, if the farmer had selected either contract A or contract B,
he or she was also asked to specify the amount of land he or she would be willing to
allocate to French bean production under that contract. When farmers selected no
contract, the land allocation was assigned as zero. A copy of the choice experiment
instructions is included in the appendix.

16

A design maximizes D-efficiency by minimizing the variance of the parameter estimates for the
specified experimental model.
17
The final distribution of farmers to blocks differed from the initial allocation through enumerator
error.
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Figure 2.4. Example Choice Set

2.4.3 Estimation of Willingness to Accept
Because farmer preferences are assumed to be heterogeneous, a random parameters logit (RPL) model is employed that relaxes the limitations of the traditional
conditional logit by allowing random taste variation [McFadden and Train, 2000].
Under RPL, the deterministic component of Utility , Vnit , in a random utility model
takes the form of:

Vnit = β 0 xnit

(2.16)

where β 0 is a vector of random parameters, which has its own mean and variance,
representing individual preferences, and xnit is the vector of contract attributes found
in the ith alternative. Following Train [2009], the probability that farmer n chooses
alternative i from the choice set C in situation t is given by:
Z
Pnit =

exp(Vnit )
P
f (β)dβ
j exp(Vnjt )

(2.17)

where the distribution of the random parameters f (.) is pre-specified . If the
parameters are fixed at βc (non-random), the distribution collapses, i.e. f (βc ) → ∞
and f (β) = 0 otherwise [Ortega et al., 2011].
The random parameters model was estimated using the software NLOGIT 5.0.
Exploratory analysis using farmer-specific data and log-likelihood ratio tests confirmed the existence of four distinct subgroups of farmers with differing preference
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structures in our data: farmers contracted to supply the fresh market; farmers contracted to supply the processed market; farmers not currently contracted for any
market who have either exited the market or are producing without a contract; and
farmers not currently contracted who have never produced French beans. In order
to simultaneously estimate preferences for all four subgroups while accounting for
differences in the scale parameter across the various data subgroups, we estimated a
joint model with separate parameter vectors [Swait and Louviere, 1993, Scarpa et al.,
2013]. We assumed that the contract-specific parameters were random and followed
a normal distribution. For identification purposes, the price coefficient was treated
as fixed18 .
Once the parameters from the RPL model were estimated, farmer-specific estimates were obtained using the estimated parameters as a prior and using each farmer’s
observed choices to form an individual-specific posterior estimate [Train, 2009, Huber
and Train, 2001]. Each farmer’s willingness to supply or accept a contract (WTA) was
calculated as the ratio of the marginal utility of a specific attribute to the marginal
utility of income, which was proxied by the price coefficient19 :

W T An =

2βattribute,n
βprice,g

(2.18)

where n is the individual farmer and g is one of four groups: fresh market, processed market, exited, or never produced. Analysis of paired results was then conducted using STATA 12.1.

2.4.4 Estimation of Land Input Demands
For a farmer to produce French beans, he or she must use a combination of
inputs including land, labor, capital, chemical inputs, irrigation, etc. The structure
18

Assuming a fixed price coefficient also implies that the distribution to WTA is the same as the
distribution of the random non-price marginal utility [Train and Weeks, 2005].
19
Our data was effects-coded in order to avoid confounding effects between the attributes and optout coefficient. Consequently, our willingness to supply/accept estimates were multiplied by two in
our calculations.
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of the farmer’s production function (eg. Cobb-Douglas, CES, Translog) determines
the optimal combination of inputs needed to produce at minimum cost, given the
target French bean output quantity. In our theoretical model of contracting, the
farmer accepts a contract and then chooses the optimal quantity to produce for that
contract (see Figure 2.3.1.1). Thus changes in the structure of the contract that
impact the expected cost to produce or expected revenue can impact the optimal
quantity produced for that contract, and therefore the optimal share of inputs required
for production.
We estimate a reduced-form relationship between optimal input of land and contract attributes of the form:

Landnt = β0 + β1 T otalP ricent + β2 Qualitynt + β3 CurrentP artnernt +
β4 M ostReliableP artnernt + β5 P erf ectP artnernt + nt

(2.19)

where n is the individual farmer, and t is the choice set. In order to identify the
effect of each attribute on the probability of selecting each contract (equation 2.17),
we need to consider all the alternatives presented in the choice set, i. For the land
analysis, however, we use only the optimal choice (contract A, B, or none) from each
choice set. We estimate the land equation above in Stata 12.1 using GLS with random
effects and clustered errors for individual farmers.
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2.5 Data

2.5.1 Survey design and data collection
We surveyed two hundred and forty households in Kirinyaga County, Kenya between September-October 201320 . We collected data on household characteristics,
food security, social capital, farm assets, production and marketing decisions, French
bean market characteristics, and contracting experience. The choice experiment was
administered at the mid-point of the survey. The median completion time, including
the choice experiment, was 1.28 hours with 95% of households completing the survey
and choice experiment within 2.6 hours.
Households were selected into two groups: farmers with contracts and farmers
without contracts. To create a sampling frame for the with contract group, we first
assembled a list of all active French bean contracts that had been registered with either
the HCDA or the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) for Kirinyaga County. By Kenyan
law, all contracts for horticultural export crops, such as French beans, are required
to be registered annually with HCDA. The registered contracts were stratified into
contracts to supply the processed export market and contracts to supply the fresh
export market. Contracts to supply the fresh market were further stratified into
contracts with individuals and contracts with groups.
Contracts to supply the processed market were then clustered into 30 groups
by location. Only three of these clusters overlapped geographically with the areas
where farmers contracted to supply the fresh market. Because all contracts used
for the processing market were with the same buyer and identically structured across
farmers, we purposefully restricted the processed market stratum to include only these
three overlapping clusters to reduce the costs of data collection and to focus on the
population of farmers who are most likely to experience the same market conditions
20

In Kirinyaga, French beans are produced year-round. Harvesting can occur two to three months
after planting and usually lasts for a three-week period. Many farmers in this area often stagger
planting so as to have a continuous production cycle throughout the year.
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as the farmers currently contracted to supply the fresh export market. These three
clusters were then each treated as substrata.
Within each substratum, subjects were randomly selected so that the total number
of subjects in the with-contract group was 120. Table (2.4) summarizes the sampling
design and sampling weights.

Table 2.4. Survey Sampling Design
Strata
Substratum
Individuals
Fresh Market (82 contracts)
Individually contracted
68
Group contracted
338
Processed market (6000 contracts)
Cluster 1
72
Cluster 2
108
Cluster 3
1400
Total
1986

Sampled

Sampling Weight

Matching Farmers

31
55

2.19
6.15

31
55

10
12
14
122

7.2
9
100

10
8
14
118
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Selection of the no-contract group was not random. Instead, each member of
the no-contract group was purposely selected to match a specific individual in the
with-contract group. For each farmer in the with-contract group, we used snowball
sampling to identify the geographically closest neighboring farmer who was not contracted to produce French beans for either the fresh or processed market. When
multiple equidistant neighbors were available, we randomly selected one to serve as
the matching farmer. The median distance between paired farmers was 1.09 km.
Two of the farmers interviewed for the no-contract group were later discovered to
also have contracts. They and their matching treated farmers were then excluded
from the analysis, leaving 118 matched pairs.

2.5.2 Comparison of farmers with and without contracts
Table 2.5. Production Status for With-Contract and No-Contract Groups

Never Produced
Production Status Currently Producing
No Longer Producing
Total

Contract Status
With-Contract No-Contract
0
37
115
7
3
74
118
118

Table (2.5) shows the current production status for both groups. Three of the
contracted farmers were no longer producing French beans at the time of the survey.
The rest were all actively producing beans. Seven of the non-contracted farmers were
producing French beans, either in expectation of signing a contract or to supply the
local market. Of the remaining farmers in the non-contracted group, approximately
one-third had never grown French beans and the remaining two-thirds had exited the
market.
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Table 2.6. Characteristics of With-Contract and No-Contract Groups
Variables

Male (%)

With-Contract
No-Contract
(N = 118)
(N = 118)
Respondent Characteristics
57.62
43.22

Age

45.35

Education

46.44

3.19

2.57

Farming Experience (Years)

20.97

21.25

French Bean Experience (Years)

12.24

4.36

1.99

0.69

French Bean Trainings

Male Head of Household (%)

Household Characteristics
88.98

Household Size
Total Household Income
(1000 Ksh)
Value of Outstanding Loans
(1000 Ksh)
Acreage Owned

83.05

4.20

3.92

453.01

176.33

45.08

19.27

Production Characteristics
2.43

2.09

Acreage Farmed

3.88

2.33

French Bean Acres Farmed

2.90

0.144

Number of Different Crops Grown

3.47

2.94

5520.17

2206.17

1

0.746

Farm-Fixed Assets Owned
(1000 Ksh)
Irrigation

Marketing Characteristics
Distance to Year-Round Road (km)
1.26

0.93

Distance to Market (km)

4.35

4.63

Known French Bean Buyers

4.83

3.16

Mean of Paired
Differences
0.144**
(0.063)
-1.093
(1.728)
0.619***
(0.185)
-0.280
(1.644)
7.881***
(0.965)
1.297***
(0.146)
0.059*
(0.046)
0.280*
(0.204)
276.688***
(89.693)
25.810**
(12.589)
0.342
(0.303)
1.559***
(0.482)
2.76***
(0.439)
0.534***
(0.174)
3314.001*
(2172.005)
0.254***
(0.040)
0.332*
(.215)
-0.282
(0.409)
1.67***
(0.475)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

Table (2.6) shows how respondent, household, production, and marketing characteristics compare across the with-contract and no-contract groups. The results are
shown as pooled averages for each group, and as the mean of the difference across
matched households. Groups were considered to be statistically different from each
other if the mean of the difference across paired households was significantly different
from zero.
The groups do not differ in a statistically significant way with regard to the average
age of respondent, years of farming experience, or acreage owned. Farmers in the withcontract group, however, are more likely to be male, have completed more education,
have over 7 years more experience growing French beans, and have completed more
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than one additional training in French bean production compared to the no-contract
group. They devote 2.76 more acres to French bean production, on average. These
farmers are also 6% more likely to live in a male-headed household.
The with-contract group appears to have significantly higher levels of all factors
of production as compared to the no-contract group. The with-contract group has
significantly higher incomes and farm fixed assets. They also have larger sized households, larger outstanding loan balances, and a higher probability of having irrigation
available for at least one of their plots. Although the groups do not differ in the
amount of acreage owned, the with-contract group farms an additional 1.6 acres compared to the no-contract group. This implies that farmers with contracts to grow
French beans for export rent-in more land than neighbors without contracts.
Farmers with contracts for French beans also produce a greater variety of crops
than farmers without contracts. The plots for the farmers with contracts are, on average, slightly further from a year-round (well-maintained) road than the no-contract
group. However, the average distance to market calculated across all plots farmed
(including owned and rented-in) is not significantly different across both groups. Although both groups are aware of more than one buyer actively purchasing French
beans in their area in the past year, the with-contract group knows, on average, 1.5
more buyers than the no-contract group.
These data show that the farmers with and without contracts are clearly not
homogenous with regards to their knowledge, experience, use of factors of productions,
or the number of French bean buyers with whom they can interact. The individuals
in the no-contract group were selected as nearest-neighbor matches for the individuals
in the with-contract group not with the expectation that this would make the groups
homogenous in all dimensions, but with the goal of minimizing the likelihood of other
confounding factors impacting the pair in heterogeneous ways. The two groups are
equidistant from markets, with the with-contract group having a slight disadvantage
in road quality. The with-contract group has an advantage in terms of knowledge,
experience, and access to factors of production, which should reduce their costs of
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production of French beans as compared to the no-contract group. The with-contract
group is also aware of more French bean buyers than the no-contract group and
produces a more diversified range of crops. This should reduce the importance of
buyer reliability and French bean revenue in the total profit function for the withcontract group as compared to the no-contract group.

2.6 Results
In this section, we present the results for the effects of contract attributes on the
extensive production margin, both overall estimates for the population and differences
in WTA across matched pairs, and on the intensive production margin.

2.6.1 Willingness to Accept Contracts
Regression results. Table (2.7) shows the marginal effects from the random
parameters logit model. The four groups are the farmers contracted to supply the
fresh market, farmers contracted to supply the processed market, farmers not currently contracted for any market who have either exited the market or are producing
without a contract, and farmers not currently contracted who have never produced
French beans. The reference level for the quality attribute is standard quality, and is
complete stranger for the partner attribute.

Table 2.7. Coefficient Estimates from Random Parameters Logit

Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract
Total Price (including bonus)
Variance for Quality
Variance for CTP
Variance for MRTP
Variance for PP
Variance for NC

Contracted
Fresh Market Processed Market
-0.444***
-0.821***
(0.094)
(0.284)
0.832***
0.968***
(0.123)
(0.271)
1.197***
2.107***
(0.135)
(0.398)
1.419***
2.395***
(0.160)
(0.502)
0.622
-4.015***
(0.506)
(1.475)
0.091***
0.060***
(0.009)
(0.018)
0.332*
1.139***
(0.177)
(0.371)
0.262
0.735**
(0.206)
(0.330)
0.386**
1.004***
(0.168)
(0.384)
0.551***
1.409***
(0.158)
(0.386)
2.800***
4.482***
(0.392)
(1.359)

No Contract
Exited Market Never Produced
-0.516***
-0.356
(0.117)
(0.216)
1.070***
1.133***
(0.163)
(0.223)
1.404***
1.591***
(0.160)
(0.344)
1.947***
1.995***
(0.201)
(0.398)
0.431
-3.974**
(0.541)
(1.725)
0.086***
0.058***
(0.010)
(0.017)
0.501***
0.908***
(0.160)
(0.324)
0.634***
0.021
(0.179)
(0.321)
0.403*
1.027***
(0.223)
(0.377)
0.621***
0.739**
(0.184)
(0.327)
3.416***
7.881***
(0.495)
(1.988)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Coefficients estimated using a Random Parameters Logit with 4 Group Partition using 1000 Halton
Draws. Total Price coefficients were fixed for each group; all other parameters assumed to vary with
normal distributions. Panel data from 236 individuals comprising 2065 choice observations.
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All estimated beta coefficients are statistically significant except for quality for
the never produced group, the no contract option for the fresh market group, and
the no contract option for the exited group. All estimated variance coefficients are
statistically significant except for current trading partner for the fresh market and
never produced groups. For all groups, price has the expected positive sign and quality
has the expected negative sign. All groups have positive signs for all of the levels of
the partner attribute. As the reference case for each of these levels is a complete
stranger, the positive signs also match our predictions. For all groups, the order
of partner attributes is consistent with current trading partner having the smallest
positive gain on complete stranger, and perfect partner has the largest positive effect.
This ordering is consistent with our theoretical model of contracting where no contract
enforcement is less desirable than endogenous contract enforcement, and endogenous
enforcement is less desirable than exogenous enforcement.
The no contract (outside) option is the only coefficient where the marginal effect
has an inconsistent sign across all four groups. For the fresh market and exited groups,
the outside option has a positive marginal effect, although the effect is not statistically
different from zero. For the processed market and never produced groups, the outside
option has a negative, statistically significant marginal effect for both groups. This
suggests that for the farmers in the processed market and never produced groups,
their next best option is less profitable for them on average than producing for the
French bean market.
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Table 2.8. Determinants of WTA for Quality
All
(1)
2.067
(2.322)

Fresh Market
(2)
-0.487
(0.776)

Processed Market
(3)
26.96∗
(13.74)

Exited
(4)
-1.080
(1.803)

Never Entered
(5)
2.731
(9.787)

Education

1.706∗∗
(0.706)

-0.0992
(0.256)

2.624
(4.654)

-0.257
(0.558)

4.914∗
(2.633)

French Bean Experience (Years)

0.145
(0.136)

0.00566
(0.0423)

0.609
(0.576)

-0.0795
(0.129)

0
(.)

French Bean Trainings

0.00534
(0.784)

0.148
(0.255)

-4.704
(4.980)

0.147
(0.608)

-45.67
(79.27)

Male Head of Household (%)

-0.792
(3.281)

0.253
(1.295)

0.677
(18.67)

2.284
(2.199)

-20.68∗
(11.96)

Household Size

0.0829
(0.693)

0.131
(0.252)

-2.756
(3.465)

-0.0204
(0.561)

3.577
(3.125)

-0.00313∗
(0.00160)

-5.40e-04
(4.12e-04)

-0.00391
(0.00775)

-0.00282
(0.00302)

-0.00817
(0.0123)

Value of Outstanding Loans
(1000 Ksh)

0.00930
(0.0108)

-6.30e-04
(0.00282)

0.0200
(0.0612)

0.00786
(0.0153)

0.0917
(0.131)

Acreage Farmed

1.364∗∗
(0.538)

0.165
(0.251)

5.855
(8.066)

0.778∗
(0.434)

4.201
(6.337)

French Bean Acres Farmed

-1.282∗∗
(0.560)

-0.178
(0.244)

-7.723
(7.144)

1.039
(0.942)

0
(.)

0.326
(0.839)

0.336
(0.243)

3.456
(7.593)

-0.645
(0.672)

1.541
(4.093)

-1.00e-05
(6.43e-05)

-1.28e-04∗∗
(6.30e-05)

9.07e-05
(2.97e-04)

-8.65e-04∗∗
(4.10e-04)

-0.00228
(0.00398)

-8.527∗∗
(3.339)

0
(.)

0
(.)

1.487
(1.991)

-8.044
(9.418)

Distance to Year-Round Road (km)

-0.507
(0.579)

-0.151
(0.159)

-6.038
(3.806)

1.182∗∗
(0.512)

-2.221
(3.572)

Known French Bean Buyers

0.182
(0.263)

-0.0310
(0.0671)

-0.621
(1.827)

0.0863
(0.234)

-3.318
(3.196)

-15.95∗∗∗
(4.530)
236
0.021

-10.40∗∗∗
(1.930)
85
0.014

-40.65
(27.14)
33
0.039

-12.75∗∗∗
(3.582)
81
0.024

-14.53
(14.43)
37
0.044

Male (%)

Total Household Income
(1000 Ksh)

Number of Different Crops Grown

Farm-Fixed Assets Owned
(1000 Ksh)
Irrigation

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Factors that influence farmers’ WTA for quality are shown in Table (2.8). Across
all groups, we see that education and acreage farmed are associated with higher values
of WTA for quality, while household income, French bean acreage, and irrigation are
associated with lower cost producers. Within groups, we see different factors that
are correlated with WTA for quality. For fresh market producers, only fixed assets
matters for quality and farmers with more assets report lower values of WTA for
quality. For the processed market, respondent gender is the only factor correlated
with WTA for quality and men are more likely to report higher WTA for quality
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than women. For the exited group, acreage farmed and distance to good roads are
positively correlated with WTA for quality while farm fixed assets are negatively
correlated. For the farmers who have never entered the market, more educated farmers
report higher values of WTA for quality and farmers who live in a male-headed
household have lower values of WTA.
In terms of statistical power, we would expect to be able to observe relationships
between WTA for quality and household income, farm fixed assets, and irrigation
since these factors have been shown to be correlated with French bean participation
in the literature [Okello and Swinton, 2007, Asfaw et al., 2010]. Across all groups,
we do see these effects for income and irrigation, but not farm fixed assets. Since we
can observe a correlation between farm fixed assets and WTA for quality for the fresh
marked and exited groups only, this may be an issue of statistical power to detect an
effect for the processed market and never entered group. Higher levels of household
income and farm fixed assets should be associated with lower WTA for quality, as
shown for the fresh market and exited groups. Thus if we lack statistical power
to detect the true impact of income and farm fixed assets on quality, then we are
overestimating WTA for quality for the processed and never entered groups. That
would also imply that our comparisons of the processed and never entered groups
against the other two groups are likely to over state the true differences between
these populations.
We also examine the factors that influence farmers’ WTA for a perfect partner as
compared to a complete stranger. The results are shown in Table (2.9). Across all
four groups, having completed more French bean trainings and living farther from a
good road are associated with lower WTA values for a perfect partner. Owning more
farm fixed assets, however, is associated with a higher premium for a perfect partner
over a complete stranger. For fresh market farmers, completing more trainings is
associated with lower WTA for a perfect partner, while having more loans is positively
correlated with WTA for a perfect partner. Loans are also positively correlated with
WTA for the processed market, while distance to a good road is negatively correlated.
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For the exited group, larger farms are associated with higher values of WTA, while
outstanding loans, farm fixed assets, and distance to good roads are all negatively
correlated with WTA for a perfect partner. For the farmers who have never entered
the market, farmers operating larger farms and with male-headed households have
higher premiums for a perfect partner. Additionally, distance to a good road has a
negative effect on WTA for a perfect partner for the never entered group.
The premium for a perfect partner should be correlated with farmers’ risk preferences. So as a measure of our statistical power to assess farmers’ preferences, we
expect to see WTA for a perfect partner correlated with household wealth, income,
or debt. In our results, we do show strong correlations with outstanding loans for
most subgroups. Interestingly, the correlation is positive for contracted farmers and
negative for farmers not in the market. This could mean that outstanding loans are
correlated with the decision to contract and/or that farmers take on more debt after
adopting contract farming. We also see that distance to roads is consistently correlated with the premium for perfect partners for most subgroups. This may reflect a
difficulty with finding alternate buyers as farmers live further away from markets.
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Table 2.9. Determinants of WTA for Perfect Partner
All
(1)

Fresh Market
(2)

Processed Market
(3)

Exited
(4)

Never Entered
(5)

Male (%)

-0.115
(3.508)

-1.266
(1.770)

9.582
(16.39)

-0.389
(2.227)

1.528
(5.681)

Education

-0.0743
(1.067)

0.177
(0.584)

0.686
(5.553)

-0.394
(0.689)

1.613
(1.528)

French Bean Experience (Years)

-0.0160
(0.205)

0.0689
(0.0965)

-0.398
(0.688)

0.0920
(0.159)

0
(.)

-4.946∗∗∗
(1.185)

-1.078∗
(0.582)

0.811
(5.942)

-0.145
(0.751)

33.71
(46.02)

Male Head of Household (%)

-0.305
(4.958)

-0.527
(2.955)

-26.78
(22.27)

-1.852
(2.716)

15.81∗∗
(6.943)

Household Size

0.898
(1.047)

0.189
(0.574)

3.694
(4.134)

0.267
(0.693)

1.479
(1.814)

-0.00326
(0.00242)

-8.12e-04
(9.40e-04)

-0.0146
(0.00925)

0.00237
(0.00373)

-0.0114
(0.00713)

0.0207
(0.0163)

0.0137∗∗
(0.00645)

0.165∗∗
(0.0730)

-0.0444∗∗
(0.0189)

-0.0561
(0.0760)

Acreage Farmed

-0.625
(0.813)

0.189
(0.574)

3.454
(9.624)

1.184∗∗
(0.536)

8.001∗∗
(3.679)

French Bean Acres Farmed

-0.212
(0.846)

-0.329
(0.556)

-6.910
(8.524)

0.0704
(1.163)

0
(.)

Number of Different Crops Grown

-0.789
(1.267)

0.0479
(0.554)

3.901
(9.060)

0.719
(0.830)

-1.112
(2.376)

2.42e-04∗∗
(9.72e-05)

1.09e-04
(1.44e-04)

2.99e-04
(3.55e-04)

-9.23e-04∗
(5.06e-04)

-0.00260
(0.00231)

Irrigation

-0.103
(5.046)

0
(.)

0
(.)

1.168
(2.459)

0.932
(5.467)

Distance to Year-Round Road (km)

-1.546∗
(0.875)

-0.118
(0.362)

-9.263∗
(4.541)

-1.211∗
(0.632)

-4.758∗∗
(2.074)

Known French Bean Buyers

-0.281
(0.398)

0.0750
(0.153)

2.555
(2.180)

-0.0724
(0.289)

0.898
(1.856)

59.73∗∗∗
(6.846)
236
0.118

31.46∗∗∗
(4.405)
85
-0.011

75.70∗∗
(32.39)
33
0.255

43.59∗∗∗
(4.424)
81
0.078

46.82∗∗∗
(8.375)
37
0.313

French Bean Trainings

Total Household Income
(1000 Ksh)
Value of Outstanding Loans
(1000 Ksh)

Farm-Fixed Assets Owned
(1000 Ksh)

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

We conducted two-sample z-score tests to determine which coefficients were significantly different between the groups. The p-values resulting from those tests are
displayed in Table (2.10). All four groups differ from each other by at least one beta
coefficient. However, the fresh and exited groups differ only for the perfect partner attribute, and the processed market and never produced groups differ only with regards
to the quality attribute. The exited group differs from the never produced group for
the price and no contract attributes. The groups who are most different are the fresh
and processed market groups. Their preferences differ for the most reliable trading
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Table 2.10. P-values from Z-tests of Differences between Parameter
Estimates for Groups

Quality
Current Trading
Partner
Most Reliable
Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract
Total Price (including
bonus)
Variance for Quality
Variance for CTP
Variance for MRTP
Variance for PP
Variance for NC

Fresh vs
Processed
0.104
0.323

Exited vs Never
Produced
0.257
0.409

Processed vs
Never Produced
0.096
0.320

Fresh
vs Exited
0.316
0.122

0.015

0.311

0.163

0.162

0.032
0.001
0.059

0.458
0.007
0.073

0.266
0.493
0.459

0.020
0.398
0.347

0.025
0.112
0.070
0.020
0.117

0.130
0.048
0.077
0.377
0.015

0.320
0.060
0.483
0.093
0.079

0.240
0.086
0.477
0.386
0.165

partner, perfect partner, price, and no contract attributes. These results suggest that
there is an underlying heterogeneity in this population which divides the fresh market
and exited group into one category, and the processed and never produced groups into
another.
Table (2.11) shows the average WTA for each group where WTA was calculated as
in equation (2.18) and standard errors approximated using the delta method [Greene,
2003]. All estimates are significantly different from zero, and most are significant
at the 1% level. The fresh market group has the smallest magnitude WTA for all
attributes except for the no contract option. The exited market group has the second
smallest magnitude WTA for all attributes except for the no contract option, which
is the smallest of all four groups. The processed market has the most negative WTA
for quality, and the highest positive WTA for both most reliable partner and perfect
partner. The never produced group has a WTA for quality which is close to that of the
exited market group, but the WTAs for all other attributes are closest in magnitude
to those of the processed market group.

Table 2.11. Average WTA Across Populations

Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract

Fresh Market
-9.73***
(0.93)
18.23***
(0.99)
26.24***
(0.79)
31.09***
(0.42)
13.62**
(5.13)

Processed Market
-27.36***
(4.14)
32.27***
(3.21)
70.21***
(1.46)
79.82***
(1.68)
-133.78***
(28.95)

Exited Market
-12.01***
(1.26)
24.91***
(1.45)
32.71***
(0.97)
45.35***
(0.00)
10.03*
(5.94)

Never Produced
-12.36***
(3.50)
39.38***
(0.12)
55.31***
(0.00)
69.34***
(0.00)
-138.14***
(29.14)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Coefficients estimated using a Random Parameters Logit with 4 Group Partition using 1000 Halton
Draws. Total Price coefficients were fixed for each group; all other parameters assumed to vary with
y2 2
1 2
normal distributions. Standard errors calculated using the delta method: V ar( xy ) = nx
4 σ x + x2 σ y +
2y
ρ . Panel data from 236 individuals comprising 2065 choice observations.
x3 xy
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The four groups do not have consistent differences in WTA between the current
partner, most reliable partner, and perfect partner attributes. For the fresh market
and exited market groups, the difference between current partner and most reliable
partner is approximately 8 Ksh. For the never produced group, this difference is twice
as large, approximately 16 Ksh. The processed market group has the largest difference
between current partner and most reliable partner, valuing the most reliable partner
38 Ksh more than their current trading partner. For all groups, on average, their
current trading partners are valued less than their most reliable partner, suggesting
that the overall set of partners currently active in this market are less reliable than
the set of partners available in the past.
For all groups, the differences in WTA between the most reliable partner and the
perfect partner are smaller than the differences between current partner and most
reliable partner. The difference between most reliable and perfect partners is less
than 5 Ksh for the fresh market group, 9 Ksh for the processed market group, 13 Ksh
for the exited group, and 14 Ksh for the never entered group. This means that, on
average, the groups that currently have contracts have, at some point in their trading
histories, interacted with partners that they perceived as closer to a perfectly reliable
trading partner than the two groups who are not currently contracted. However, the
never produced group, having no current or past trading partners for French beans,
were instructed to use the trading partners for a different crop that they grow. This
may have lead them to draw on their experiences differently for these two attributes.
Compared to farmers in the never produced group, farmers in the processed market
find it more burdensome to produce high quality, and value buyer reliability more.
However, farmers in the processing market have coefficients which are significantly
different than the group which has never produced French beans only for quality.
This suggests that farmers who supply the processing market may not actually differ
from farmers who never try French bean farming in how they value partner reliability.
Compared to farmers supplying the processed market, farmers contracted for the fresh
market find it less burdensome to produce high quality beans, have more profitable
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alternatives to producing French beans, value partner trust less strongly, value their
current trading partner less, and have had best trading partners who reliably honored
their contracts more frequently than the best partners trading with farmers supplying
the processed market. Compared to the exited group, the fresh market farmers on
average have smaller WTA values for all partner attributes and a less negative WTA
for quality, suggesting that farmers who are higher cost producers and value contract
enforceability more highly end up exiting French bean production.
Altogether, these results suggest that farmers may be sorting themselves between
the fresh and processed French bean markets. Farmers who are better able to supply
high quality beans, care less about contract enforcement, and are less dependent on
French bean markets for profitable uses of their resources tend to supply the fresh
market. Farmers who are less able to supply high quality beans, more concerned
about partner reliability, and have few profitable alternatives supply the processed
market. Of the group that selects into the fresh market, the subpopulation which is
more efficient and less concerned about risk for contract renegotiations and rejections
remain in this market over time. Of the group that does not choose to enter either
market, on average, they are more able to produce high quality beans but otherwise
very similar to the group that enters the processed market.
Paired differences. Comparing farmers’ willingness to accept along matched
pairs provides additional insight into the entry and exit dynamics for the fresh and
processed markets. Our sample of 118 matched pairs falls into four categories: fresh
market paired with never entered, fresh market paired with exited, processed market
paired with never entered, and processed market paired with exited21 . Table (2.12)
shows the relative frequency of each pair type in our sample.
Pooling all pair types together, Table (2.13) shows the estimated mean and standard deviation for the distribution of differences for the different pairs in willingness
21

Never entered means never entered either the fresh or processed markets. Exited means previously
contracted for either the fresh or processed market, but not currently contracted for either market.
We do not distinguish between farmers who exited the fresh market and those who exited the
processed market.
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Table 2.12. Frequency Table for Pair Type by Market Status

Never Entered
No-Contract Type
Exited
Total

With-Contract Type
Fresh
Processed
24
13
61
20
85
33

Total
37
81
118

Table 2.13.
Differences in WTA for Contract Attributes Across
Matched Pairs, All Pairs
Attribute
Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract
Observations (Pairs of Subjects)

Estimate of Mean Difference in WTA
-2.917
(1.870)
-7.197***
(1.200)
-0.816
(2.588)
-8.463***
(2.961)
-3.671
(17.137)
118

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

to accept for each attribute. For the full sample, we see that the with-contract group
has lower WTA values for each attribute, the differences are only significant for the
current trading partner and perfect partner. This suggests that aggregate differences
in cost functions to produce high quality French beans do not act as barriers to market participation, while differences in tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement
do deter participation. On average, farmers who contract to supply French beans
value exogenous contract enforcement more than 8 Ksh less than farmers who do
not contract. This is equivalent to 27% of the contract price for a processing market
contract, and 16% of the price for the typical fresh market contract.

63

Table 2.14.
Differences in WTA for Contract Attributes Across
Matched Pairs, by Pair Types

Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
NC
Number of obs

Fresh
- Never
4.958
(4.337)
-21.226***
(0.366)
-29.729***
(5.179)
-38.759***
(3.374)
117.997**
(53.798)
24

Mean Difference
Processed
Fresh
- Never
- Exit
-11.636
1.705*
(9.047)
(0.884)
-4.326
-6.838***
(3.120)
(1.148)
21.210**
-6.530***
(7.846)
(0.684)
6.740
-13.887***
(9.616)
(1.224)
-82.063
2.830
(72.896)
(11.232)
13
61

Processed
- Exit
-20.95***
(5.644)
6.674*
(3.541)
36.992***
(4.969)
34.556***
(9.031)
-118.544***
(34.963)
20

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

Looking at the results categorized by pair type, as shown in Figure (2.6.1) and
Table (2.14), provides additional insight into the barriers to entry and exit for each
market. For the entry decision, we find no significant difference in willingness to
accept for the quality attribute between either the fresh market - never entered pairs,
or the processed market - never entered pairs. While with-contract and no-contract
groups differ significantly in the factors which should influence their cost function
(labor, capital, credit, etc), these differences do not result in different willingness to
accept values.
For the fresh market - never entered pairs, all partner attributes are negative and
statistically significant. This means that the farmers who enter the fresh market
have lower WTA for buyer reliability than farmers who do not enter, suggesting
that contract enforcement may act as barriers to entry. The no contract attribute
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the farmers who enter the
fresh market have many more profitable alternatives to French bean production than
farmers who never enter the market.
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Figure 2.5. Box Plots of Differences in WTA for Contract Attributes
Across Matched Pairs, by Pair Types

For the processed market - never entered pairs, the only attribute which is significantly different across the pairs is the most reliable partner. Most reliable partner
is positive, meaning that farmers contracted for the processed market have at some
point encountered a best partner who was more reliable than the best partner encountered by the farmers who have never entered the market. Otherwise, there are
no significant differences across these pairs, suggesting there are few barriers to entry
for the processed market.
For the exit decision, we see opposite patterns between the fresh and processed
markets. The farmers in the fresh market have higher WTA for quality and lower
WTA for buyer reliability than exited farmers. This suggests that farmers who have a
lower cost of production but less tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement tend to
exit production for the fresh market. For the processed market, it is the higher cost
producers who care less about buyer reliability who exit. Additionally, the farmers
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who remain in the processed market have, on average, fewer profitable alternatives
to French bean production than the farmers who choose to exit.
Overall, we see that imperfect contract enforcement may deter entry into the fresh
market. It also interferes with the dynamics of exit such that higher cost but more risk
tolerant types remain in the market. For the processed market, contract enforcement
does not seem to play a role for entry or exit decisions. Underlying heterogeneity
divides farmers into two types: farmers with profitable alternatives to French bean
contracting, and farmers without profitable alternatives. The farmers with profitable
alternatives, on average, find it less costly to produce high quality beans and value
contract enforcement less than the farmers without profitable alternatives. The farmers with profitable alternatives tend to enter into the fresh market, while the other
type enters the processed market.

2.6.2 Supply Margins
Table (2.15) reports the results for land allocation to French bean production as
a function of contract attributes. We estimate a model for share of land allocated to
French bean production under contract. We estimate the model using Generalized
Last Squares with random effects and standard errors clustered for each individual
farmer. We include all attributes in the model except No Contract, and interact
each attribute with a dummy to indicate if the farmer is currently contracted to
supply French beans. For all variables, there is no different impact on land share for
contracted farmers than non-contracted farmers.
Price has a positive effect on land share allocate to the contract, consistent with
theory. Increasing contract prices by 10 Ksh/kg would be associated with an additional 10.3% of land allocated to French bean production, on average. In our sample,
contracted farmers allocate 71.5% of their total land to French bean production. This
means that for an additional 10 Ksh/kg contract price, they would either reallocate
their crop portfolio such that 81.8% of their existing land was devoted to French bean
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Table 2.15. Land Allocation as a Function of Contract Parameters
Variables
TotalPrice
Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
TotalPrice*Contracted
Quality*Contracted
Current Trading Partner*Contracted
Most Reliable Trading Partner*Contracted
Perfect Partner*Contracted
Constant
Number of obs
Number of groups
Prob > χ2

Estimate
0.0103***
(0.0024)
-0.0009
(0.0244)
0.164***
(0.0314)
0.155***
(0.0369)
0.197***
(0.0418)
-0.0015
(0.0029)
0.0383
(0.0397)
-0.0195
(0.0493)
-0.0683
(0.0466)
-0.0507
(0.0496)
-0.256***
(0.0594)
2065
236
0.0000

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Estimated using a GLS regression with random effects
and robust, clustered standard errors for each individual. Dependent variable is the difference between land
share allocated in the choice experiment and actual
land share allocated to French bean production.

production, or that they would increase the total amount of land farmed. Our choice
experiment design does not allow us to distinguish between these two cases.
We do not estimate a significant effect for quality on land allocation. For farmers both with and without contracts, increasing quality requirements results in no
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additional land allocation. If farmers do intensify production in response to higher
quality standards, they do not allocate additional land to increase production. They
may instead rely on more flexible inputs such as labor, fertilizers, or chemicals.
Current trading partner, most reliable trading partner, and perfect partner all have
statistically significant, positive coefficients. In addition to impacting the probability
of accepting a contract, imperfect contract enforcement also reduces the quantity of
land allocated to French bean production. On average, farmers would increase their
land allocation by 19.7% under perfect contract enforcement from what they would
allocate when the contract is offered by a complete stranger. Since non-contracted
farmers produce with 2.33 acres on average, improving contract enforcement could
increase total French bean acreage by 0.45 acres for new adopters of contract farming.

2.7 Robustness Checks
We conduct several analyses to validate key assumptions of our methodology and
demonstrate the robustness of our findings. First, we demonstrate that we have
stronger effects for the subsample with the smallest distance between matched pairs
compared to the total sample. Second, we demonstrate that our findings are robust
to problems of inexact matching. Third, we demonstrate that our findings are robust
to alternate specifications of the RPL model. Fourth, we demonstrate that our paired
results are robust to variation in the point estimates from the RPL model. Fifth, we
address lack of saliency in our choice experiment and discuss the implications of type
I error on our findings. Finally, we report results of post-hoc calculations of statistical
power.

2.7.1 Effectiveness of Geographically-Nearest Neighbor Matching
Although we cannot assess how well geographically-nearest neighbor matching
would perform compared to a propensity-score matching algorithm, we can use the
variation in observed distances between matched pairs to check the key assumption
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behind our matching algorithm. Geographically-nearest neighbor matching assumes
that farmers who are located geographically close to each other are more similar in
their farm characteristics and perceptions of market conditions than farmers who live
further apart. If this assumption is correct, then it must also follow that nearest
neighbor pairs who are located closer to each other must also be more similar than
nearest neighbor pairs located further apart.

Figure 2.6. Distribution of Distances Between Matched Pairs

Figure (2.7.1) shows the distribution of distances between surveyed pairs. Distances were calculated based on the GPS coordinates where each farmer was interviewed22 . The median distance between pairs was 1.09 km. We divide our sample
22

The majority of farmers were interviewed in their homes or in fields closely adjacent to their homes.
Some farmers were not available for interviews at home, but were willing to be interviewed in more
remote locations (market centers, fields located far from their home, etc). This accounts for the
observations with pair differences over 10km apart.
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at the median value, and examine how characteristics differ between pairs who are
closer and further apart.
Table (2.16) shows the average difference in farm characteristics for all matched
pairs, pairs located closer than 1.09km apart, and pairs located further than 1.09km
apart. Averages which are closer to zero in absolute value are more similar than pairs
with larger absolute differences. Pairs located closer to each other are more similar
than pairs separated by longer distances for most characteristics including respondent gender, education, farming experience, gender of head of household, household
size, household income, acreage owned, acreage farmed, number of different crops
grown, fixed assets, irrigation, distance to road, and distance to market. Closer pairs
are less similar than distant pairs along the dimensions age, French bean experience,
French bean trainings, outstanding loans, French bean acreage, and French bean buyers known. Thus geographically nearer neighbors are more likely to be different along
dimensions related to French bean production, and more likely to be similar otherwise for their farming and household characteristics, than farmers who live further
apart. By sampling geographically near neighbors, we accomplish the same goal that
underlies propensity score matching: to create a non-experimental no-contract group
that differs from the with-contract group only along the factors related to treatment.
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Table 2.16. Characteristics of Closer and More Distant Pairs
Variables

All Pairs
Distance < Median
(N = 118)
(N = 59)
Respondent Characteristics
Male (%)
0.144**
0.051
(0.063)
(0.092)
Age
-1.093
-1.593
(1.728)
(2.501)
Education
0.619***
0.576**
(0.185)
(0.256)
Farming Experience (Years)
-0.280
0.085
(1.644)
(2.446)
French Bean Experience (Years)
7.881***
9.661***
(0.965)
(1.460)
French Bean Trainings
1.297***
1.390***
(0.146)
(0.173)
Household Characteristics
Male Head of Household (%)
0.059*
0
(0.046)
(0.059)
Household Size
0.280*
0.169
(0.204)
(0.296)
Total Household Income
276.688***
181.163*
(1000 Ksh)
(89.693)
(95.801)
Value of Outstanding Loans
25.810**
28.293**
(1000 Ksh)
(12.589)
(13.668)
Production Characteristics
Acreage Owned
0.342
-0.184
(0.303)
(0.458)
Acreage Farmed
1.559***
1.13
(0.482)
(0.846)
French Bean Acres Farmed
2.76***
2.819***
(0.439)
(0.779)
Number of Different Crops Grown
0.534***
0.169
(0.174)
(0.261)
Farm-Fixed Assets Owned
3314.001*
587.597
(1000 Ksh)
(2172.005)
(657.707)
Irrigation
0.254***
0.203***
(0.040)
(0.053)
Marketing Characteristics
Distance to Year-Round Road (km)
0.332*
0.323
(.215)
(0.223)
Distance to Market (km)
-0.282
-0.239
(0.409)
(0.549)
Known French Bean Buyers
1.67***
1.864***
(0.475)
(0.693)

Distance > Median
(N=59)
0.237***
(0.085)
-0.593
(2.403)
0.661**
(0.269)
-0.644
(2.218)
6.102***
(1.230)
1.203***
0.235
0.119*
(0.069)
0.39
(0.282)
371.750**
(151.551)
23.227
(21.255)
0.868**
(0.388)
1.989***
(0.465)
2.700***
(0.411)
0.898***
(0.224)
6040.406
(4283.014)
0.305***
(0.060)
0.341
(0.371)
-0.324
0.61
1.475**
(0.655)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

Any average differences in contract preferences across pairs in our sample, therefore, should be associated only with factors related to French bean production. In
terms of their contract preferences, closer pairs differ less in their WTA for quality
and more in their WTAs for all partner types than more distant pairs (see Table 2.17).
Pairs who are geographically closer to each other differ mainly in their characteristics around French bean production, and larger differences in French bean production characteristics are associated with larger differences in preferences for contract
enforcement regimes and smaller differences in preferences over cost factors. This
provides additional indirect evidence that contract enforcement is one of the causal
issues around French bean production in this region.
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Table 2.17. Differences in WTA for Closer and More Distant Pairs
Willingness to Accept
Quality

All Pairs
-2.917

Current Trading Partner

-7.197***

Most Reliable Trading
Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract

-0.816
-8.463***
-3.671

Obs

118

Distance < Median
-1.091
(2.26)
-8.354***
(1.55)
-4.827
(3.13)
-9.045**
(4.21)
27.909
(19.60)
59

Distance > Median
-4.742
(2.98)
-6.04***
(1.83)
3.196
(4.08)
-7.881*
(4.20)
-35.25
(27.70)
59

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

2.7.2 Inexact Matching and Selection Bias
By design, our matching algorithm is expected to match farmers based on exogenous conditions and allow for variation in factors endogenous to the repeated
contracting decision. This leaves potential for bias from inexact matching across
pairs. Table (2.18) shows the results of regressing the differences in pair characteristics on differences in WTA for each contract attribute. A positive coefficient
indicates increasing differences in characteristics between pairs is associated with increasing differences in WTA; a negative coefficient indicates increasing differences in
characteristics between pairs is associated with decreasing differences in WTA. Most
characteristics are uncorrelated with differences in WTA for any of the attributes,
and no characteristic is correlated with differences in WTA for all attributes. The
characteristics correlated with any contract attribute include education, French bean
training, household income (although the magnitudes of these correlations are effectively zero), acreage farmed, French bean acreage, irrigation, distance to road, and
known French bean buyers.
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Table 2.18. Differences in Farmer Characteristics as Predictors of
Differences in WTA Across Matched Pairs
Farmer Characteristic
Male (%)
Education
French Bean Experience (Years)
French Bean Trainings
Male Head of Household (%)
Household Size
Total Household Income
(1000 Ksh)
Value of Outstanding Loans
(1000 Ksh)
Acreage Farmed
French Bean Acres Farmed
Number of Different Crops Grown
Farm-Fixed Assets Owned
(1000 Ksh)
Irrigation
Distance to Year-Round Road
(km)
Known French Bean Buyers
Constant
Number of Obs
Significance of Model (F test)

Quality
0.254
(3.184)
2.489**
(1.019)
0.132
(0.191)
0.889
(1.244)
-0.942
(4.395)
-0.712
(0.945)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
1.278
(0.852)
-1.145
(0.900)
-0.820
(1.130)
0.000
(0.000)
-9.198**
(4.629)
-1.006
(0.956)
0.712*
(0.392)
-1.259
(3.225)

CTP
2.631
(2.041)
-0.457
(0.653)
-0.146
(0.122)
-1.154
(0.798)
2.599
(2.817)
0.280
(0.606)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.651
(0.546)
0.363
(0.577)
-1.033
(0.724)
0.000
(0.000)
0.754
(2.967)
0.099
(0.613)
-0.276
(0.251)
-5.008**
(2.068)

MRTP
1.746
(4.408)
-0.610
(1.411)
0.107
(0.264)
-3.718**
(1.723)
5.514
(6.084)
-0.278
(1.309)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-2.096*
(1.180)
0.871
(1.246)
-1.033
(1.564)
0.000
(0.000)
2.018
(6.409)
2.983**
(1.323)
-0.691
(0.543)
0.399
(4.465)

PP
1.549
(5.038)
-1.192
(1.612)
0.123
(0.302)
-4.827**
(1.969)
-7.126
(6.954)
1.634
(1.496)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.226
(1.349)
-0.321
(1.424)
-2.312
(1.788)
0.000
(0.000)
2.816
(7.324)
-1.522
(1.512)
-0.005
(0.620)
0.903
(5.104)

NC
-3.929
(28.561)
10.065
(9.14)
1.169
(1.713)
28.499**
(11.161)
-31.353
(39.418)
3.823
(8.480)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
22.435***
(7.646)
-14.176*
(8.075)
-16.680
(10.135)
0.000
(0.000)
-76.929*
(41.519)
4.100
(8.571)
2.296
(3.516)
-29.972
(28.930)

118
0.178

118
0.173

118
0.183

118
0.174

118
0.058

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
OLS regression of paired differences in farmer characteristics on their paired difference in WTA
for attributes in the choice experiment. Attributes are quality, current trading partner (CTP),
most reliable trading partner (MRTP), perfect partner (PP), and no contract (NC). An increase
in an explanatory variable implies a greater difference in the value of that characteristic between
paired farmers.

Overall, differences in pair characteristics as a group offer little explanatory power
for most attributes as demonstrated by the significance of the full model. The full
model is only significant for the no contract option, which is consistent with our
choice experiment design. Specific instructions were given for interpreting all contract
attributes except for the no contract option in order to allow farmers to consider all
their potential alternatives to contracting. If there is bias in our measurements caused
by inexact matching, it is most likely to occur in farmers’ alternatives to French bean
contracting as pairs may not share the exact same set of alternatives to contracting.
For the quality attribute, differences in household income, education, use of irrigation, and known French bean buyers are correlated with differences in WTA for
quality. No characteristics are correlated with differences in WTA the current trading
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partner. Differences in French bean trainings, acreage farmed, and distance to road
are correlated with differences in WTA for the most reliable trading partner. Differences in French bean trainings is also correlated with WTA for a perfect partner.
Differences in the no contract option are correlated with differences in French bean
trainings, acreage farmed, French bean acreage, and irrigation.

2.7.2.1 Mismatch for Quality Factors

We use cluster analysis to separate our sample into two groups: one group that
includes the pairs who are best matches for income, education, use of irrigation, and
known French bean buyers; and one group who includes the pairs who are worst
matches for these characteristics. To perform the cluster analysis, we standardize
the continuous variables and then use the cluster kmeans command in Stata 13.1.
To seed the clustering algorithm, we manually select the pairs who are worst and
best matches in the data set. The pair we select as the best match has farmers who
have the exact same number of known buyers and education, both have irrigation,
and report differences in total household income of 1000 Ksh. The pair we select as
the worst match has farmers who do not both have irrigation, have large differences
in known buyers and education, and report household income differences of 928,000
Ksh.

74

Table 2.19. Descriptive Statistics for Clusters of Pairs Based on Quality Factors
Characteristics
Mean income difference (1000 Ksh)
Mean education difference
Mean difference in known French bean buyers
Mean irrigation difference
Number of Pairs
Mean pair distance (km)

Cluster 1
Best Matches
38.4
-0.38
0.32
0.16
81
2.93

Cluster 2
Worst Matches
798.3
2.81
4.62
0.46
37
4.54

Clusters created using Stata 13.1 cluster kmeans algorithm. Seeds were manually chosen as pairs with most and least similarities for household income,
education, known French bean buyers, and use of irrigation. Differences equal
to 0 indicate both pairs report the same value for the desired attribute. Differences less than zero indicate the farmer without a contract has a larger value
than that reported by the contracted farmer. Differences greater than zero indicate the contracted farmer in the pair has a larger value than the non-contracted
farmer.

Table (2.19) displays summary statistics for each cluster. 81 pairs were categorized
as best matches through the cluster analysis. On average, the farmers in these pairs
have household incomes that differ by less than 40,000 Ksh, have almost the same
levels of education, know almost equal numbers of French bean buyers, and generally
both have irrigation. The pairs characterized as worst matches for quality factors,
strongly differ for all of these factors on average.

Table 2.20. Differences in WTA for Better and Worse Matches by Quality Factors
Willingness to Accept
Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading
Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract
Obs

All Pairs

Best Matches

Worst Matches

-2.917

-4.961**
(2.17)
-6.773***
(1.47)
0.743
(3.18)
-5.163
(3.74)
-14.121
(20.59)
81

-1.558
(3.53)
-8.125***
(2.08)
-4.228
(4.44)
-14.700***
(4.62)
19.208
(30.97)
37

-7.197***
-0.816
-8.463***
-3.671
118

Best Matches
Fresh
Processed
1.711
-18.303***
(1.72)
(4.62)

Worst Matches
Fresh
Processed
4.214*
-12.163
(2.28)
(18.59)

-19.873***
(2.34)

22.906***
(7.72)

-22.715***
(2.65)

26.711
(17.92)

54

27

31

6

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0
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Table 2.21. Differences in WTA for Quality Using Pairs with Best
Matches for Quality
Pair Type
Fresh - Never
Processed - Never
Fresh - Exit
Processed - Exit

All Pairs
Obs Mean Diff
24
4.958
(4.337)
13
-11.636
(9.047)
61
1.705*
(0.884)
20
-20.95***
(5.644)

Best Matches Only
Obs
Mean Diff
13
2.085
(6.47)
9
-7.446
(7.16)
41
1.592
(1.09)
18
-23.732***
(5.63)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0
:
V arwith − V arwithout
V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

=

0; HA

:

We show the results for differences in WTA by cluster in Tables (2.20) and (2.21).
Using only the 81 pairs who are best matches for quality, we see an average difference
in WTA for quality of almost 5 Ksh/kg lower for contracted than non-contracted
farmers. However, this difference is only for farmers in the processed market. Of the
54 pairs who are best matches for quality and have one member of the pair supplying
the fresh market, we see no significant differences in quality. Moreover, the results
broken down by fresh, processed, exited, and never entered pairs show the same signs
and reasonably similar magnitudes to the full results.
If we examine only the pairs who are worst matches for quality factors, we see
a weakly significant difference in WTA for the fresh market which is not present for
the pairs who are best matches. We estimate a positive average difference, suggesting
that contracted fresh market farmers have higher production costs to produce quality
than non-contracted farmers. Comparing the results for the best matches with the
results for the worst matches, we estimate effects of production costs which are lower
than for the more mismatched pairs in each market. These differences reinforce our
conclusions for the effect of production costs on participation in the processed market.
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For the fresh market, the differences do not refute our conclusions for the effect of
production costs of participation decisions. However, better quality matches still
show a smaller average difference than worse quality matches. Therefore, we cannot
completely eliminate the possibility that mismatch bias is impacting our conclusions.

2.7.2.2 Mismatch for Perfect Partner Factors

We also construct a metric of how similar pairs are for French bean trainings as
a measure of match quality for perfect partner factors. We measure of quality of
match by perfect partner factors as the absolute difference between paired farmers
for French bean trainings. The best matches for quality factors are the pairs with
French bean training scores less than or equal to the median value of 1. The worst
matches for quality factors have quality scores of 2 or more. We have 23 pairs that
match exactly on this characteristic, and the median value of the metric was 1.
Table (2.22) summarizes how WTA for a perfect partner varies for pairs with
better and worse match quality for perfect partner factors. Looking at just the 23
pairs that match exactly on this characteristic, we find no significant difference in
WTA for a perfect partner. When we divide the pairs by market, however, we find
that the pairs do differ in their WTA for a perfect partner. For the fresh market, pairs
with exactly the same number of French bean trainings also show a 16 Ksh difference
in WTA for a perfect partner which is significant at the 1% level. For the processed
market, pairs with the exact same number of French bean trainings show a 39 Ksh
difference which is significant at the 5% level. The difference for the fresh market
is negative, indicating that the contracted farmers in this market have smaller WTA
than their matched counterparts. In the processed market, the difference is positive
and thus contracted farmers in this market have larger WTA than their matched
counterparts. These findings also correspond well with the results in Table (2.14)
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Table 2.22. Differences in WTA for Better and Worse Matches by
Perfect Partner Factors
Sample

Number of
Pairs
118

All Pairs
Pairs with exact matches for perfect
partner factors

Pairs with best matches for perfect
partner factors

Pairs with worst matches for perfect
partner factors

All

23

Fresh

14

Processed

9

All

66

Fresh

45

Processed

21

All

52

Fresh

40

Processed

12

WTA for Perfect
Partner
-8.463***
(2.961)
5.550
(8.588)
-16.093***
(3.566)
39.218**
(15.919)
-6.145
(3.922)
-17.477***
(1.992)
18.137*
(9.754)
-11.404**
(4.523)
-24.772***
(2.935)
33.155***
(8.631)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0
Measure of quality of match by perfect partner factors was constructed as the
absolute difference between paired farmers for French bean trainings. The best
matches for perfect partner factors are the pairs with differences in French bean
training scores less than or equal to the median value of 1. The worst matches
have differences of 2 or more. Exact matches have differences equal to 0.

and support the notion that imperfect contract enforcement matters for both the
fresh and processed markets with opposing effects across markets.
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2.7.2.3 Match Quality and Pair Distance

The set of pairs who are classified as best matches by quality factors does not
overlap exactly with the set of pairs classified as best matches by perfect partner
factors, and vice versa. Pairs that are best matches for quality, report average differences for WTA for a perfect partner that have the same signs but lower magnitudes
than pairs that match exact for perfect partner factors. These differences in magnitude are relatively small for the fresh market and large for the processed market,
reflecting the small sample size of surveyed farmers. Pairs who are classified as best
matches by quality factors report an average difference in WTA for quality of 0.68
Ksh/kg (std. err. of 3.94), 3.35 Ksh/kg for the fresh market (std. err. of 1.95), and
-3.47 Ksh/kg for the processed market (std. err. of 9.78). These results overestimate
the average difference for the fresh market and underestimate the difference for the
processed market compared to the results using the best matches for quality. While
the magnitudes of the estimates of average differences across pairs are sensitive to
the variables used to identify best matches, the signs are consistent. This suggests
that our conclusions about the effects of quality and contract enforcement on farmers’
participation decisions may be robust to mismatch bias.
The mean pair distance for pairs classified as best matches for perfect partner
factors is 1.58 km, and 2.93 km for pairs classified as best matches for quality factors,
with median values of 0.96 km for both sets. Since the mean and median values of
pair distance for all pairs are 3.43km and 1.09 km, respectively, this suggests that
better match quality is associated with smaller distances between matched pairs.

2.7.3 Interactions Between Quality and Partner Attributes
Our choice experiment design allowed for interaction effects between quality and
partner attributes to test if farmers had different WTA to pay for quality depending
on the nature of the buyer proposing the contract. Table (2.23) shows the coefficient
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estimates for the Random Parameters Logit estimates of the full model including
interaction terms. Because of software and data limitations, we fixed both price
and no contract coefficients for each market type. All other parameters, including
interaction effects, were assumed to vary normally.
The fresh market, processed market, and exited groups show no evidence changing
their WTA for quality based on partner type. For these three groups, no coefficient
estimates for interactions between quality and partner type are significantly difference
from zero. For the never entered group, the interaction between quality and perfect
partner is positive and weakly significant. This suggests that the never entered group
may shift to a lower cost function when producing for a perfect partner compared to
the cost functions used to produce for any other partner type.
Failing to account to the never entered group’s willingness to shift cost functions
for specific partner types makes our results an overestimate of the true impact of
cost functions in deterring entry into the market. In Table (2.14), we show that the
average differences across matched pairs with a never entered farmer is 4.958 Ksh/kg
for the fresh market, and -11.636 Ksh/kg for the processed market. Accounting for
shifting cost functions under perfect contract enforcement, we would expect to see an
even larger positive difference for the fresh market and further supporting the notion
that differences in cost functions do not deter entry into the fresh market. For the
processed market, we would see at minimum a smaller negative difference, reinforcing
the idea that cost factors also do not deter enter into the processed market.

Table 2.23. Coefficient Estimates from Random Parameters Logit
with Interaction Effects
Quality
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
Quality X CTP
Quality X MRTP
Quality X PP
No Contract
Total Price (including bonus)

Contracted
Fresh Market
Processed Market
-0.548**
-0.361
(0.265)
(0.433)
0.561***
0.298
(0.160)
(0.251)
0.954***
0.900***
(0.170)
(0.261)
0.884***
2.395***
(0.183)
(0.502)
0.140
0.450
(0.188)
(0.296)
-0.055
0.384
(0.198)
(0.310)
0.245
0.457
(0.219)
(0.348)
0.814**
-1.039*
(0.335)
(0.555)
0.066***
0.036***
(0.006)
(0.010)

No Contract
Exited Market
Never Produced
-0.786***
0.242
(0.293)
(0.388)
0.649***
0.499**
(0.177)
(0.248)
1.037***
0.484***
(0.186)
(0.236)
1.396***
0.600***
(0.217)
(0.260)
0.138
0.398
(0.208)
(0.293)
-0.098
0.474
(0.218)
(0.289)
-0.187
0.564*
(0.252)
(0.319)
0.478
0.012
(0.359)
(0.478)
0.060***
0.029***
(0.006)
(0.009)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Coefficients estimated using a Random Parameters Logit with 4 Group Partition using 500 Halton Draws.
Total Price and No Contract coefficients were fixed for each group; all other parameters assumed to vary
with normal distributions. Panel data from 236 individuals comprising 2065 choice observations.
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2.7.4 Robustness of RPL Specification
We test the robustness of our findings against an alternate specification of the
random parameters logit model. Our preferred specification fixes the total price
coefficient for each farmer type (fresh, processed, exited, and never entered) and
allows all other coefficients to vary by individual farmer. We consider an alternate
specification where total price and no contract attributes are fixed for each farmer
type, and all other coefficients vary by individuals as previously specified. Table (2.24)
displays the results of both models. We selected the final model based on various
model fit criterion (Log Likelihood Function, AIC, McFadden Pseudo R-squared,
etc.).
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Table 2.24. Random Parameters Logit with Fixed and Variable Outside Option
Fresh Market
Processed Market
Quality

Exited Market
Never Produced
Fresh Market
Processed Market

Current Trading Partner

Exited Market
Never Produced
Fresh Market
Processed Market

Most Reliable Trading Partner

Exited Market
Never Produced
Fresh Market
Processed Market

Perfect Partner

Exited Market
Never Produced
Fresh Market
Processed Market

Total Price

Exited Market
Never Produced
Fresh Market
Processed Market

No Contract

Exited Market
Never Produced

Obs
Log Likelihood Function
McFadden Pseudo R-squared
Inf.Cr.AIC

Variable NC
-0.444***
(0.094)
-0.821***
(0.284)
-0.516***
(0.117)
-0.356
(0.216)
0.832***
(0.123)
0.968***
(0.271)
1.070***
(0.163)
1.133***
(0.223)
1.197***
(0.135)
2.107***
(0.398)
1.404***
(0.160)
1.591***
(.344)
1.419***
(0.160)
2.395***
(0.502)
1.947***
(0.201)
1.995
(0.398)
0.091***
(0.009)
0.060***
(0.018)
0.086***
(0.010)
0.058***
(0.017)
0.622
(0.506)
-4.015***
(1.475)
0.431
(0.541)
-3.974**
(1.725)

Fixed NC
-0.453***
(0.093)
-1.084***
(0.340)
-0.564***
(0.120)
-0.358**
(0.172)
0.837***
(0.126)
1.151***
(0.319)
1.339***
(0.224)
1.839***
(0.517)
1.108***
(0.139)
2.339***
(0.462)
1.608***
(0.232)
1.633***
(0.419)
1.350***
(0.163)
2.325***
(0.515)
2.009***
(0.257)
3.330***
(0.928)
0.083***
(0.008)
0.051***
(0.016)
0.078***
(0.009)
0.044***
(0.014)
1.302***
(0.341)
-2.779***
(0.810)
0.630
(0.403)
-1.516*
(0.781)

2065
-1451.536
0.360
1.448

2065
-1751.277
0.228
1.735

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients estimated using a Random
Parameters Logit with 4 Group Partition using 1000 Halton Draws. Both models
use fixed total price coefficients for all groups.
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Under the alternative specification, all of the coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero, with the exception of the no contract option for the exited
group, and all of the coefficients have the same sign as in the preferred model. For 13
of the 24 estimated coefficients, the difference in magnitudes is less than 0.1 between
the two specifications. For 19 of the 24 coefficients, the difference in magnitudes is
less than 0.5. Of the 5 coefficients whose differences in magnitudes is more than 0.5,
no contract for the processed market and the never entered group both move further
away from zero. Only the coefficients for no contract for the fresh market, current
trading partner for the never entered group, and perfect partner for the never entered
group move closer to zero in a substantial way.
Under the alternative specification, more coefficients are statistically significant
but the effect is unchanged for all price coefficients and improved for quality and outside option coefficients. The order of the partner attributes remains current trading
partner < most reliable trading partner < perfect partner for all groups except for the
processed market. For the processed market, the ordering of the coefficients for most
reliable parter and perfect partner are reversed, although the magnitudes of both differ by less than 0.02. Z-tests for differences between group coefficient estimates (not
included but available from the authors on request) confirm that all four groups are
still distinct groups in terms of their preferences, with the same underlying division
between fresh-exited groups and processed-never entered groups.
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Figure 2.7. Differences in WTA for Contract Attributes Across
Matched Pairs (Alternate RPL Specification)

Qualitatively, our paired results are also unchanged using the alternative RPL
specification. Figure (2.7.4) shows the distribution of differences between matched
pairs when the WTA values were calculated using fixed no contract options. As before,
there is no significant difference for the quality attribute when the match is with a
farmer who never entered the market. Difference in attributes for the fresh-exited
group show opposite patterns from the processed-exited group.

2.7.5 Robustness of Average Differences across Pairs
Our paired results stem from differences in WTA values calculated based on point
estimates from the random parameters logit model. The model generates individual
specific mean and variance estimates for each contract attribute. As an additional robustness check, we simulate 1000 draws of WTA for each attribute for each individual
and calculate a sampling distribution of average differences across pairs. Using the
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Table 2.25. Differences in WTA Across Matched Pairs with Simulated
Confidence Intervals, All Pairs
Attribute
Quality
Current Trading
Partner
Most Reliable
Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract
Observations

Estimate of Mean
Difference in WTA
-2.917
(1.870)
-7.197***
(1.200)
-0.816
(2.588)
-8.463***
(2.961)
-3.671
(17.137)
118

Simulated 95% CI
(-6.89, 1.14)
(-9.99, -4.41)
(-4.76, 3.22)
(-12.78, -4.19)
(-21.38, 13.86)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
V arwith − V arwithout
=
0; HA
:
H0
:
V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0
CIs simulated by drawing 1000 sets of WTP estimates for
each individual, differencing the WTP between matched
pairs for each set of estimates, calculating the average difference for each set, and then using resulting mean and
standard error from the sampling distribution to generate
the 95% CI.

individual mean and variance estimates, we draw a new attribute coefficient for each
individual, recalculate the individual’s WTA, and then use the new WTA to estimate
the average difference in WTA across pairs. We repeat this procedure 1000 times, to
create a sampling distribution for the average different in WTA across pairs for each
attribute. Then we use this sampling distribution to calculate 95% confidence intervals. We implement this procedure in Stata. As shown in Table (2.25), the 95% CIs
for Current Trading Partner and Perfect Partner do not contain zero while all other
CIs do contain zero. Thus our findings for average differences across pairs appear
robust to variations in the the point estimates from the RPL model.
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2.7.6 Saliency and Type I Error
Experiments in economics, both in laboratory and field settings, are normally
designed to provide salient rewards to subjects conditional on performance in the
experiment [Davis, 1993]. Salient payments incentivize subjects to make decisions
within the experimental setup that are consistent with the decision-making process
they would apply in daily life. To address saliency concerns, choice experiments in
marketing contexts often require subjects to make a real purchase based on their
decisions in the experiment. The farmers who participated in our survey received a
gift of sugar (value less than US$5) in appreciation for their time, but no additional
compensation was provided to incentivize decision-making in the choice experiment.
This introduces the possibility that farmers’ decisions in the choice experiment do
not reflect their true preferences.
To get a sense of how lack of saliency may be impacting our results, we compare
the decisions made in the choice experiment to the actual contracts held by our
subjects. 118 subjects have current contracts, of which 38 were offered at least one
choice set that included their current contract as one of the options.23 Of these, 9
selected their current contract as optimal, 20 preferred the alternative contract, and 9
subjects (approximately 24%) rejected their current contract in favor of no contract.24
For the 9 subjects who selected their current contract in the choice experiment, the
acreage allocated through the choice experiment was 0.1 acres greater than their
actual acreage under contract (a deviation of 0.008% from their actual total acreage).
Although results for land allocation show little sign of bias, the decision to accept
or reject contracts has a relatively high incidence of false rejection. However, this is
a problem for our methodology only if lack of saliency impacts the groups of farmers
with and without contracts in systematically different ways, and only if the impact
acts to make the preferences of both groups more similar to each other. In exper23

Current contract was defined as the actual total price and quality level in their registered contract,
and proposed by their current trading parter.
24
We are not able to assess the incidence of false acceptance (accepting a contract in the choice
experiment which was previously rejected in reality) with our existing data set.
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imental settings, experienced subjects have been shown to exhibit behaviors which
are more consistent between salient and non-salient environments than inexperienced
subjects [Camerer and Hogarth, 1999]. This suggests that farmers currently without
contracts, being less experienced with contracting, should have a greater discrepancy
between the preferences expressed in the choice experiment and their true preferences.
We are neither able to access the rates of false acceptance nor false rejection for farmers without current contracts, although their aggregate percent rejected across all
choice sets (30.2%) is higher than that for farmers with contracts (23.3%) and statistically different at the 1% level. Additional research is required to determine how
non-saliency impacts both groups.

2.7.7 Statistical Power and Minimum Detectable Effect Size
Because we want to rule out potential causes of effects, false negatives (type II
errors) have more important implications for policy making than false positives (type
I errors). Matched designs have greater statistical power to detect differences in the
population means than designs with independently sampled groups. This gives us the
ability to detect smaller differences between the populations for a given sample size.
We use the software G*Power to compute the minimum effect size which can be
detected by this study. Using the full sample (118 pairs) and assuming a minimum
required α of 10% and statistical power of 80%, we can detect an effect size of 23% or
higher. This means that as long as the true preferences of farmers with and without
contracts differ by at least 23% on average, our test will have sufficient power to
detect that difference. More pairs would need to be surveyed in order to detect effect
sizes of less than 23% or with greater certainty against type I or type II errors.
For differences in preferences between the fresh and exited groups, we can detect
a minimum effect size of 32%. Between the fresh and never groups, we can detect
differences at least as large as 52%. Between the processed and exited groups, we can
detect average differences of at least 58% or more. Between the processed and never
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group, preferences must differ on average by at least 73% in order to be detected in
our sample. Each of these calculations assume minimum required levels of α = .1 and
1 − β = .8.
In their evaluation of the DrumNet program, Ashraf and colleagues [2009] find that
the program increases the probability of producing an export crop by 19.2% (with a
std. err. of 0.067) compared to the control group. This corresponds to an effect size
of 287%. If one of the effects of the program was to improve contract enforcement for
adopters and that lack of contract enforcement was a key issue preventing adoption,
then our test would need to be able to detect an equivalent difference in preferences.
Since we have sufficient power to detect effect sizes of less than 100% for all groups,
we believe that our null results are not a result of low power but instead reflect no
actual differences in preferences across these groups.

2.8 Experience of Benchmark Development Interventions
In this section, we compare our results to outcomes from two development interventions conducted in Kirinyaga County to increase the number of small-scale
producers supplying French beans for export. The first intervention is the Frigoken
processing firm, which has been operating since 1989 and currently contracts with
more than a thousand smallholders in Kirinyaga. The second intervention was the
DrumNet program which operated from 2004-2007. We review the outcomes for each
of these programs, including evidence about the causes of the programs successes
and failures, and discuss what outcomes we would expect to occur under these programs given our findings about the roles of contract enforcement and cost functions
in market participation decisions.

2.8.1 Processed Market
Frigoken is an non-profit organization funded by the Aga Khan Foundation with
the specific mandate of reducing rural poverty by helping smallholder producers.
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Conversations with Frigoken staff and the Ministry of Agriculture suggest that the
firm tries to target farmers who would not otherwise engage in French bean production
and who have limited profitable alternative crops to produce. The consensus opinion
among all parties, including farmers who do not choose to work with Frigoken, is that
the firm acts as though contracts are perfectly enforced. Contract terms are held
constant over the duration of the contract and that the firm rarely rejects produce.
To keep barriers to entry low, the firm employs private extension officers who provide
education and oversee pest surveillance and control for all contracted farmers.
Our results match well with the reports provided by the MOA and Frigoken agents.
We do not find evidence of differences in cost functions or preferences over contract
enforcement between farmers contracted to supply the processed market and farmers
who have never entered the market. The farmers who remain in the processed market
have lower production costs, higher tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement, and
less profitable outside options than farmers who exit the market. On average, farmers
supplying the processed market also have higher production costs than farmers supplying the fresh market. These results suggest that the processed market operated
by Frigoken has few barriers to entry, and is attracting farmers who do not have
profitable alternatives to pursue.

2.8.2 Fresh Market
For the fresh market, we can compare the results of our test to the outcomes from
the RCT evaluation of the DrumNet program [Ashraf et al., 2006, 2009]. DrumNet
was a program operated by the NGO PrideAfrica with financial support from the
Gates Foundation. The purpose of the program was to help groups of small-scale
farmers participate in the fresh export market. The program acted as an intermediary
between farmers and exporters. From the exporters perspective, the program reduced
the costs of contracting large numbers of farmers, coordinated logistics to reduce the
costs of aggregating and transporting produce from the farm gate to market, and pre-
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screened farmers for their ability to supply reliably. From the farmers’ perspective, the
program reduced the search costs for information about current prices, available input
suppliers, and available buyers; the transaction costs for aggregating and transporting
the produce from the farm gate to market; and reduced the cost of bank credit to
finance French bean production.
In their evaluation of the DrumNet program, Ashraf and colleagues found that
DrumNet’s marketing services did increase the probability of growing export crops
and household incomes, but including subsidized credit with the marketing services
had no improvement in incomes over the marketing services alone. They also found
that the program increased the likelihood of growing French beans and incomes for
new adopters without changing the average prices the with-contract group paid for
their inputs or received from exporters. These results suggested that endowment
constraints were not deterring entry from this market.
Our results also match well with the findings from the DrumNet evaluation. We
find that fresh market producers differ from farmers who don’t enter the market in
their tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement risks, but not in their production
costs. Farmers remaining in the fresh market have higher costs but better tolerance
for imperfect contract enforcement than farmers who exit the market. These results
suggest that the main barrier to entry in the fresh market is lack of enforceable
contracts. If farmers also believed that using an intermediary like DrumNet would
reduce the hazard of unenforceable contracts, then our findings are consistent with
the fact that DrumNet’s marketing services increased adoption of contract farming.
Our findings suggest that imperfect contract enforcement may be implicated in
both entry and exit decisions. Ashraf and colleagues report anecdotal evidence that
contracting difficulties decreased farmers returns until they could be corrected through
improved relationships between buyers and DrumNet:
In the beginning, the relationship between DrumNet and export buyers
suffered from wholesale rejection of produce, missed pickup agreements,
poor communications, poor contractual arrangements, and in some cases
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outright corruption at the loading dock. However, over the months, by
working consistently with the management of the export buyers, and by
building trusted relationships with local traders, the flow of produce, payment, and information has now been streamlined. The increased capacity
of the buyers has led to more coordination, more efficiency, and higher
returns for both the buyer and the farmer. [Ashraf et al., 2006, footnote,
p. 8]
DrumNet did not include any program features to reduce counter-party risk in
their transactions with exporters on behalf of farmers. DrumNet also did not have
any provisions to verify French bean quality such as monitoring production practices or enforcing export quality standards, and so could not referee quality disputes.
In 2006 when new export standards went into effect, this provided a shock to the
minimum quality requirements for all buyers. DrumNet’s relationships with buyers
unraveled, and ultimately the program was bankrupted. Although the exact causes of
the programs collapse are not known, the problems DrumNet experienced with quality disputes, lack of buyer reliability, and difficulty identifying alternate buyers mirror
the problems that small-scale producers experience when contracting individually.

2.9 Conclusions
We propose a new approach to test for causes of barriers to technology adoption
and apply the method to investigate barriers to adopting French bean supply contracts in Kenya. We test two barriers to market participation: factors that cause
differences in cost functions and differences in tolerance for imperfect contract enforcement. We find that differences in production costs do not act as barriers to
entry for either the fresh or processed export market. Instead, lower cost producers
gravitate towards supplying the fresh market and higher cost producers supply the
less lucrative processed market.
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We find that imperfect contract enforcement may act as a barrier to market for the
fresh export market, but not the processed market. Imperfect contract enforcement
may also be interfering with the normal process of exit from the fresh market, such
that risk tolerant but higher cost producers remain in the market over time. For
both markets, imperfect contract enforcement reduces the amount of land allocated
to both production on the intensive margin by approximately 20%.
These findings suggest that development interventions aimed at increasing smallholder participation in Kenya’s French bean export markets do not need to include
mechanisms to reduce farmers’ costs of production, even for farmers with no previous experience producing French beans. Instead, programs may need to include
mechanisms to reduce the impact of imperfect contract enforcement in order to draw
new farmers into these markets, and expand acreage cultivated by farmers already
engaged in French bean production.

2.9.1 Broader Significance of Approach for Research on Empirical Contract Theory
The empirical literature on contract theory is sparse and mainly restricted to a
few topics such as adverse selection and moral hazard [Cardon and Hendel, 2001,
Chiappori and Salanié, 2000, Lafontaine, 1992]. This is partially due to the difficulty
of collecting data on real-world contracts. Even when observational data on contracts
is available, it is challenging to disentangle the effects of unobservable heterogeneity
and endogenous matching of agents to contracts in order to measure the true causal
effect of a factor like asymmetric information [Chiappori and Salanié, 2002].
By using a choice experiment, we directly examine the impact of a treatment on
the set of contracts agents are willing to accept. We employ this method to study
imperfect contract enforcement, but it is suitable for other concepts in contract theory
which are otherwise difficult to analyze with observational data, such as the value of
reputations, degree of contractual incompleteness, structure of incentive payments,
importance of fairness, etc. Used alone, choice experiments are ideal tools for studying
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the design of contracts used in a particular empirical setting. The panel structure
of the choice experiment allows for clear identification of the causal impact of a
treatment on both contract acceptance and effort exerted under chosen contracts
at the individual agent level. By analyzing the choice experiment results within
a matching framework, we can look at the overall population and assess whether
differences in preferences are capable of explaining patterns in observed behavior,
such as market entry and exit. In combination, these techniques can help advance
research on the design, adoption, and use of contracts in a variety of intra- and
inter-firm applications.

2.9.2 Broader Significance of Approach for Development Research and Policy
Policy-makers put forth much effort and millions of dollars each year on programs
to help make people better off by adopting technologies such as contract farming,
fertilizers, microcredit, treated bednets for malaria prevention, etc. When these programs are unsuccessful, it is difficult to know if the program was poorly implemented,
targeting the wrong population, and/or targeting a false symptom of the problem (for
examples, see discussion of business training programs in McKenzie and Woodruff
[2014]). When these programs are successful, it is equally difficult to know which
factors led to the program’s success and what conditions are necessary to replicate
that success in other settings (e.g. Blattman et al., 2014).
When designing interventions, policy-makers could benefit from additional diagnostic tools capable of ruling out false causes of problems. Currently, many researchers
and policy-makers rely on focus group interviews and case studies for this purpose.
This study demonstrates one diagnostic approach, rooted in well-established statistical methodologies, which can provide evidence to confirm or refute issues raised
in focus groups. Additionally, diagnostic procedures such as ours can be executed
relatively quickly and inexpensively, compared to the cost and time required for an
RCT. Incorporating such tools into the development research agenda could there-
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fore improve the process by which researchers and policymakers determine the root
causes and optimal policies to address barriers to technology adoption, allowing for
more productive use of scare program and research funding, and helping development
programs generate more benefits for their recipients.
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CHAPTER 3. DO SEARCH FRICTIONS COMPOUND PROBLEMS OF
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING?

3.1 Introduction
Two development interventions were conducted in Kirinyaga County, Kenya with
the goal of increasing the number of small-scale producers supplying French beans
for export. The interventions had mixed outcomes, and the causes of the programs’
successes and failures were not clearly identified. In a recent working paper [Rosch
and Ortega, 2014], we demonstrate that imperfect contract enforcement is one possible barrier to entering the market. In this paper, we investigate how search frictions
interact with imperfect contract enforcement to deter small-scale farmers from participating in this market.
In markets with imperfect contract enforcement, theory predicts parties will use
informal, relational contracts to generate incentives for both parties to adhere to contract terms within long-term relationships (e.g. [MacLeod, 2007, Levin, 2003, Baker
et al., 2002]). In these models, the strength of incentives in relational contracting
is constrained by two exogenous forces: agents’ preferences over risk and time, and
agents’ reservation payments. In a world with search frictions and decentralized trading, however, finding new partners may be costly. In the agricultural contracting
literature, this is sometimes referred to as placement risk [Goodhue et al., 2000, MacDonald, 2014]. It has been well established in the large literature on search theoretic
models that these frictions will affect agents’ reservation payments.1 It is less well
1

In labor search models, reservation payments are an endogenous outcome of the market. Search
frictions that impede agents’ abilities to locate and match with new trading partners drive a wedge
between the reservation payment to an alternate buyer, the equivalent of the endogenous wage in a
standard search model (e.g. Pissarides [1985]), and the reservation payout from an alternate activity
(e.g. exogenous unemployment benefits).
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established how search frictions interact with other types of frictions that may impede
relational contracting.
As search frictions increase, this drives up buyers’ and sellers’ reservation payouts
and requires greater gains from trade to enter into contracting. This is the familiar
hold-up problem for incomplete contracts [MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993]. However,
search frictions also support relational contracting when autarky is not a credible
punishment for reneging on contract terms. Search frictions increase the expected
time it takes to form a new match, reducing the value of reneging on the contract
terms for both parties in established relationships. This reduces the total surplus
from trade necessary to maintain relational contracts. Thus the net impact from
search frictions on trade with imperfect contract enforcement is non-obvious.
We examine three related questions about Kenya’s French bean export market:
1. Does Kenya’s French bean market export market show evidence of search frictions between farmers and export buyers?
2. Are search frictions a barrier to adopting French bean production in a world
with perfect contract enforcement?
3. Are search frictions a barrier to adopting French bean production in a world
with imperfect contract enforcement between farmers and export buyers?
To answer these and related questions, we build a simple directed search model
featuring endogenous posted offers and imperfect contract enforcement. As a framework for our empirical analysis, we adapt Mortensen and Wrights’s [2002] and Moen’s
[1997] models of directed search in a posted offer market and allow for heterogenous
outside options across agents. We then examine the impact of imperfect contract
enforcement on equilibrium market offers. To formalize this, we model imperfect contract enforcement in a similar manner as search models from monetary theory (e.g.
Nosal and Rocheteau [2011]), which to our knowledge has not yet been integrated
into labor search models.
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Given the benchmark environment, we then develop empirical tests for whether
search frictions pose a barrier to entry in this market.2 We use a choice experiment to
impute farmers’ reservation payments under different contract enforcement scenarios.
Then we use the local spatial density of buyers and sellers to estimate the effects
of search frictions and imperfect contract enforcement on reservation payments and
actual contract prices. Finally, we compare the reservation payments of paired farmers
with and without contracts to determine whether search frictions could be impacting
entry and/or exit decisions.

2

Most search models predict some level of unemployment when search frictions are present. As
an empirical matter, there is no established method to test that a given population of agents are
unemployed because they experience different search frictions (see discussion in [Shimer, 2012]).

Figure 3.1. Glossary of Terms for Different Contexts
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Although we are examining the dynamics of contracting between agents outside
of employment relationships, it is a natural fit to study the dynamics of this market
using labor search models. Firstly, these models describe behaviors that occur in many
contexts. Figure (3.1) illustrates how terminology changes depending on whether the
application is in labor markets, industrial supply chains, or agricultural markets.
Secondly, the farmers we study have a relationship with their buyers that captures
many of elements of the employer/employee relationship. Farmers are working at
the direction of exporters even though they are not formally within the boundaries
of the exporting firms. Likewise, both parties care only about performance for the
contracted task, as opposed to a within-firm setting where total compensation may
depend on multiple, interrelated tasks. Thus this market offers a relatively clean
environment to empirically test labor search models’ theoretical predictions.
Preliminary findings. We find that search frictions are present in the market and
that they primarily limit farmers’ abilities to match with potential buyers and not vice
versa. Examining the two component submarkets of the French bean export market,
search frictions are a potential barrier to entry for the fresh submarket and may be a
factor in farmers’ exit decision from the processed market. Lastly, search frictions are
a potential barrier to entering the market in areas where buyers are more reliable on
average, suggesting there may be a trade-off for policymakers depending on whether
they design an intervention to target contract enforcement or search frictions. These
findings are important for designing more effective programs to connect small-scale
producers to French bean markets.
Key contributions. This research is important for three main reasons. First, most
labor contracts are incomplete in the sense that they either generate rents that can
be bargained after the relationship is initiated, or do not specify all possible contingencies that could impact a continuing relationship, or can be renegotiated with the
consent of all parties [Malcomson, 1997]. Yet theorists have not incorporated this
feature into models of equilibrium wage setting in markets with search frictions. Our
model bridges this gap and provides empirically testable comparative static predic-
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tions for equilibrium outcomes. Second, few empirical studies of labor markets focus
on frictions within a specific market (see [Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001] for a survey), or examine whether search frictions act as a barrier to market for some types of
agents. Our empirical approach introduces a new method of measuring the extent of
search frictions using the local spatial densities of agents which makes it possible to
study the effects of search frictions on market outcomes in settings where aggregate
statistics are not available. Third, our results can help policy makers design interventions for Kenya’s French bean market that better target the relevant barriers to
market in this industry and have greater likelihood for improving farmer welfare.
Related literature. This paper contributes to two broad strands of literature. The
effect of search frictions on relational contracts has not been well-studied in the literature. Ackerberg and Botticini [2002] demonstrate it is important to control for endogenous matching of heterogeneous farmers and landlords when studying the structure of land rental contracts. They control for the effect of an unspecified matching
technology that pairs farmers and landlords by using variation in land characteristics
across their study area. We apply the same underlying logic to study French bean
contracts, and improve on the method by providing a more explicit theoretical model
of the matching process and using geographically-based proxy instruments that have
a clear relationship to the theoretical model.
Most search models assume wages are determined through ex-post Nash bargaining instead of through relational contracts. A few studies have looked at relational
contracts in general equilibrium settings [Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1998, Board and Meyer-ter Vehn, 2011]; however, these models do not incorporate search or matching frictions. Acemoglu and Shimer [1999] show how wage
posting and directed search generate efficient allocations when firms have to make
ex-ante investments. In this case, workers (farmers) are the party making the investments of either high or low effort, while firms still retain all the bargaining power.
It is unclear how the new frictions of imperfect contract enforcement and hold-up
interact with directed search in equilibrium.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes stylized facts about Kenya’s
French bean market. Section 3 presents our theoretical model. Section 4 describes the
data, and section 5 displays the results of the empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes
with a discussion of the implications of our findings for market design.

3.2 Stylized Description of Kenya’s French Bean Market
French beans, a variety of green beans, are one of Kenya’s most important agricultural export crops by value. They are exported as either packaged fresh produce or
as processed (frozen or canned) beans, and regulated by Kenya’s Horticultural Crop
Development Authority (HCDA). Aside from the export market, there is very limited
domestic demand for French beans. Conversations with experts from the Ministry of
Agriculture and HCDA suggest that outside of the capital, few households consume
French beans, and that the majority of French beans available for sale in traditional
markets and supermarkets were originally intended for the export market.
HCDA records show 84 different firms exported at least one shipment of beans in
2012. There is only one firm, Frigoken, which exports processed beans. Nonetheless,
processed bean shipments make up a significant fraction of total exports, approximately 13% of total volume exported in 2012, and 12% in 2011. Although the fresh
and processed markets are nominally one market, with farmers free to switch between
them, the strong preference between varietals appropriate for canning and varietals
appropriate for fresh exports effectively segments the market after farmers’ make their
planting decisions.
By Kenyan law, exporters are required to have a written contract with each farmer
or group of farmers that they use to source horticultural produce. Contract terms
must include price, quantity, and quality specifications, and typically include provisions for contract renewal, termination, and dispute resolution. According to HCDA
records for Kirinyaga county, all contracts for the processing market are identical in
terms of prices, production and quality requirements, and enforcement provisions.
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Contracts for the fresh market vary by exporting firm but do not vary substantially
across the suppliers for any given firm. The most common difference within any given
exporting firm’s set of contracts is the delivery location. Across fresh market buyers,
contracts differ in terms of required seed varietals, specifications for input levels and
pre-approved suppliers, and availability of buyer-supplied credit. Phytosanitary and
physical appearance conditions are largely identical for all fresh market contracts.
Although the HCDA has taken steps to improve contract enforcement after 2012,
contracts are still imperfectly enforced. As a result, farmers often experience differences in realized revenues compared to contract specifications. Sometimes these
differences are from explicit changes in prices paid. A Kenyan extension officer reports:
“Prior to planting, an exporter and [a group of] farmers agree on a specific
price and volume of beans. When the crop is in flower stage, it [the
exporter] sends a verbal message through its truck loader to farmers that
the price will be lower because the “market is bad.” At harvest, the
exporter sends another message with even lower price. At this time, the
green beans must be picked and sold, hence farmers have no choice but
to take the price. If they dispute the price offered, the exporter leaves
the area and goes to buy in another region. I see this often during peak
production season when there are plenty of beans.” [Okello and Swinton,
2007, p. 279]
Price modifications also sometimes occur indirectly through “rejections”. Because
quality is not independently verified at time of delivery, exporters have discretion to
adjust the share of a shipment which is deemed to be high quality so as to reduce the
total payment to the farmers. This has been identified as a source of friction between
exporters and small-scale suppliers of pineapples in Ghana [Suzuki et al., 2011]. Other
tactics used by exporters which reduce the farmers’ realized total compensation from
the contract included reporting shipments as underweight, and delaying or refusing
to provide payments for delivered produce.
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The amount of discretion available to buyers and farmers to modify the terms of
trade within a signed contract is impacted by difficulties in finding alternate trading
partners at two stages in the production process. At harvest time, farmers report few
alternate buyers available and low salvage values for unsold French beans. Farmers
frequently prefer to leave crops unharvested rather than to harvest them for animal
feed or home use. Prior to planting time, when contracts are being negotiated and
signed, farmers also report difficulty in finding available buyers with which to partner.
Some farmers report traveling as far as the capital in order to attend agricultural
promotion fairs and connect with potential buyers.

3.3 The Model
In this section, we present a simple model to demonstrate the effect of imperfect contract enforcement on equilibrium market outcomes when search frictions are
present. The model is based on the competitive search frameworks of Moen [1997] and
Mortensen and Wright [2002]. We first describe equilibrium under perfect enforcement and show how search frictions can act as a barrier to market in this context. We
then extend the model to feature imperfect contract enforcement, highlighting how
this added friction interacts with search frictions to deter sellers from participating
in this market.

3.3.1 Environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. There is a continuum of buyers and
sellers who match in pairs in a decentralized market. Agents, referred to as buyers
and sellers, are defined by their technologies and preferences: only sellers have the
technology to produce, and only buyers wish to consume. The measure of sellers is
normalized to one, while the measure of buyers is endogenous. Let v and u be the
subsets of buyers and sellers, respectively, who are seeking a match. All buyers and
sellers are risk neutral, infinitely lived, and share common discount rate, r. Sellers
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produce an indivisible good of quality q ∈ [q, q] with strictly increasing convex cost
function C(q) where C(q) = C 0 (q) = 0. Buyers earn revenue R(q) from each good
traded which is strictly increasing and concave in q.

3.3.1.1 Matching Process
Buyers and sellers are matched pairwise according to a constant-returns-to-scale
matching function. We adopt a Cobb Douglas specification:

M = m(u, v) = uγ v 1−γ

(3.1)

where M is the total number of matched created, m(u, v) is the technology used
to produce matches, and γ is the elasticity of substitution for unmatched sellers and
buyers. Let θ ≡ uv . θ represents the tightness of a market, or how difficult it is for
buyers and sellers to find each other. θ ∈ [0, 1] where θ → 0 indicates increasing
difficulty for sellers to find buyers, and θ → 1 indicates increasing difficulty for buyers
to find sellers.
The probability of a buyer matching with a seller is:
u v
1
1
Q(θ) = m( , ) = m( , 1) = ( )γ 11−γ = (θ)−γ
v v
θ
θ

(3.2)

Similarly, the probability of a seller matching with a buyer is:
u v
P (θ) = m( , ) = m(1, θ) = (1)γ (θ)1−γ = (θ)1−γ = θQ(θ)
u u

(3.3)

As θ increases, Q(θ) decreases, and P (θ) increases. In other words, as the ratio of
buyers to sellers in the market increases (higher relative share of buyers), it becomes
more difficult for buyers to match and easier for sellers to match.
The matching function encapsulates two search frictions: a congestion externality
and a thick market externality. The congestion externality says that as more sellers
enter the market, it will be harder for any one seller to find a buyer to trade with.
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The same thing happens for buyers; more buyers in the market make it harder for any
one buyer to match with a seller. This is a negative externality imposed by buyers
on other buyers, and sellers on other sellers. The thick market externality, however,
is a positive externality imposed by buyers on sellers and vice versa. As more sellers
enter the market, it becomes easier for buyers to match with a seller. Likewise, more
buyers improve the odds of sellers finding a match.
Buyers and sellers meet and trade in one of Θ submarkets, where submarkets are
characterized by a specific market tightness θi and contract price wi (θi ). Buyers can
pay a sunk cost k > 0 to announce an open contract in their preferred submarket.
Buyers can post at most one open contract. Buyers post contracts and sellers search
across submarkets for their preferred contract. Once matched, pairs continue to
trade with each other until the match breaks up, either exogenously with probability
s ∈ (0, 1) or endogenously when contracts are imperfectly enforced.
Unmatched sellers earn flow revenue b ≥ 0 which accounts for the gain from their
best alternative activity. Unmatched buyers have no alternate activities and therefore
do not earn any benefits while unmatched.

3.3.1.2 Contracting Environment

Buyers post contracts and sellers search for their preferred contract. A contract
is an incentive compatible menu of payments conditional on the quality of the traded
good, w(q, θi ), which is defined as:

w(q, θi ) =



pq

if q ≥ q(θi )


0

otherwise

(3.4)
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where pq > 0 is the payment from buyer to seller.3 q(θi ) is the minimum quality
level that can be supported in equilibrium given the level of search frictions present
in the market.
Quality is perfectly observable to both buyer and seller but not observable outside
of the matched pair. We assume contracts are imperfectly enforced, that there is no
record keeping technology, and that the history of play within a match is private
information to the parties involved. Therefore a single defection on a contract cannot
be punished outside of the match. Instead, buyers and sellers are punished by the
threat of match termination and having to wait to be rematched. However, buyers
can pay a one time cost of κ > 0 to announce to all sellers that they will always
behave as if contracts are perfectly enforced.

3

We assume contracts are stationary because agents are risk neutral, there is no adverse selection,
and buyers only make contract offers to unmatched sellers. Burdett and Coles [2003] show that it is
optimal for contract payments to increase in job tenure when sellers are risk averse and can search
for new matches on-the-job.

Figure 3.2. Diagram of Contracting Process
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The order of actions for a contract is summarized in Figure (3.3.1.2). First buyers
post contract offers w(q, θi ). Then sellers search for their preferred contract and
matches form. Third, sellers produce quality q. Fourth, buyers provide payment
w0 (q, θi ). If w0 (q, θi ) 6= w(q, θi ), the match endogenously terminates with probability 1.
Even if buyers pay w0 (q, θi ) = w(q, θi ), the match may still exogenously terminate with
probability s. Finally, if the match neither endogenously nor exogenously terminates,
the buyer and seller repeat the entire process from step three with the same contract
terms as before.
Under perfect contract enforcement, a 3rd party ensures buyers’ ex post payments
are identical to their originally posted offers, w0 (q, θi ) = w(q, θi ). With imperfect contract enforcement, buyers deliver w0 (q, θi ) = w(q, θi ) with exogenous probability α and
w0 (q, θi ) = 0 with complimentary probability 1 − α.45 Increasing values of α increase
the likelihood that the buyer behaves as if contracts are perfectly enforced. We assume
that matches will terminate endogenously after a single payment of w0 (q, θi ) = 0.6
With imperfect contract enforcement, buyers keep a higher share of the ex post
trade surplus on average, which we model as if buyers earn an exogenously higher
average revenue. Under imperfect contract enforcement, buyers can choose whether
they wish to act if contracts are perfectly enforced or follow the exogenously determined likelihood of defecting on contract terms. We refer to the former type as g
and the later type as m. Type g buyers earn Rg (q) for each unit of q produced.
Type m buyers earn Rm (q) per unit of q, where Rm (q) and Rg (q) are strictly concave
0
functions, and Rm (q) > Rg (q) and Rm
(q) > Rg0 (q) for all q ∈ [q, q].
4

Typically, imperfect contract enforcement allows for bilateral action such that either buyer or seller
can defect on the contract. For this problem, however, it is sufficient to consider a one-sided contract
enforcement problem because we are not allowing for moral hazard. Quality is perfectly observable
to both buyers and sellers, just not observable to a third party.
5
This method of modeling ex-post uncertainty over transfers between buyers and sellers is commonly
used in the monetary search literature [Nosal and Rocheteau, 2011], but has not yet been introduced
into labor search models.
6
In contract theory, we usually work with the most restrictive strategy possible that still supports
trade. Typically, we assume agents employ a Grimm trigger strategy which says that no trade
will occur after one defection. Assuming the match breaks up with probability = 1 after a single
defection is equivalent to seller’s playing a Grimm trigger.
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Our approach to modeling contract enforcement as an exogenous shock to buyer
defection is conceptually similar to Carlton’s [1979] model of vertical integration with
uncertainty about the downstream firm’s demand function. In Carlton’s model, buyers partially vertically integrate with their suppliers in order to meet low demand
periods from in-house production and source from external suppliers only during periods of high demand. Our model is also motivated by the idea that buyers face
uncertain shocks to their demand from French bean importing countries. In periods
when buyers realize high demand, they have sufficient surplus to share with sellers
and maintain relational contracts. In periods with low demand for exported French
beans, buyers earn less surplus and prefer to defect on relational contracts.

3.3.1.3 How Search Frictions Interact with Contracting Frictions

Buyers post contracts that incentivize sellers to produce the optimal level of q ∗ that
maximizes utility for buyers and sellers. With no search or contract frictions present,
this optimal value can span the full set of possible quality levels. The optimal quality
level generates the maximum possible surplus from trade by equating the buyers’
marginal revenue with marginal cost to procure it from the seller, while providing a
payment to the seller at least as good as his outside option.

Figure 3.3. Diagram of Mechanisms Impacting Equilibrium Payments and Quality Levels
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Imperfect contract enforcement and search frictions impact the expected payment,
w(q, θi ), and the equilibrium value of q ∗ , but through two different mechanisms, as
illustrated in Figure (3.3.1.3). Imperfect contract enforcement, modeled as an exogenous shock to the buyer’s likelihood of providing the contracted payment, reduces
value of the expected transfer for sellers, causing them to choose a lower equilibrium
value of q ∗ . This results in lower costs incurred by sellers and lower revenues earned by
buyers, and decreases the posted offer compared to the perfect contract enforcement
case.
Search frictions raise the cost of buyers’ and sellers’ outside options. Depending
on how much surplus is available, these increased costs could potentially render some
trades unprofitable at any value of q ∗ . As long as sufficient surplus exists for trade
to occur at q ∗ , the increases to buyers’ and sellers’ outside options will be shared
between buyers and sellers, resulting in higher equilibrium contract payments.
When combined, the impact on contract payments is indeterminate. When imperfect contract enforcement is an endogenous choice for buyers, search frictions would
increase the cost to buyers’ for deviating from the contracted payment, helping to
drive the expected transfer back towards its value under perfect contract enforcement, and incentivizing sellers’ to provide quality levels closer to first-best. With
exogenous contract deviations, the parameters of the problem determine whether the
effect from the search frictions or imperfect contract enforcement dominate.

3.3.2 Perfect Contract Enforcement
We begin by establishing the benchmark model with perfect contract enforcement.7
Steady-state relationship between unmatched buyers and sellers. In the
base case with perfect contract enforcement, the populations of buyers and sellers are
7

This environment is equivalent to Moen’s [1997] environment when submarkets are unordered, and
Mortensen and Wright’s [2002] environment when matched buyers and sellers can engage in repeat
trading.
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both homogeneous. Therefore there is only one active submarket in equilibrium. Assuming the submarket is in steady-state equilibrium, then the net difference between
match creation and match destruction will be zero:

u̇ = (destruction) − (creation) ≡ 0

(3.5)

Since all contracts are perfectly enforced, there is no endogenous match destruction. Matches are destroyed at the exogenous rate s and created at the rate θQ(θ).
Therefore we can rewrite Equation (3.5) as:

u̇ = s(1 − u) − θQ(θ)u ≡ 0

(3.6)

In words, Equation (3.6) says that the rate of change of unmatched sellers over
time is equal to the mass of matched sellers whose matches are dissolved less the mass
of unmatched sellers who become matched. Solving Equations (3.6) for u, we arrive
at:

u=

s
s + θQ(θ)

(3.7)

In steady-state, the equilibrium level of unmatched sellers depends on the match
separation rate and the degree of market tightness. Note that this model predicts
there will always be some unmatched sellers in equilibrium. The presence of unmatched sellers in equilibrium implies that search frictions are necessarily a barrier
to market, an issue that we will explore further in the next section.
Sellers’ problem. We can write value functions for sellers in their unmatched
and matched states:

rU = b + θQ(θ)[E − U ]

(3.8)

rE = w(q, θ) − C(q) − s[E − U ]

(3.9)
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where U and E are the values that accrue to sellers in their unmatched and
matched states, respectively. Equation (3.8) says that the value received by an unmatched seller is the expected gain from matching plus the value of their outside
option. Equation (3.9) says that the value to sellers from being matched is the payment from the buyer less the costs incurred for producing quality q and the expected
loss from match destruction. Solving Equation (3.9) for E and substituting back into
Equation (3.8), we arrive at an equilibrium expression for U :

rU =

(r + s)b + θQ(θ)[w(q, θ) − C(q)]
r + s + θQ(θ)

(3.10)

Equation (3.10) shows that sellers’ value when unmatched is function of the contract price and market tightness. In equilibrium, sellers will enter the market, causing
prices and market tightness to adjust until sellers have maximized their value to being unmatched. Equation (3.10) implicitly assumes that sellers employ a reservation
payment strategy. It must be the case that the gain from search for sellers must be
at least as good as not searching at all, E ≥ U . Therefore the minimum contract
payment that a seller will need to enter the market is:

wR ≡ rU

(3.11)

Sellers’ reservation payments depend on their outside option, the cost of producing
q, the probability of matching, the discount rate, and the exogenous match destruction rate. Reservation payments increase with higher outside options and increasing
market tightness.
Buyers’ problem. We can also write analogous value functions for buyers in
their unmatched and matched states:

rV = −k + Q(θ)[J − V ]

(3.12)

rJ = R(q) − w(q, θ) − s[J − V ]

(3.13)
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where V and J are the flow Bellman equations for buyers in the unmatched and
matched states, respectively. Equation (3.12) says that the value received by an
unmatched buyer is the expected gain from matching less the cost of posting an
available contract. Equation (3.13) says that the value of being matched for a buyer
is equal to the gain from trade (revenue less payment to the seller) less the expected
loss from match destruction. Assuming free entry of buyers into the market, in
equilibrium buyers will have V = 0. Substituting this expression back into Equations
(3.12) and (3.13), we arrive at the equilibrium contract creation condition:

J=

k
R(q) − w(q, θ)
=
Q(θ)
r+s

(3.14)

Rewriting Equation (3.14) as rk = Q(θ)[R(q) − w(q, θ)] − sk shows that in equilibrium, the expected gains from trade (right hand side of the expression) equals to
the discounted cost of posting an open contract (left hand side of the expression).
The choice of q and θ uniquely determines the equilibrium contract payment w(q, θ)
for the submarket.
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, buyers post contract payments that optimize their
expected gain from posting an open contract subject to sellers’ expected gain from
searching in the market. Enough buyers enter the market and post contracts until
buyers’ expected gain from matching with a seller equals the cost of announcing an
opening. To arrive at equilibrium, the market tightness adjusts until the correct
proportion of buyers and sellers are in the market to optimize the balance between
the congestion and thick market externalities.
Equilibrium is determined by the following set of equations:

w(q, θ) = arg max J

(3.15)

w(q,θ)

rU = max
q

(r + s)b + θQ(θ)[w(q, θ) − C(q)]
r + s + θQ(θ)

(3.16)
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J=

k
R(q) − w(q, θ)
=
Q(θ)
r+s

(3.17)

s
s + θQ(θ)

(3.18)

u=

Buyers choose a contract payment w(q, θ) that optimizes their expected gain to
being matched (Equation 3.15). Sellers choose a quality level q that optimizes their
expected gain to being unmatched (Equation 3.16). Equilibrium is reached when
enough buyers have entered the market such that all buyers earn no gains when
unmatched (Equation 3.17) and the total number of unmatched sellers is stable over
time (Equation 3.18).
This problem has a unique solution, and can be reformulated using the dual form:

arg max rU =
q,θ

(r + s)b + θQ(θ)[w(q, θ) − C(q)]
r + s + θQ(θ)

k
R(q) − w(q, θ)
=
Q(θ)
r+s

u=

(3.19)

(3.20)

s
s + θQ(θ)

(3.21)

Substituting Equation (3.20) into Equation (3.19), the objective function can be
simplified to:
(r + s)b + θQ(θ)[R(q) − C(q) −
arg max rU =
q,θ

k(r+s)
]
Q(θ)

r + s + θQ(θ)

(3.22)

Applying the first order conditions with respect to θ, we see that:
[1 − η(θ∗ )]
k
[R(q) − C(q) − b + kθ∗ ] =
∗
∗
r + s + θ Q(θ )
Q(θ∗ )

(3.23)
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where η(θ) =

−θQ0 (θ)
Q(θ))

is the elasticity of the matching function.8 Equation (3.23)

says that the optimal market tightness, θ∗ , equates the discounted expected gain from
trade (left hand side) to the discounted cost of opening a contract. Applying the first
order conditions with respect to q, we see that:
θQ(θ)[R0 (q ∗ ) − C 0 (q ∗ )]
=0
r + s + θQ(θ)

(3.24)

From Equation (3.24) optimal quality q ∗ satisfies R0 (q ∗ ) = C 0 (q ∗ ). Search frictions
do not distort seller’s effort and the quality traded is efficient. Moreover, this equilibrium outcome is socially efficient. Because of the posted offer mechanism, buyers
can post contract offers that internalize the search externalities present in the market
and incentivize first-best effort from sellers.
Trade is feasible provided there is enough surplus generated at q ∗ such that:

R(q ∗ ) − C(q ∗ ) ≥ arg max rU
q,θ

(3.25)

Substituting Equation (3.23) into the expression for the optimized value of rU :

R(q ∗ ) − C(q ∗ ) ≥ b + [

η(θ∗ )
]kθ∗
1 − η(θ∗ )

(3.26)

Equation (3.26) says that trade will occur provided that enough surplus is generated at first-best quality to cover the seller’s outside option, b, and the expected cost
of search. The optimal posted offer contract is therefore:

w(q, θ) =



C(q ∗ ) + b + [

0

8

η(θ∗ )
]kθ∗
1−η(θ∗ )

if q ≥ q ∗
(3.27)
otherwise

From Equation (3.1), η(θ) = γ for a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to
scale.
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3.3.3 Imperfect Contract Enforcement with Exogenous Default
Now we introduce imperfect contract enforcement into the search environment
from the previous section. The novel contribution of this model is that we allow for
two active submarkets, one with perfect contract enforcement and one with imperfect
contract enforcement.
Steady-state relationship between unmatched buyers and sellers. To
best illustrate the key effects of imperfect contract enforcement and search frictions on
market outcomes, we begin with the case of homogenous sellers, bL = bH = b. Buyers,
however, are no longer a homogeneous population. We will have two submarkets: one
for buyers who pay a cost κ to announce they will always behave as if contracts are
perfectly enforced, and one for all other buyers. Sellers will choose which type of
submarket to enter and therefore which type of buyer to trade with.
Let θg =

vg
u

be the market tightness in the submarket where buyers behave as

if contracts are perfectly enforced, and θm =

vm
u

be the market tightness for the

submarket where contracts are imperfectly enforced. However, the adjustment process
across submarkets is no longer independent, and changes in market tightness in one
submarket impact the other submarket through the common factor u.
As before, we define a steady-state equilibrium where the net change in unmatched
sellers over time is zero:

u̇ = seg − θg Q(θg )u ≡ 0

(3.28)

u̇ = (1 − α + αs)em − θm Q(θm )u ≡ 0

(3.29)

where eg and em are the number of matched sellers in the perfect enforcement
and imperfect enforcement submarkets, respectively. Equation (3.28) is the same as
Equation (3.6) with eg replacing (1 − u). Equation (3.29) reflects the two sources of
match termination. With probability 1 − α, buyers do not provide any ex-post compensation and matches break up endogenously with probability 1. With probability
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α, buyers provide ex-post compensation as promised but matches still break up with
exogenous probability s. We also need an additional equation to relate eg , em , and u:

eg + em + u = L ≡ 1

(3.30)

Equation (3.30) says that the total population of sellers, L, is one of three possible
states: unmatched, or matched in either submarket. Combining Equations (3.28),
(3.29), and (3.30), we can write the equation for the measure of unmatched sellers as:

u=

s(1 − α + αs)L
s(1 − α + αs) + (1 − α + αs)θg Q(θg ) + sθm Q(θm )

(3.31)

Now the equilibrium level of unmatched sellers is determined by what happens
in each submarket simultaneously. The total population of sellers does not impact
how sellers trade-off between being unmatched and matched in either market; it only
alters the levels for matched and unmatched sellers.
Sellers’ problem. We can write value functions for sellers’ in their unmatched
and matched states as:

rUi = b + θi Q(θi )[Ei − Ui ]

∀

i ∈ {g, m}

(3.32)

rEg = w(q, θg ) − C(q) − s[Eg − Ug ]

(3.33)

rEm = αw(q, θm ) − C(q) − (1 − α + αs)[Em − Um ]

(3.34)

For the g submarket, value functions for the matched and unmatched states are
unchanged from the previous section. For the m submarket, the only change is to
the value function for the matched state. Imperfect contract enforcement impacts the
expected payment, αw(q, θm ) , and the probability of match destruction, 1 − α + αs.
As in the previous sections, we substitute for Ei in each equation and arrive at
expressions for the value of being unmatched in each submarket:
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(r + s)b + θg Q(θg )[w(q, θg ) − C(q)]
r + s + θg Q(θg )

(3.35)

(r + 1 − α + αs)b + θm Q(θm )[αw(q, θm ) − C(q)]
r + 1 − α + αs + θm Q(θm )

(3.36)

rUg =

rUm =

In equilibrium, sellers must be indifferent between being unmatched in either
submarket. Therefore, Ug = Um = U .
Buyers’ problem. We write the analogous value functions for buyers in their
unmatched and matched states in each submarket:

rVi = −k + Q(θi )[Ji − Vi ]

∀

i ∈ {g, m}

(3.37)

rJg = Rg (q) − w(q, θg ) − s[Jg − Vg ]

(3.38)

rJm = Rm (q) − αw(q, θm ) − (1 − α + αs)[Jm − Vm ]

(3.39)

Just as in the sellers’ problem, the value functions for buyers in the g submarket
are unchanged from the equivalent value functions under perfect contract enforcement. In the m submarket, however, buyers’ value to being matched differs for the
expected revenue, expected payment to the agent, and probability of match termination. Combining all four equations, we can write expressions unmatched buyers in
each submarket as:
−(r + s)k + Q(θg )[Rg (q) − w(q, θg )]
r + s + Q(θg )

(3.40)

−(r + 1 − α + αs)k + Q(θm )[Rm (q) − αw(q, θm )]
r + 1 − α + αs + Q(θm )

(3.41)

rVg =

rVm =
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Free entry will drive the equilibrium value of being unmatched in the m submarket
to 0. Because of the fixed cost, however, the value of being unmatched in the g
submarket is driven down to κ in equilibrium.
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, the subset of submarkets with active trading satisfy
two conditions [Mortensen and Wright, 2002]. First, each active submarket is open in
the sense that it is the preferred submarket of at least one buyer-seller pair. Second,
the set of active submarkets is complete in that no other potentially active submarket
would be preferred by any matched pair.
To be a competitive equilibrium, the price function must be tangent to the utility functions for both buyers and sellers. So we can solve for the price function
that equates the marginal rates of substitution for both buyers and sellers in each
submarket.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, sellers produce first best quality in each submarket. The relationship between market tightness in each submarket is:
∗ 2
(θm
)
κ
=
+1
(θg∗ )2
k

(3.42)

and the optimal posted offer contract for each submarket is:

w(qg , θg ) =

w(qm , θm ) =


∗
∗

C(qg∗ ) + b + [ θg η(θg∗) ](κ + k)θg∗

if qg ≥ q ∗


0

otherwise

1−η(θg )


∗ η(θ ∗ )

θm
∗
∗
m
 1 {C(qm
)
+
b
+
[
]kθm
} if qm ≥ q ∗
α
1−η(θ∗ )
m


0

(3.43)

(3.44)

otherwise

Derivations for all equations in Proposition 1 are included in the Appendix.
Imperfect contract enforcement in this setting does not result in inefficient allocations along the intensive production margin. It only impacts the extensive margin
of trade in a similar manner to Shapiro and Stiglitz’s efficiency wage model [1984].
Posted contract prices are higher in the m submarket than in the g submarket in or-
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der to incentivize sellers to search for buyers in the m submarket and produce higher
∗
quality qm
> qg∗ . Optimal quality is higher in the m submarket because buyers in

this submarket have greater revenues from trade than in submarket g. However, the
expected gains from search are the same in either market.
∗
For a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, the ratio of the ratio of θm
to θg∗ depends
∗
only on κ and k. For positive values of κ, we see that equilibrium requires θm
> θg∗ .

The submarket where buyers behave as if contracts are perfectly enforced is less
tight than the submarket where buyers can default on their posted contract offers.
Intuitively, sellers prefer the g submarket, leaving fewer available to search in the m
submarket.
Comparative Statics. Table (3.1) summarizes the comparative static predictions. From Equation (3.44), it is readily apparent that

dwm
dα

< 0. As buyers in the

m submarket deviate from posted prices more frequently, they must offer higher contract prices to induce sellers to contract in that market. Equation (3.44) also shows
that

dwm
∗
dθm

> 0. So as contract enforcement gets worse in the m market, posted prices

increase and market tightness both increase in that submarket. Sellers then have a
better likelihood of matching with buyers in the m submarket, although buyers are
less likely to honor their contract commitments.
Table 3.1. Comparative Static Predictions for Equilibrium Payments
α
θg∗
∗
θm

Submarket g
dwg
<0
dα
dwg
>0
dθ∗
g

dwg
∗
dθm

Submarket m
dwm
<0
dα
dwm
>0
dθ∗

>0

g

dwm
∗
dθm

>0

From Equation (3.42), we know that the ratio of

∗
θm
θg∗

is fixed by k and κ, and

∗
therefore invariant to changes in α. Any changes in θm
are exactly offset by changes

in θg∗ . From Equation (3.43), we know that

dwg
dθg∗

> 0. Therefore, a decrease in

α increases market tightness and posted contract prices in the g submarket too.
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Worsening contract enforcement in the m submarket makes buyers in submarket m
raise their posted offers, making the g submarket less attractive to sellers, and forcing
buyers in g submarket to also raise their prices.

3.3.4 Imperfect Contract Enforcement with Endogenous Default
In this section, we describe the process required for endogenizing default rates
in the model. We begin by showing how to construct a model with a single submarket, limited commitment, and imperfect record-keeping where the default rate is
endogenously determined to be zero. This case generalizes the standard relational
contracting model to a multilateral setting with search frictions. Then we discuss
how the model could be adapted to allow for an endogenous positive probability
of defaults, and review the complexities involved in extending the model to a twosubmarket setting.
Relational Contracting with One Submarket. Assume there is only one
submarket and that contracts are not perfectly enforced. Players choose a series
of actions over time as described above for the mixed submarket in the section on
exogenous imperfect contract enforcement. Players define strategies over these actions
which span the full set of actions that could be taken at every point in the game,
both past and future. We are interested in solving for Markov Perfect Equilibria in
steady-state with no population growth over time. Let η indicate the equilibrium
state of uη , v η , and θη contingent on the history and strategy space of all actions
taken by all agents.
Along the equilibrium path, assume buyers choose to honor their contract commitments, and the outcome is described as in section 3.3.2. Let θC indicate the
equilibrium market tightness when buyers all choose to cooperate with their contract
commitments, and J(θC ) indicate the value to buyers from being contracted under
those conditions.
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To establish an endogenous enforcement regime, we must specify the payoff to
buyers for defaulting. In the monetary search literature, this is often assumed to
be the autarky payoff [Kehoe and Levine, 1993, Alvarez and Jermann, 2000, Lotz
et al., 2015]. No trade after a single default is also the most common assumption
for modeling bilateral relational contracts [Levin, 2003, Halac, 2012]. In our model,
there is no alternate method of trading outside of contracts. Thus the autarky payoff
to buyers is zero.
If all sellers were able to know which buyers had defaulted and credibly commit
to refuse to trade with any buyer after a single default, then the necessary incentive
compatibility constraint would be:

J(θC ) ≥ J(θAutarky ) ≡ 0

(3.45)

From Equation (3.14), we know that J(θC ) is always strictly positive at equiilbrium. Thus Equation (3.45) would never be binding and relational contracting
would achieve the same outcome as perfect contract enforcement. However, the real
situation in Kenya’s French bean market has no record-keeping mechanism to make
defaults common knowledge to all other parties in the market. Thus we need to consider an alternate method of determining the payoff to buyers for defaulting. If sellers
expect that buyers will always default on their agreements, then no sellers will ever
be willing to search and equilibrium cannot be sustained in the market. Therefore
we should consider alternatives to always cooperate which range somewhere between
never cooperating and always cooperating.
Consider an equilibrium where buyers honor their contracts with frequency α ∈
(0, 1) and matches terminate after a single instance of default. Let θα indicate the
equilibrium market tightness when buyers play this strategy, and J(θα ) indicate the
value to buyers from being contracted under those conditions. Incentive compatibility
would then require:

J(θC ) ≥ J(θα )

(3.46)
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Provided that always cooperating generates higher payoffs to buyers in their
matched state than playing a strategies where they default on contracts with some
positive probability, buyers will prefer to adhere to contract terms. From Equation
(3.14), we also know that J is increasing in θ and decreasing in r. As buyers default
more frequently, sellers have less incentive to search for a buyer and market tightness
decreases. Also as buyers default more frequently, trade is feasible equilibrium outcome only when agents care more about the future. For Equation (3.46) to constrain
the equilibrium outcome, it should increase the minimum discount factor needed for
agents to trade in the market, which should in turn impact the equilibrium market
tightness generated when buyers endogenously choose to always adhere to contract
terms.
Equation (3.46) constrains agents to select an equilibrium where defaults never
occur. To generate an equilibrium where buyer defaults occur with some positive
probability, we can consider a different incentive compatibility condition. The least
possible cooperative strategy would be one where buyers honor their contract once
and default on any repeat trades. Let θD1 indicate the equilibrium market tightness
when buyers play this strategy. Then we would observe equilibria with some instances
of default provided:

J(θα ) ≥ J(θD1 )

(3.47)

Relational Contracting with Two Submarkets. Introducing a second submarket and buyer heterogeneity adds another dimension of complexity to the model.
With two submarkets, equilibrium θiη is contingent on strategies used by the buyers in the both submarkets. As shown in the above section on exogenous imperfect
contract enforcement, the extent of buyer reliability in the mixed submarket has an
impact on outcomes in the good submarket. To achieve an equilibrium where contracts are endogenously always adhered to in the good submarket and endogenously
not always adhered to in the mixed submarket requires separate incentive compatibility constraints for each submarket. Additional work would be necessary to show
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that strategies are jointly feasible and constitute best responses to buyers in the same
submarket, buyers in the opposite submarket, and sellers.

3.3.5 Comparison of Perfect and Exogenous Imperfect Contract Enforcement Models
Table (3.2) summarizes how the equilibrium predictions differ between the perfect
and imperfect contract enforcement settings. Both settings predict that the equilibrium quality, q, should be the first best outcome. With risk neutral buyers and sellers,
there are no effects of imperfect contract enforcement on the intensive margin, and
payments and match probabilities absorb all the impacts on the extensive margin of
trade.
Table 3.2. Comparison of Equilibrium Predictions of Theoretical Model
Perfect Enforcement
1st best

Imperfect Enforcement
1st best
∗
∗
qg
< qm

Seller
matching

θ ∗ Q(θ ∗ )

∗
∗
θg
Q(θg
) < θ ∗ Q(θ ∗ )
∗
∗
∗
∗
θg
Q(θg
) < θm
Q(θm
)

Payments

w(q, θ) = C(q ∗ ) + b + [ 1−η(θ∗ ) ]kθ ∗

Quality

θ ∗ η(θ ∗ )

η(θ ∗ )

g
g
∗
∗
w(qg , θg ) = C(qg
) + b + [ 1−η(θ
∗ ) ](κ + k)θg
g

w(qm , θm ) =

1 {C(q ∗ )
m
α

+b+

∗ η(θ ∗ )
θm
∗
m
[ 1−η(θ
∗ ]kθm }
m)

The probability that a seller will match with a good type buyer, θg∗ , is strictly lower
under imperfect enforcement then under perfect enforcement. If we fix unemployment
to be at the same level under perfect and imperfect contract enforcement and set
∗
Equations (3.7) and (3.31) equal to each other, we can see that θ∗ , θg∗ , and θm
have

a simple relationship:

θ∗ Q(θ∗ ) = θg∗ Q(θg∗ ) + (
For 0 < α < 1, the fraction

s
1−α+αs

s
∗
∗
)θm
Q(θm
)
1 − α + αs

(3.48)

falls strictly between s and 1. Therefore

∗
θg∗ < θ∗ . However, the relationship between θm
and θ∗ depends model parameters.
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∗
We know from Equation (Appendix B.15) that θg∗ < θm
. κ is the critical factor

that generates different market tightness in each submarket. If both markets had
free entry, the ratio of

∗
θm
θg∗

would be 1 and agents would have the same probability of

matching in either submarket. In this environment, imperfect contract enforcement
by itself does not alter the probability of making a match in either submarket. Instead,
imperfect contract enforcement creates the possibility for buyers and sellers to value
perfect contract enforcement, which manifests as different match probabilities and
contract prices across the two submarkets.
Posted offers from the mixed type are always greater than posted offers for the
∗
good type for 0 < α < 1. Because the relationship between θm
and θ∗ depends model

parameters is indeterminant, however, we also cannot say whether posted offers from
the good type buyer will be higher or lower under imperfect enforcement compared
to under perfect contract enforcement. With imperfect contract enforcement, posted
offers internalize the cost of declaring buyer type, κ, which is not paid by buyers or
sellers when contracts are perfectly enforced. Higher values of κ increase the wedge
∗
, which acts to offset the increase in posted offers relative to the
between θg∗ and θm

perfect enforcement case.

3.4 Data

3.4.1 Survey design
We surveyed two hundred and forty households in Kirinyaga County, Kenya between September-October 2013. Households were sampled as matched pairs in a
case-control design. Each pair consists of one randomly selected farmer who was currently contracted to produce French beans (case), and a matching farmer without a
contract (control) who was purposefully selected as the geographically closest neighboring farmer without a contract. Details about the sampling design and matching
procedures are provided in Rosch and Ortega [2014].
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The survey collected data on household characteristics, food security, social capital, farm assets, production and marketing decisions, French bean market characteristics, and contracting experience. As part of the survey, we administered a choice
experiment to each farmer to measure their preferences over different contract enforcement regimes. The choice experiment measured farmers’ preferences for producing
low or high quality French beans, which captures information about the production
cost functions, and their preferences for contracting with more and less reliable buyers, which measures their willingness to contract under different exogenous contract
enforcement scenarios.
Table 3.3. Production Status for With-Contract and No-Contract Groups

Never Produced
Production Status Currently Producing
No Longer Producing
Total

Contract Status
With-Contract No-Contract
0
37
115
7
3
74
118
118

Our sampling design was based on farmers with contracts on register with the
Kenyan French bean regulatory authorities. As such, we observed some sampling
variation between contract status and actual production of French beans at the time
of the survey. Table (3.3) shows the current production status for farmers with and
without contracts. Three of the contracted farmers were no longer producing French
beans at the time of the survey. The rest were all actively producing beans. Seven
of the non-contracted farmers were producing French beans, either in expectation
of signing a contract or to supply the local market. Of the remaining farmers in
the non-contracted group, approximately one-third had never grown French beans
and the remaining two-thirds had exited the market. 1/3 of the contracted farmers
surveyed supplied the processed export market; the remaining 2/3 of surveyed farmers
supplied the fresh export market.
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We also observed some sampling variation between contract status and receipt
of contract offers. All currently contract farmers received at least one offer, and 17
farmers received multiple contract offers. Of the 118 farmers without contracts, 18
farmers (15% of the sample) received at an offer to contract from at least one buyer
and 2 received multiple contract offers. 17 of the 18 farmers had previously grown
French beans.

3.4.2 Data structure and key variables
Because we sample pairs of farmers, we have both information unique to each
farmer, and information that is unique to each pair of farmers. At the level of individual farmers, the key variables of interest are distance to market, a dummy variable
if they received a contract offer, price offered, reservation payment, outside option,
and perception of probability of buyer default (α). At the level of individual pairs, the
key variables of interest are the local densities of buyers, sellers, and filled contracts;
local average prices; and local average perception of buyer default (α).
Data from individual farmers. Distance to market is measured as the average
distance to market for all plots farmed. We include three measurements of price
offered: contracted price offered, and minimum and maximum bids received outside
of a contract. We impute measures for the reservation payment, outside option, and
α using the choice experiment results.
The choice experiment presented each farmer with a series of decisions between
hypothetical contracts. Every farmer was presented with a series of choice scenarios, each involving two hypothetical contracts and a third, no-choice option. We
calibrated the hypothetical contracts to mimic the full set of contracts used in the
market. This allowed us to isolate the effect of differences in preferences on contract
status separately from the effect of actual contracts offered. Contracts in the experiment included three attributes: contract price, required quality, and type of buyer
proposing the contract.
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We used the panel of choices made by each farmer to estimate individual specific
willingness to supply or accept a contract (WTA).9 The willingness to supply metric
represents the minimal payment that the farmer requires in order to supply French
beans under contract, wR , given different contract attributes. We can also impute
a value for the farmer’s outside option to contracting, b, because each choice set
included the possibility of picking no contract.
To calculate a farmer’s specific reservation payment for the bundle of attributes
embodied by a contract, we aggregate the individual specific WTAs for quality and
partner type.10 The bundle then captures the production costs of growing French
beans as well as the marketing risks associated with a given buyer type. Then we
compare these measures across matched pairs of farmers with and without contracts.
Differences in reservation payments across pairs will then reflect differences in how
they perceive the market, including differences in search frictions.
To form an individual-specific proxy of α, which we call δ, we construct ratios of
WTA for different buyer types. The choice experiment included four categories of
buyers: a complete stranger, a perfect trading partner, the farmers’ current trading
partner, and the most reliable partner a farmer had ever traded with. The perfect
partner type corresponded to exogeneous perfect contract enforcement. The complete
stranger type corresponded to exogenous imperfect contract enforcement with no relationship history to allow for relational contracting. The current trading partner
type corresponded to exogenous imperfect contract enforcement with some history
that could allow for relational contracting. The most reliable partner type ever corresponded to exogenous imperfect contract enforcement with relational contracting
with a buyer who employs the most cooperative trading strategy available. These
last two types capture endogenous contract enforcement regimes, with potentially
9

A complete description of the estimation procedures is available in Rosch and Ortega [2014].
WTA for a bundle of attributes is the sum of the individual effects for each attribute plus any
interaction effects between attributes. Our choice experiment design allowed for interaction effects,
but these interactions were not statistically significant. Results are available from the authors upon
request.
10
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stronger endogenous contract enforcement under the most reliable partner type than
the current trading partner type.
We calculate WTA using complete stranger as the base case. Therefore WTA for
a perfect partner represents how much lower a payment a farmer requires to contract
with a perfect partner then they would charge for a complete stranger. Therefore the
ratio of WTA for current partner to perfect partner measures how much the farmer
values their current partner on the scale from complete stranger to perfect partner.
A current partner that behaves exactly like a perfect partner would have a ratio of 1.
A current partner that behaves exactly like a completely stranger would have a ratio
of 0. We calculate these ratios for the current partner and most reliable partner ever,
and use them to proxy for α.
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Figure 3.4. Map of Sampled Farmers with Contracts and Corresponding Buyers

Data from individual pairs of farmers. We recorded GPS coordinates for
each farmer surveyed. Figure (3.4.2) shows the locations of all sampled farmers
with contracts and the corresponding buyer with whom they transact. The maps
shows that farmers tend to be clustered, which reflects the underlying dispersion of
irrigation projects within the county. The map also shows that some clusters have
a greater variety of buyers actively contracting in their local area. We exploit this

133
variation in cluster and buyer densities across Kirinyaga County in order to identify
the relationship between available contracts and farmers seeking contracts.
For each contracted farmer in our sample, we count the number of sampled pairs
and unique buyers active within the surrounding 5km radius. We use the number of
sampled pairs to proxy for the total number of contracted pairs in the market. As our
survey was designed to be representative of all contracted farmers in Kirinyaga, this
measure should provide an unbiased estimate of the total number of local matches in
each part of the county. We use the number of unique buyers to proxy the number
of contracts available in the local neighborhood of each farmer.
We use the distance between the paired contracted and nearest non-contracted
farmers as a proxy for the total number of farmers seeking contracts. Greater distances between pairs should correspond to a larger number of available farmers in
the local area. Figure (3.4.2) plots these values for each contracted farmer sampled
along with a polynomial fit line. The figure shows the expected downward sloping
relationship, analogous to the Beveridge Curve relationship between job vacancies
and unemployment rates for labor markets.
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Figure 3.5. Plot of Buyer Density vs Pair Distance

We calculate θ∗ as the ratio of unique buyers to distance between paired contracted
and non-contracted farmers. We calculate the local average price and δ using the
individual prices and δ reported by the contracted farmers within the surrounding
5km radius. Again, because we are only using results from the randomly selected
member of each pair and not both members, the spatial averages should provide
unbiased estimates of the true values for the population of contracted farmers.

3.4.3 Characteristics of farmers with and without contracts
Table (3.4) shows how farmers with and without contracts differ in terms of their
household and farm characteristics, while Table (3.5) summarizes how they differ in
their French bean marketing experiences and Table (3.6) summarizes how they differ
in their search for buyers. We report statistics separately for the farmers without
contracts who received no contract offers and the farmers without contracts who
received at least one offer.
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Table 3.4. Household and Farm Characteristics for With-Contract
and No-Contract Groups

Male (%)
Age
Education
Farming Experience
(Years)
French Bean
Experience (Years)
French Bean
Trainings
Male Head of
Household (%)
Household Size

Acreage Owned
Acreage Farmed
French Bean Acres
Farmed
Number of Different
Crops Grown
Irrigation

Total Household
Income (1000 Ksh)
Value of Outstanding
Loans (1000 Ksh)
Farm-Fixed Assets
Owned (1000 Ksh)
Obs

With
No Contract
Mean of Paired
Contract
With Offers
No Offers
Differences
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1) - (2)
Respondent and Household Characteristics
57.63
66.67
39.00
-0.11
(0.17)
45.35
48.17
46.13
-4.67
(5.15)
3.19
2.50
2.58
0.39
(0.36)
20.97
25.94
20.40
-6.28
(5.33)
12.24
5.56
4.14
5.28*
(2.53)
1.99
0.89
0.66
1.33***
(0.34)
88.98
88.89
82.00
0.00
(0.11)
4.20
4.33
3.85
-0.66
(0.62)
Production Characteristics
2.43
2.66
1.99
-0.53
(0.54)
3.90
2.76
2.25
0.56
(0.97)
2.90
0.36
0.11
2.47***
(0.83)
3.47
3.44
2.85
0.00
(0.57)
1.00
1.00
0.70
0.00
(0.00)
Outcomes
453.01
219.33
168.58
-13.21
(89.69)
45.08
14.39
20.15
97.93a
(62.05)
5520.17
2430.84
2165.73
184.06
(860.54)
118
18
100
18

Mean of Paired
Differences
(1) - (3)
0.19***
(0.07)
-0.45
(1.82)
0.66***
(0.21)
0.80
(1.68)
8.35***
(1.04)
1.29***
(0.16)
0.07
(0.05)
0.45**
(0.21)
0.50
(0.34)
1.74***
(0.54)
2.81***
(0.50)
0.63***
(0.18)
.30***
(0.05)
328.87***
(103.88)
12.83
(9.53)
3877.39
(2556.37)
100

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The mean of paired differences tests are calculated as H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA :
V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0
a: Distribution is highly skewed with two outliers. Median value of difference is 0.

Household and farm characteristics. Farmers who received at least one offer
have household and farm characteristics that are very similar to the farmers with
contracts. These two groups significantly differ only in terms of French bean experience, French bean trainings, and French bean acreage. In contrast, the population
of farmers who do not receive any contract offers differ from the population of contracted farmers in many dimensions. On average, farmers who receive no contract
offers are more likely to be female, less educated, have less training and experience
growing French beans, have fewer members in their household, earn less income, farm
fewer acres, plant fewer acres of French beans, produce fewer types of crops, and are
less likely to have irrigation than farmers with contracts. In Rosch and Ortega [2014],
we show that these factors do not to influence farmers’ preferences over contracting.
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While they may not influence farmers’ ability to supply under contract, they may be
influencing farmers’ opportunity to contract.
French bean marketing. Looking at the results in Table (3.5), we see that
farmers who received no contract offers also perceive the French bean market differently from the population of farmers with contracts. On average, these farmers know
of fewer French bean buyers, receive fewer offers, and consequently receive significantly lower market prices than farmers with current contracts. Even though these
groups are located equidistant from their closest local market, and the farmers without contracts are located 0.4 km closer to roads, these groups perceive the French
bean market very differently.
Farmers without contracts who received at least one contract offer, however, are
very similar to the farmers with current contracts. On average, the farmers with
current contracts sell to slightly more buyers than the farmers who rejected all offers.
Interestingly, farmers with contracts also receive maximum price offers of 12 Kenyan
shillings (Ksh) per kg more than the farmers who rejected all offers. 12 Ksh/kg
represents a 40% premium over the floor price contract offered for in processed bean
market. It is possible that these rejections were solely for processing market contracts
and that we did not observe rejections of any fresh market contracts, however this
conjecture cannot be explored with our existing dataset.

Table 3.5. Marketing Characteristics for With-Contract and No-Contract Groups

Known French
bean buyers
Buyers offering to purchase
beans in past year
Buyers offering a contract
in past year
Buyers sold to in past year
Lowest price offered per
Kg in past year
Highest price offered per
Kg in past year
Distance to Year-Round
Road (km)
Distance to Market (km)
Obs

With
Contract
(1)
4.94

No Contract
With Offers No Offers
(2)
(3)
3.61
3.09

2.08

1.72

0.21

1.05

1.11

0.00

1.34

0.83

0.10

33.72

32.39

3.38

56.81

44.72

5.96

1.26

1.12

0.90

4.35

5.20

4.50

118

18

100

Mean of Paired
Differences
(1) - (2)
-0.28
(0.47)
0.06
(0.33)
-0.06
(0.15)
0.33**
(0.14)
3.83
(5.02)
12.06*
(5.74)
-0.11
(0.51)
-0.28
(1.19)
18

Mean of Paired
Differences
(1) - (3)
2.02***
(0.55)
1.92***
(0.21)
1.05***
(0.05)
1.27***
(0.20)
29.89***
(1.72)
50.86***
(3.76)
0.41*
(0.24)
-0.28
(0.44)
100

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The mean of paired differences tests are calculated as H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA :
V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0.
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On average, the farmers who receive contract offers (regardless of their current
contract status) know more French bean buyers and receive more offers than farmers
who do not receive any offers. They receive offers from roughly half of their known
buyers and half of those offers were for written contracts. The farmers who receive
no offers know two fewer French bean buyers on average and perceive market prices
close to 0 Ksh/kg, even though most of these farmers have previously produced French
beans.
Farmers with current contracts sell to a larger set of buyers on average than just
the set of buyers who proposed written contracts. This indicates that there is some
side-selling behavior occurring in the market. Farmers without contracts who receive
no contract offers also sell to slightly more buyers than offer them contracts. This
suggests that there is some production occurring outside of contracts, but this appears
to be a small share of the market.
The average minimum price for the with contract group is 33.7 Ksh/kg, which is
just above the standard price offered for contracts for processed beans (30 Ksh/kg).
The average maximum price for the with contract group is 56.8 Ksh/kg, which is just
slightly more than the average contract price listed for all contracts in our sampling
frame.
Search behavior. Looking at the results in Table (3.6), we see that relatively
few farmers actively search for new buyers. 40% of farmers with contracts searched
for a buyer in 2013, compared to roughly 10-15% of farmers without contracts. On
average, farmers without contracts also devote 6 hours less and spend half as much
on buyer search than farmers with contracts, although their unit costs of search seem
to be roughly equivalent.
Overall, these facts suggest that how buyers select the farmers to whom they
offer contracts is a key factor for farmers’ observed contract status. Buyers seem to
be targeting male farmers, with more education, larger size farms, and with access
to irrigation. Most non-contracted farmers are aware of multiple buyers, but still
receive no contract offers or bids of any kind. Few farmers end up rejecting all
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Table 3.6. Search Characteristics for Farmers With-Contract and
No-Contract Groups

Time spent searching for
French bean buyers (hours)
Total cost of French bean
buyer search (Ksh)
Per unit cost of buyer
search (Ksh)
Obs (Engaged in any buyer search)
Obs (Total)
Share of farmers who search (%)

With
Contract
(1)
15.83

No Contract
With Offers No Offers
(2)
(3)
1.67
9.45

1526.17

166.67

727.27

164.40

55.56

185.61

46
118
40.0

3
18
16.7

11
100
11.0

contract offers, and few farmers report side-selling outside of their contract. Farmers
who receive offers, whether accepted or rejected, devote significantly more time and
money to searching for French bean buyers. This evidence is consistent with a story
of search frictions complicating the buyer-farmer matching dynamic and potentially
acting as a barrier to market in this setting.

3.4.4 Choice experiment variables for farmers with and without contracts
Table (3.7) shows the average willingness to accept (WTA) values from the choice
experiment. Quality has a negative effect on willingness to contract, which is consistent with our expectations that it measures farmer’s costs of producing French beans.
Partner attributes all have positive coefficients, that increase from current trading
partner, to most reliable partner, to perfect partner.11 A negative outside option
indicates that farmers’ best alternatives to contracting as not as profitable as the
contracts in the choice experiment, on average.

11

Base case is a perfect stranger.

140
Table 3.7. Average WTA and δ, Across Populations

Quality
Current Trading
Partner
Most Reliable
Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
No Contract
δ (CTP)
δ (MRTP)
Obs

With
Contract
(1)
-15.25***
(1.59)
22.35***
(0.93)
38.36***
(2.10)
44.70***
(2.77)
-29.51***
(9.55)

No Contract
With Offers
No Offers
(2)
(3)
-11.17***
-12.55***
(1.53)
(1.39)
26.46***
30.10***
(2.27)
(0.96)
29.58***
40.90***
(3.49)
(1.71)
46.89***
54.29***
(2.08)
(1.66)
-18.80
-27.10
(17.78)
(17.04)

Mean of Paired
Differences
(1) - (2)
-6.54
(3.81)
-4.69
(2.83)
9.16
(5.84)
2.83
(7.91)
-22.07
(28.74)

Mean of Paired
Differences
(1) - (3)
-2.27
(2.10)
-7.65***
(1.32)
-2.61
(2.84)
-10.49***
(3.16)
-0.36
(19.58)

0.63***
(0.04)
1.02***
(0.08)

0.58***
(0.06)
0.68***
(0.08)

0.58***
(0.02)
0.77***
(0.03)

-0.04
(0.06)
0.29*
(0.15)

0.07
(0.05)
0.25***
(0.10)

118

18

100

18

100

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The mean of paired differences tests are calculated as H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA :
V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0.

As shown in column (1) - (2), there are no significant differences for any WTA
between farmers with contracts and farmers who received at least one contract offer. Farmers who received no offers, however, have significantly higher WTAs for
current partner and perfect partner than farmers with contracts. This means that
the farmers who received no offers would need higher contract prices to compensate
for partner risk than farmers currently under contract, even if the contracts were
perfectly enforced.
The proxy for buyer reliability, δ, as measured using the ratio of CTP to PP,
is at roughly 60%, with no significant differences between farmers with and without
contracts. δ measured using the most reliable partner, however, is somewhere between
70% - 100%. Additionally, farmers with current contracts perceive buyer reliability
to be roughly 25-30% higher than farmers without contracts. Because the bulk of
our surveyed farmers without contracts had some prior experience with French bean
contracting, these estimates are consistent with the idea that farmers who end up
exiting the market tend to encounter less reliable buyers on average.
Table (3.8) shows the factors that are correlated with δ for the CTP and MRTP
measures. Distance to a good road and household income are positively correlated
with both metrics of δ. Farmers who live closer to good roads and wealthier farmers
perceive buyers to be more reliable than farmers who are poorer or live further away
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Table 3.8. Determinants of δ
CTP
(1)
0.0210
(0.0539)

MRTP
(2)
-0.0536
(0.0924)

-0.00153
(0.0164)

-0.00207
(0.0281)

-0.00757∗∗
(0.00315)

-0.00522
(0.00539)

0.0265
(0.0182)

0.0239
(0.0312)

0.0000197
(0.0762)

0.164
(0.131)

Household Size

-0.0147
(0.0161)

-0.0278
(0.0276)

Acreage Farmed

-0.0222∗
(0.0125)

-0.0653∗∗∗
(0.0214)

French Bean Acres Farmed

0.0207
(0.0130)

0.0638∗∗∗
(0.0223)

Number of Crops Grown

0.0107
(0.0195)

0.00228
(0.0333)

Irrigation

0.0223
(0.0775)

0.189
(0.133)

1.86e-04∗∗∗
(3.71e-05)

2.92e-04∗∗∗
(6.36e-05)

Farm Fixed Assets (1000 Ksh)

-8.72e-10
(1.49e-09)

-3.12e-09
(2.56e-09)

Value of Outstanding Loans (1000 Ksh)

-2.49e-04
(2.50e-04)

-6.51e-04
(4.29e-04)

Distance to Year-Round (km)

0.0337∗∗
(0.0134)

0.0483∗∗
(0.0230)

Known French Bean Buyers

-0.0120∗
(0.00617)

-0.0185∗
(0.0106)

Constant

0.637∗∗∗
(0.105)
236
0.093

0.803∗∗∗
(0.180)
236
0.097

Male (%)

Education

French Bean Experience (Years)

French Bean Trainings

Male Head of Household (%)

Total Household Income (1000 Ksh)

Observations
Adjusted R2

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

from markets. Known French bean buyers and acreage farmed are negatively correlated with both metrics of δ. Farmers who operate larger farms or know more buyers
have a lower opinion of buyer reliability than smaller, less well integrated producers.
Additionally, farmers with more years of experience producing French beans report
lower values of buyer reliability based on their current partner. Likewise, farmers
with more acreage devoted to French bean production report higher values of buyers
reliability for their most reliable partner ever.
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Table 3.9. Statistics for 5km Radius Around Each Contracted Farmer
Unique Number of Contracted Sellers
Unique Number of Buyers
Mean Low Bid
Mean High Bid
Mean Contract Price
Mean δ (CTP)
Mean δ (MRTP)

Min
2
1
21.67
35
35
0.46
0.76

Max
31
7
42.88
129
55
0.84
1.50

Mean
19.03
3.76
33.61
56.07
44.44
0.63
1.01

Median
23
4
33.88
56.70
43.33
0.62
0.95

3.4.5 Descriptive Statistics for Spatial variables
Table (3.9) provides descriptive statistics for the spatial variables that we use in the
analysis. In the 5km region surrounding each contracted farmer, the median farmer
has 23 other contracted farmers and 4 unique buyers around her. Three contracted
farmers have only one unique buyer operating in their local 5km area. Thirty-six
farmers have only two unique buyers operating in their immediate surroundings.
Average low offers range from 21.67 Ksh/kg to 42.88 Ksh/kg, with a mean offer of
33.61 Ksh/kg. Average maximum offers range from 35 to 129 Ksh/kg, with a mean
offer of 56.07 Ksh/kg. Average contract prices range from 35 to 55 Ksh/kg, with a
typical local average price of 44.44 Ksh/kg. Average reliability for current trading
partners ranges from 46-84% reliable, with a typical level of average buyer reliability
of 63%. Average reliability as measured by most reliable trading partner varies from
76-150%, with a typical level of average buyer reliability of 101%.

3.5 Results

3.5.1 Are search frictions present in this market?
Matching function. We estimate a matching function:

Mi (θ∗ ) = f (θ∗ ) + δ + i

(3.49)
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where θ∗ is the equilibrium market tightness (ratio of buyers to sellers), M (θ∗ ) is
the total number of contracted farmers or filled vacancies, and f (θ∗ ) is a production
function that transforms farmers and vacancies into filled contracts. Equation (3.49)
takes a “black box” approach to matching functions [Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001],
meaning that we do not model the effect of each type of friction individually but only
look for aggregate relationships between available buyers, sellers, and the total number
of contracts in the market. Following the literature, we estimate Cobb-Douglas and
translog functional forms for the matching function. We estimate functions using θ
as well as for buyer and sellers densities individually. Results are shown in Tables
(3.10) and (3.11).
For the results using θ as a regressor, we see that theta has a significant, positive
relationship with match formation in all Cobb-Douglas and translog specifications.
In areas where markets are less tight (higher values of θ), the ratio of buyers to sellers
is more favorable for sellers which is associated with a greater density of contracts, on
average. The translog specifications show diminishing returns for θ. This is consistent
with the market having an optimal degree of market tightness. Both proxies for α
are statistically significant individually, and have consistent magnitudes across model
specifications. Except for the translog specification with both proxies included (column 8), all proxy coefficients show positive effects on match formation which agree
with model predictions. Areas where buyers are more reliable have higher densities
of contracted farmers.

Table 3.10. Matching Function Estimates Using θ

Market Tightness θ

(1)
0.0490∗
(0.0283)

Cobb-Douglas
(2)
(3)
0.0725∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0268)

(4)
0.0721∗∗∗
(0.0269)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.0263)

(M arketT ightness)2
2.619∗∗∗
(0.760)

δ (CTP)

δ (MRTP)

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

(5)
0.143∗∗∗
(0.0355)

2.752∗∗∗
(0.0633)
118
0.017

1.062∗∗
(0.494)
118
0.101

2.294∗∗∗
(0.729)

1.246∗∗∗
(0.334)
118
0.161

1.771∗∗∗
(0.527)
118
0.166

-0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0263)

-0.0878∗∗∗
(0.0249)

2.046∗∗∗
(0.747)

-2.177
(1.691)
1.448∗∗∗
(0.316)

Translog
(6)
(7)
0.146∗∗∗
0.151∗∗∗
(0.0346)
(0.0333)

2.897∗∗∗
(0.0698)
118
0.129

1.554∗∗∗
(0.495)
118
0.175

(8)
0.153∗∗∗
(0.0329)
-0.0973∗∗∗
(0.0250)
-3.341∗∗
(1.623)

1.270∗∗∗
(0.306)

2.549∗∗∗
(0.691)

1.552∗∗∗
(0.331)
118
0.236

2.391∗∗∗
(0.522)
118
0.257

∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimates of the aggregate matching function for the French bean industry in
Kirinyaga County, Kenya. Dependent variable is the natural log of the number of contracted
farmers within a 5km radius.
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Table 3.11. Matching Function Estimates Using Buyer and Seller Densities
(1)
0.661∗∗∗
(0.0981)

Cobb-Douglas
(2)
(3)
0.892∗∗∗
0.916∗∗∗
(0.0865)
(0.0780)

(4)
0.909∗∗∗
(0.0788)

(5)
1.512∗∗
(0.454)

(6)
2.099∗∗∗
(0.394)

Translog
(7)
1.408∗∗∗
(0.362)

(8)
1.323∗∗
(0.427)

0.0326
(0.0275)

0.0184
(0.0227)

0.0208
(0.0207)

0.133∗
(0.0653)

0.0954
(0.0556)

0.0256
(0.0538)

0.0195
(0.0564)

Buyer x Distance

-0.0788
(0.0541)

-0.0578
(0.0459)

0.00180
(0.0443)

0.00733
(0.0468)

(BuyerDensity)2

-0.825∗
(0.382)

-1.072∗∗
(0.325)

-0.469
(0.308)

-0.401
(0.356)

(P airDistance)2

-0.123∗∗∗
(0.0333)

-0.0301
(0.0314)

-0.0276
(0.0291)

-0.0297
(0.0297)

Buyer Density

Pair Distance

4.421∗∗∗
(0.593)

δ (CTP)

δ (MRTP)

Constant
Obs
Adjusted R2
Returns to Scale

0.0199
(0.0206)

2.006∗∗∗
(0.128)
118
0.271
DRTS

-1.079∗
(0.427)
118
0.506
DRTS

4.270∗∗∗
(0.634)

-0.854
(1.190)
2.214∗∗∗
(0.231)

2.540∗∗∗
(0.511)

-0.555
(0.284)
118
0.593
DRTS

-0.338
(0.416)
118
0.591
DRTS

1.836∗∗∗
(0.265)
118
0.366
DRTS

-1.506∗∗
(0.544)
118
0.546
CRTS

-0.540
(1.418)
2.063∗∗∗
(0.256)

2.273∗∗∗
(0.607)

-0.562
(0.365)
118
0.596
IRTS

-0.383
(0.596)
118
0.593
IRTS

∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimates of the aggregate matching function for the French bean industry in
Kirinyaga County, Kenya. Dependent variable is the natural log of the number of contracted
farmers within a 5km radius.
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For the results using buyer and sellers densities as individual regressors, both the
Cobb-Douglas and translog specifications show positive effects for buyer density and
pair distance on the number of local contracts created. Buyer density is statistically
significant in both specifications. Pair distance is not statistically significant in either
model, but as shown in Table (3.11) regression 5, this is due to the opposing first and
second order effects of farmer density on the likelihood of forming contracts. However,
our measurement of pair density is not truly exogenous to the contracting problem,
and thus may be introducing some endogeneity bias into our estimates with buyer
and seller densities as separate regressors.
Both proxies for α are statistically significant individually, have consistent magnitudes across model specifications, and show positive effects on match formation
which agree with model predictions. Without accounting for α, both Cobb-Douglas
and translog specifications show diminishing returns to scale overall. After accounting for partner reliability, the Cobb-Douglas specification still displays diminishing
returns to scale although they are much less severe. The translog specification shows
increasing returns to scale for the proxy based on the MTRP, and constant returns
to scale for the proxy based on CTP.
Overall, these results suggest that search frictions are present in the market, that
match formation is impacted by buyer reliability, and that there is an optimal degree
of market tightness. Increasing the number of available farmers appears to have a
negligible effect on the aggregate number of contracted farmers in the market. Better
contract enforcement (values of α closer to 1), however, is likely to result in increased
match formation, consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
Market Prices. We estimate the effect of search frictions on local market prices:

wi (vi∗ , u∗i , αi ) = f (vi∗ , u∗i ) + αi + i

(3.50)

where wi is the average contracted price of all contracted farmers within a 5km
radius, αi is the average of the proxy value for all contracted farmers within a 5km
radius, and vi∗ and u∗i are measured as before. We also examine the effects of search
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frictions on the average minimum and maximum bids received in the 12 month period
prior to the survey. The results are shown in Table (3.12).
The densities of buyers and sellers both have positive and significant correlations
with the average contract prices offered. Our theoretical model predicts positive
effects on prices from increased numbers of buyers, but negative effects from increased
sellers in the market. Average buyer reliability as measured by the CTP metric is
not correlated with average contract prices, while reliablity measured by the MRTP
metric is strongly negatively correlated with average contract price.
Pair distance has a significant and negative effect on the local average minimum
bid. As more sellers enter the market, the minimum prices offered decrease, which is
consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. Buyer density and reliability
are not correlated with minimum prices, which is consistent with the notion that the
overall floor to the market is determined by the prices in the submarket with perfect
contract enforcement (processing submarket). Because the processing submarket in
Kenya is composed of only one firm that offers the same price to all contracted
farmers, we would not expect buyer density to have an effect on minimum prices in
this particular setting.
These effects are reversed for average maximum bid in the market. Now pair
distance is not significant, while buyer density and reliability both have significant
negative effects on the maximum prices. This is inconsistent with the predictions of
our theoretical model, which predicts that increasing the number of buyers available
should increase equilibrium prices. However, increasing the reliability of buyers reduces the maximum prices that need to be offered by making the two submarkets
more similar.

Table 3.12. Effect of Search Frictions on Average Market Prices

Buyer Density

Pair Distance

Average Contract Price
(1)
(2)
(3)
1.387∗
1.295∗
0.522
(0.702) (0.755)
(0.711)
0.428∗∗
(0.197)

Avg α (CTP)

0.434∗∗
(0.198)

Observations
Adjusted R2

-0.645∗∗∗
(0.240)

-1.769
(5.172)

-0.657∗∗∗
(0.241)

42.96∗∗∗
(0.915)
118
0.041

44.19∗∗∗
(3.725)
118
0.034

-0.662∗∗∗
(0.240)

Average Maximum Bid
(7)
(8)
(9)
-14.63∗∗∗ -20.09∗∗∗ -22.41∗∗∗
(3.511)
(3.496)
(3.079)
-1.144
(0.984)

51.67∗∗∗
(2.589)
118
0.130

-0.808
(0.918)

-67.69∗∗∗
(9.118)

2.905
(2.691)
33.61∗∗∗
(1.115)
118
0.049

30.88∗∗∗
(4.529)
118
0.043

-0.756
(0.813)

-104.5∗∗∗
(23.94)

3.904
(6.289)
-7.525∗∗∗
(2.107)

Avg α (MRTP)

Constant

0.471∗∗
(0.188)

Average Minimum Bid
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.189
0.393
0.523
(0.855)
(0.918)
(0.909)

30.24∗∗∗
(3.307)
118
0.050

74.13∗∗∗
(4.577)
118
0.116

147.1∗∗∗
(17.24)
118
0.236

152.5∗∗∗
(11.21)
118
0.399

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Reservation payments. To proxy for the reservation payment, we use preferences measured through a choice experiment to calculate a reservation payment for
which the farmer is indifferent between contracting and not contracting. Using only
information from farmers with contracts, we estimate the effect of search frictions on
farmers’ reservation payments:

wR,i (q ∗ , vi∗ , u∗i ) = f (vi∗ , u∗i ) + bi + ki + αi + i

(3.51)

We run these regressions using reservation payments computed assuming contracts
were offered by their current buyer, their most reliable buyer ever, and a perfect buyer.
We use distance to market to proxy for search costs, ki , and the value of the outside
option as calculated in the choice experiment to account for bi . The results are shown
in Table (3.13).
Buyer reliability has a weakly negative effect on reservation payment in half of
the regressions. As buyers become more reliable on average, farmers are willing to
contract for lower promised payments. Outside options are positive and significant for
the reservation payments from a perfect partner, but negative for payments from their
current trading partner. When ex-post payments can differ from ex-ante promises,
farmers with better alternatives to contracting are willing to contract at lower prices
than farmers with less lucrative alternatives to contracting. This is a puzzling result
which does not match with our theoretical predictions.

150

Table 3.13. Effect of Search Frictions on Reservation Payments
CTP

MRTP

PP

(1)
-2.880
(6.614)

(2)
-1.992
(6.583)

(3)
-2.371
(6.907)

(4)
-2.069
(6.851)

(5)
-2.094
(3.564)

(6)
-1.620
(3.548)

-1.019
(1.732)

-1.088
(1.738)

-1.829
(1.809)

-1.904
(1.809)

-0.934
(0.933)

-0.978
(0.937)

-0.0584∗∗
(0.0292)

-0.0598∗
(0.0305)

0.0158
(0.0305)

0.0103
(0.0317)

0.0406∗∗
(0.0157)

0.0392∗∗
(0.0164)

Distance to Market

-0.385
(0.720)

-0.323
(0.720)

-0.956
(0.752)

-0.902
(0.749)

-0.547
(0.388)

-0.509
(0.388)

Avg α (CTP)

-74.42
(47.49)

Buyer Density

Pair Distance

Outside Option

Avg α (MRTP)

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

-83.85∗
(49.59)
-37.06∗
(22.07)

-27.04
(21.20)
57.72∗
(34.35)
118
0.004

36.64
(25.84)
118
-0.004

-47.68∗
(25.59)

51.72
(35.87)
118
0.015

35.47
(26.89)
118
0.015

-18.22
(11.43)
21.08
(18.51)
118
0.099

8.592
(13.93)
118
0.092

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Individual prices. Using only information from farmers with contracts, we
estimate the effect of search frictions on the actual prices offered to farmers:

wi (q ∗ , vi∗ , u∗i ) = f (vi∗ , u∗i ) + bi + ki + αi + i

(3.52)

We use three outcomes: contract prices offered, and minimum and maximum
bids received. We use distance to market to proxy for search costs, and assume
that all farmers have the same bargaining power and expected productivity. The
results are shown in Table (3.14). The outside option has a statistically significant
and positive effect on all three measures of market prices. As farmers have more
profitable alternative crops to pursue, buyers have to offer higher payments to induce
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the farmers to supply French beans. The magnitude of this effect is small, however,
and increases prices offered by less than 1 Ksh/kg in all regressions.
Distance to market has a significant positive relationship on the minimum and
maximum bids received by farmers. This is consistent with Equation (3.27). The
farther farmers have to travel to get to market, the greater the cost of searching for (or
advertising) a vacancy, and the higher equilibrium payments needed to compensate for
these costs. However, distance has no impact on contract prices offered. This result
is inconsistent with Equation (3.27), but matches well with HCDA records showing
that exporters consistently offer uniform contract prices across all their subcontracted
farmers, regardless of where they are located within the county.
For farmer and buyer densities, we find significant effects only on the maximum
bid received and the signs are opposite of those predicted in Equation (3.27). This
parallels the findings for the average market prices. Again we see that decreasing
market tightness, either through increasing the number of buyers or decreasing the
number of sellers, decreases the maximum bids on average. Moreover, buyer reliability is only weakly significant for one of the regressions. This is a surprising result,
since our model predicts buyer competition to drive up prices. We consider possible
explanations for this behavior in the discussion section.

Table 3.14. Effect of Search Frictions on Individual Prices
Contract Price
(1)
(2)
0.547
0.152
(1.966)
(1.957)

Minimum Bid
(3)
(4)
0.917
1.758
(2.582) (2.536)

Maximum Bid
(5)
(6)
-14.95∗∗ -16.68∗∗
(7.074)
(6.938)

0.832
(0.515)

0.847
(0.517)

-0.459
(0.676)

-0.453
(0.669)

3.713∗∗
(1.853)

0.0588∗∗∗
(0.00867)

0.0580∗∗∗
(0.00906)

0.0229∗∗
(0.0114)

0.0286∗∗
(0.0117)

0.111∗∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0321)

Distance to Market

-0.208
(0.214)

-0.226
(0.214)

0.546∗
(0.281)

0.558∗∗
(0.277)

1.333∗
(0.770)

Avg α (CTP)

15.83
(14.11)

Buyer Density

Pair Distance

Outside Option

3.811
(6.304)

Avg α (MRTP)

Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

10.95
(18.54)

36.55∗∗∗
(10.21)
118
0.272

43.25∗∗∗
(7.682)
118
0.266

1.327∗
(0.758)

-57.61
(50.79)
-43.74∗
(22.35)

13.15
(8.168)
23.95∗
(13.41)
118
0.043

3.669∗∗
(1.832)

16.61∗
(9.953)
118
0.061

109.2∗∗∗
(36.74)
118
0.176

118.8∗∗∗
(27.23)
118
0.194

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5.2 Are search frictions a barrier to market?
To test if search frictions are a possible barrier to market, we analyze the differences in reservation payments between farmers with and without contracts. We
test:

H0 : E[wR,i,C=1 − wR,i,C=0 ] = 0

(3.53)

HA : E[wR,i,C=1 − wR,i,C=0 ] 6= 0

(3.54)

where i is the set of all sampled pairs. If search frictions are a barrier to market,
then matched pairs of farmers should have different values of wR on average. The
results are shown in Table (3.15).
On average, farmers with and without contracts do not have different reservation
payments except when trading with their most reliable trading partner ever (column 1). When contracts are perfectly enforced and when trading with their current
partners, farmers in and out of the market require the same minimum payments on
average. Farmers with contracts require 10.6 Ksh/kg less on average than farmers
without contracts to contract with their best ever partners, suggesting that the group
with contracts has encountered a more cooperative set of buyers over time than the
group without contracts. We see similar results if look at just the pairs where the
matching farmer received no contract offers (column 3). If we consider only the pairs
where the matching farmer also received at least one contract offer (column 2), we see
no significant differences in reservation payments for any buyer type. These results
suggest that if search frictions are acting as a barrier to market, it is not due to
systematic differences in reservation payments.

Table 3.15. Average Differences in Reservation Payments Across Matched Pairs
All

Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
Number of obs

(1)
-4.18
(3.18)
-10.56***
(3.51)
-2.92
(1.87)
118

Mean Difference
Contract Contract
Fresh
Processed
Fresh
Processed
- Offer - No Offer - Never
- Never
- Exit
- Exit
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.98
-5.11
-12.58**
-0.57
-5.34***
7.09
(8.25)
(3.45)
(5.42)
(14.35)
(1.88)
(13.91)
-12.86
-10.15***
-4.07
-26.11
-5.56***
-23.23*
(10.48)
(3.71)
(6.68)
(18.99)
(1.66)
(13.56)
-6.54
-2.27
4.96
-11.64
1.71*
-20.80***
(3.81)
(2.10)
(4.34)
(9.05)
(0.88)
(5.64)
18
100
24
13
61
20

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is differences in reservation payment for accepting a contract bundle as measured by a choice
experiment. T-test compares H0 : V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0
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Looking at the differences between the fresh and processed submarkets, however,
we see systematic differences in preferences for farmers in and out of the market in
both submarkets. When contracts are perfectly enforced in the fresh submarket, there
are no average differences between farmers with contracts and farmers who have never
entered the market (columns 4). When contracts are imperfectly enforced, however,
farmers with contracts have significantly lower reservation payments than farmers who
have never entered the market. We see the same pattern when comparing contracted
farmers with those who have exited the market (column 6). When contracts are
perfectly enforced, farmers in the market have higher reservation payments on average
then those who exit the market, but lower average payments under both imperfect
enforcement scenarios. These results suggest that if search frictions are a barrier to
market, it is only a problem because of poor contract enforcement.
For the processed submarket, we see no average differences in reservation payments
between contracted farmers and those who have never entered the market (column
5), and either no difference or lower average payments compared to farmers who have
exited the market. This suggests that search frictions are not a barrier to entry for
the processed submarket, but could potentially be a factor in farmers’ exit decisions.
To isolate the effect of search frictions on market entry and exit decisions directly,
we subtract individuals outside option from their reservation payment as in Equation
(3.55). This allows us to factor out differences in outside options and measure the
impact of search frictions on reservation payments.

Yi ≡ w(R)i − bi = f (vi , ui ) + i

(3.55)

If search frictions are a barrier to market, then matched pairs of farmers should
have different values of Y on average. Recall that matches were selected as the nearest
geographic neighbors of the opposite status. As nearest neighbors, we expect that
they should experience the same degree of market tightness. Table (3.16) summarizes
the results.

Table 3.16. Average Differences in Search Frictions Across Matched Pairs
All

Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
Number of obs

(1)
-0.51
(17.18)
-6.89
(16.72)
0.75
(16.60)
118

Mean Difference
Contract Contract
Fresh
Processed
- Offer - No Offer - Never
- Never
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
23.05
-4.75
-130.57**
81.49
(26.27)
(19.72)
(53.21)
(70.14)
9.20
-9.79
-122.07**
55.96
(24.85)
(19.24)
(53.56)
(71.57)
15.53
-1.91
-113.04**
70.43
(27.12)
(19.00)
(53.35)
(70.02)
18
100
24
13

Fresh
- Exit
(6)
-8.17
(11.12)
-8.48
(11.18)
-1.13
(11.45)
61

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable is differences in reservation payment less outside option values.
V arwith − V arwithout = 0; HA : V arwith − V arwithout 6= 0

Processed
- Exit
(7)
123.63***
(35.40)
95.31**
(34.09)
97.75***
(33.52)
20
H0

:
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Although the aggregate results show no sign of search frictions (column 1), this is
because the effects of search frictions are different for the fresh and processed markets.
For the fresh market, we see that contracted farmers have significantly smaller premiums for search frictions than farmers who have never entered the market (column
4), but no difference for farmers who have exited the market (column 6). The size
of the premiums increases as contract enforcement moves further away from perfect
enforcement. These results reinforce the idea that search frictions are a potential
barrier to entry for the fresh market, and that their effect is augmented by imperfect
contract enforcement.
In the processed market, there are no differences in search frictions for the farmers
in the market and the farmers who have never entered the market (column 5). However, farmers who have remained in the processed market have much higher search
premiums than farmers who have exited the market (column 7). Search frictions do
not seem to be a barrier to entering the processed market, but farmers who choose
to remain in the processed market experience tighter markets than farmers who exit
the market. These findings are consistent with a notion that the farmers who exit
the processed market do so because their contracts are not renewed and are unable
to locate alternate buyers to form new contracts.

Table 3.17. Effect of α on Average Differences in Search Frictions Across Matched Pairs
All
(1)
Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner

Current Trading Partner
Most Reliable Trading Partner
Perfect Partner
Number of obs

830.35***
(241.09)
752.00***
(236.29)
794.43***
(233.22)
420.79***
(102.63)
378.21***
(100.95)
398.68***
(99.44)
118

Mean Difference
Contract
Contract
Fresh
Processed
Fresh
- Offer
- No Offer
- Never
- Never
- Exit
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
α (CTP)
971.64*** 788.48*** 1513.82*
918.23
274.99
(252.61)
(290.89)
(819.33)
(870.10) (240.43)
803.22***
738.40**
1554.83*
861.58
287.92
(263.70)
(284.66)
(822.10)
(894.82) (221.41)
1008.85*** 742.40**
1400.12
811.88
294.74
(259.38)
(280.74)
(830.94)
(878.09) (226.67)
α (MRTP)
415.87*** 420.56*** 964.20**
329.53
178.45**
(106.46)
(124.85)
(348.19)
(413.25)
(86.40)
334.18*** 390.70*** 998.21***
298.86
170.95*
(113.26)
(122.21)
(347.58)
(424.25)
(87.17)
413.45*** 396.75*** 925.11**
285.71
183.07**
(113.64)
(120.32)
(354.82)
(415.48)
(88.97)
18
100
24
13
61

Processed
- Exit
(7)
384.05
(376.03)
287.57
(366.26)
503.93
(346.43)
127.38
(183.40)
85.71
(177.83)
192.31
(170.03)
20

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable is differences in farmers’ reservation payments less outside option values. Positive values mean
increasing differences in reservation payments between farmers with and without contracts. Negative values mean
decreasing differences in reservation payments between farmers with and without contracts.
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To provide additional evidence that that these results are due to search frictions,
we regress the average differences in Y across pairs against our proxies for average
buyer reliability in the market. The correlation coefficients for the α terms are summarized in Table (3.17). Both measures of average buyer reliability are strongly
correlated with Y under all contract enforcement regimes (column 1). Positive coefficients indicate that the difference between paired farmers is larger in areas where
buyers are more reliable on average. A 1% increase in average buyer reliability is
associated with a 7-8 Ksh/kg difference using the CTP metric, and a 3-4 Ksh/kg
difference using the MRTP metric. We see systematic differences when the pair both
receive contract offers (column 2), when only one farmer receives any contract offers
(column 3), the pairs compare fresh market farmers with farmers who have never entered the market (column 4), and fresh market farmers compared with farmers who
have exited the market (column 6).
These findings support the idea that search frictions are a barrier to market in
the fresh submarket. For the processed submarket, however, we see no evidence of
a systematic relationship between average buyer reliability and paired differences in
Y (columns 5 and 7). This suggests that the average differences between processed
market farmers and exited farmers are due to factors other than search frictions.

3.6 Discussion and Policy Implications
Features and limitations of the theoretical model. Our theoretical model
is based on a highly simplified environment, and as such does not accurately predict
all of our empirical results. However, some of these discrepancies could be addressed
with simple extensions to the model. For example, we observe in the data that
farmers are heterogeneous with regards to their outside options and search costs. We
also observe price dispersion across buyers in the market. Although our environment
assumes all buyers and sellers are homogeneous within their type, price dispersion is
one of the key aspects of Mortensen and Wright’s framework, which our theoretical
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model is based on. In their model, price dispersion stems directly from heterogeneous
reservation values for buyers and sellers. Assuming these types of heterogeneities are
perfectly observable to buyers and sellers12 , they can be easily incorporated into the
existing theoretical model.
Other discrepancies, however, cannot be addressed within our theoretical model.
All estimates of the matching function show no effect on match probability from
increasing seller density in the market. Assuming that this is a true feature of this
market and not an artifact of low sample size or measurement error, then search
frictions are independent of the level of sellers available in the market. This implies
that there is no thick market externality for buyers from inducing more sellers to enter
the market, and thus no need to split the gains from trade with sellers. Our model
assumes that sellers are a scare resource and therefore that buyers must compensate
sellers for search costs in equilibrium. The empirical findings suggest that buyers
should be treated as the scare resource, which would have very different implications
for model closure and division of gains from trade in equilibrium.
Furthermore, we estimate decreasing, increasing, and constant returns to scale
overall depending on the functional form used for the matching function. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in our search model is predicated on having
a CRS matching technology. Diminishing returns to scale would suggest that the
negative affects of the congestion externality outweigh the positive thick market externality at increasing levels of buyers and sellers in the market. Increasing returns
to scale would suggest the opposite case, and generally leads to multiple possible
equilibrium [Diamond, 1982].
Finally, we estimate an effect of search frictions on aggregate contract prices which
is inconsistent with that predicted by our model. Contract prices are positively correlated with higher buyer density but also higher seller density. If seller density does
impact match formation, then the positive correlation between contract prices and
seller density would suggest that the thick market externality is dominating the con12

Guerrieri et al. [2010] offer a model of adverse selection in a frictional search model with perfect
contract enforcement.
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gestion externality. In this case, we would expect to see sellers investing more in
search since more matches would drive up the average prices offered. However, we
observe very few instances of sellers outside of the market investing any time or money
in searching for buyers.
On the other hand, if seller density does not impact match formation, then it
would also not impact contract prices offered. In that case, the seller density metric
could be simply capturing how sellers respond to market prices. Where buyers choose
to offer higher contract prices, we would observe that more sellers accept the contracts
on average. Likewise, when minimum offers are lower, fewer farmers opt to contract.
This conjecture is more consistent with the empirical results, and reinforces the idea
that our theoretical model needs to be adapted to allow for one-sided search frictions.
Approach to modeling relational contracting. Our approach to modeling
contract enforcement treats the rate that buyers’ default on their contracts as exogenous. We follow this approach because it is a commonly used modeling device
in monetary search models, and consistent with our choice experiment design. Typical models of bilateral trade from contract theory, however, endogenize the choice
to default on contract terms under the threat of autarky [Levin, 2003, Halac, 2012].
To generalize autarky to a setting with rematching would require strong assumptions
about sellers’ ability to share information with each other as well as their willingness
to commit to enforcing autarky. Since there is no device or entity in this market
that publicizes contract defaults or renegotiations, we prefer to assume that farmers
respond to contract defaults by switching to the submarket with perfect contract
enforcement.
Our model generates an equilibrium price for each submarket that is greater than
the marginal cost of effort, just as in the Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model with
frictionless matching and imperfect monitoring. In both models, transfers from buyers
to sellers incentivize effort and allocate workers between employment and unemployment. Unlike in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, unemployment (match dissolution) is
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not a punishment to sellers for shirking but rather an opportunity to switch between
submarkets and thus forcing buyers to compensate sellers for contract default.
Our model also generates price dispersion, as in Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn’s [2011]
but for a different reason. In our model, price dispersion arises from heterogeneous
buyer types separated into different submarkets. In Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, price
dispersion arises from on-the-job search in a frictionless market with imperfect contract enforcement. On-the-job search also generates dispersion of job quality, because
the marginal cost of incentivizing effort decreases with increasing job tenure. Low
wage jobs have lower expected returns to being matched, and provide lower-powered
incentives to exert effort than higher paying jobs. In our model, the expected returns
to being matched are equal in both submarkets, and so provide the same incentive to
exert effort.
In our model, firms are willing to invest in the cost of declaring themselves good
type buyers for the same reason that firms are willing to invest in high levels of
capital in Acemoglu and Shimer’s [1999] posted offer market with perfect contract
enforcement. Firms that make higher levels of ex-ante investment are able to post
higher equilibrium offers and match more quickly than firms with lower offers. In our
model, buyers that invest in declaring that they are good types are able to match
more quickly than mixed type buyers because more sellers choose to search in the
good type submarket than in the mixed submarket. Unlike in Acemoglu and Shimer,
higher investment isn’t associated with higher posted offers. Good type buyers are
able to take advantage of their investment by offering lower posted prices than mixed
type buyers. Sellers accept these lower posted prices because they yield the same
expected gains as the imperfectly enforced prices of the mixed submarket.
Implications for market design and development interventions. Our results show that farmers who do not receive contract offers have the same average
reservation payments under perfect contract enforcement as farmers with contracts
(Table 3.15), suggesting that the two groups do not differ in their abilities to produce
French beans. Our results also show that the farmers who do not receive contract
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offers have markedly different observable characteristics from contracted farmers, including less education, smaller size farms, and less access to irrigation (Table 3.4).
This suggests that buyers are avoiding farmers that they perceive are unable to supply
French beans, even when these perceptions do not reflects farmers’ actual capabilities.
Thus there is a opportunity for policy to help farmers’ overcome these misperceptions.
We also observe that farmers with and without contract offers do not differ in
how they experience search frictions on average (Table 3.16) even though the farmers
without offers know significantly fewer buyers (Table 3.5) and invest less time and
money in search (Table 3.6). The differences in search frictions are more pronounced
in areas where buyers are more reliable on average (Table 3.17), indicating that search
frictions are more likely to be a barrier to market in areas where contract enforcement
is less of a barrier to market.
This suggests that there may be a trade-off for policymakers depending on whether
they design an intervention to target contract enforcement or search frictions. Reducing search frictions by helping farmers connect with more buyers, may also bring
them into contact with less reliable buyers on average, which presents its own barrier
to market (Table 3.15). Improving contract enforcement, however, may not correct
for problems of search frictions average differences in search frictions persist under
perfect contract enforcement for the fresh submarket (Table 3.16). To effectively increase farmer participation in this market, development interventions may need to
tackle both issues simultaneously.
The farmers with contracts invest more in search, know more buyers, and have
encountered more reliable buyers on average. While we cannot tell from this analysis
whether or not this additional search caused the farmers with contracts to have encountered more reliable buyers, a development intervention that makes it easier for
farmers to find more reliable buyers will improve the incentives for farmers to enter
and remain in this market over time. However, the intervention would also need to
address buyers’ misperceptions about farmer capabilities in order to maximize participation for disadvantaged producers.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In the essays of this dissertation, I have explored some of the issues which could explain why small-scale producers do not supply French bean export markets in Kenya.
In the first essay, I examined the role of imperfect contract enforcement as a barrier
to entering the market and potential explanation for exit decisions. This essay introduced a new empirical approach to test for barriers to technology adoption based on
the causal mechanisms technique of Imai et al. [2013]. The approach can be used
to pre-screen hypotheses before conducting a randomized control trial to reduce the
likelihood of null experimental findings, and after program evaluations to identify the
specific mechanisms impacted by the intervention. I found that imperfect contract
enforcement deters entry, complicates exit, and reduces land allocation on the intensive margin. I also found that cost factors do not act as a barrier to market, but help
sort entrants into different market segments. These findings corresponded well with
the outcomes of the two development interventions conducted in this location.
In the second essay, I examined the role of partner search frictions plays in conjunction with imperfect contract enforcement to serve as a barrier to entry and potential
explanation for exit decisions. To do so, I created a model of competitive wage search
in posted offer markets with imperfect contract enforcement using the frameworks of
Moen [1997] and Mortensen and Wright [2002]. Then I employed two novel empirical
methodologies to test the model using data from Kenya’s French bean export industry. The first methodology measured search frictions based on the spatial density of
firms and farmers in the market. The second used preferences measured in a choice
experiment to quantify the impact of search frictions on farmers entry and exit decisions under different contract enforcement scenarios. I found that search frictions are
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present in the market which primarily limit farmers’ abilities to match with potential
buyers and not vice versa. I also found that search frictions are a potential barrier
to entry for the fresh submarket and may be a factor in farmers’ exit decision from
the processed market. Lastly, I found that search frictions are a potential barrier to
market participation in areas where buyers are more reliable on average, suggesting
that there may be a trade-off for policymakers depending on whether they design an
intervention to target contract enforcement or search frictions. These findings can
be used to design more effective programs to connect small-scale producers to French
bean markets.
The main result from these essays is that Kenya’s French bean market has structural features - including imperfect contract enforcement and partner search frictions
- which may help deter small-scale producers from participating in the market. To
build on this result, I plan to conduct two lines of follow-up research. First, I will
continue to empirically investigate the dynamics of this market in an effort to understand how buyers benefit from the current market structure. Syverson [2010] lists
flexible input markets as one of the possible sources of firm productivity. Using data
from the survey instruments to measure cost efficiency and degree of contractual incompleteness, as well as external data on buyer export performance, I will investigate
whether farmers who supply the market are more efficient on average then those who
do not; whether more efficient buyers tend to match with more efficient sellers (assortive matching); and how the relative efficiencies of buyers and sellers is correlated
with the extent of ex-post deviations from contract terms.
Second, I will use lab experiments to investigate program designs to mitigate the
impact of problems of contract enforcement and partner search. Theory suggests
three possible mechanisms for mitigating these problems: establishing a third-party
to independently assess quality (e.g. California’s Processing Tomato Advisory Board
[Wu, 2006]); reducing the cost of partner search (e.g. Monster.com for job hunting); or
making trading histories public (e.g. Yelp or Angie’s list for rating service providers).
I will use lab experiments to compare these approaches in terms of efficiency, measures
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as the number of trades executed and the average quality of the traded good, and
equity of the division of surplus. These results will be used to construct a menu of
options for policymakers that weighs the potential benefits from implementing one of
these mechanisms against the expected cost of implementation.
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Appendix A: Choice Experiment Instructions
All information provided during the choice experiment will be kept private and
confidential by the research team as described in the participant consent form. The
procedures described on that form were designed to protect your privacy and confidentiality, and have been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at Purdue
University. By signing this form, you are indicating that you understand these procedures and intend to participate in this choice experiment.
PART II: Choice Experiment
You will be asked to make a series of choices between different hypothetical, written contracts to supply French beans. You will be provided 8 or 9 choice sets of
hypothetical contracts. For each choice set, please indicate the option you like best:
contract A, contract B, or prefer not to contract.
Each contract will contain the following attributes:

Attribute
Price
Quality

Buyer

Description
Price is expressed in Ksh per kg. This price is a fixed for the duration of the
contract.
Standard quality French beans are those which meet minimum requirements
for size, physical appearance, and tenderness. A buyer who requires standard
quality will also purchase specialty quality beans. Specialty quality French
beans are those grown from specified seed varieties; using specified chemical
inputs; following a specified schedule of planting, harvesting and pesticide
application; and which meet minimum requirements for size, physical
appearance, and tenderness. A buyer who requires specialty quality beans
will only purchase specialty quality and only provided all rules for producing
specialty quality are followed exactly.
Buyer is the hypothetical party offering you the contract. Buyers may differ in
how reliably they honor the contract. Please consider an ideal partner to be a
buyer who never renegotiates prices after you agree to the contract and who
never rejects produce which meets the required quality standard.

For each contract offered, assume the buyer will agree to any volume you would
like to supply, but will not purchase any volume beyond the contracted amount. For
example, if you produced 1500 kg of French beans but contracted for 1000kg, the
buyer would only accept a maximum of 1000 kg. All contract attributes will be the
same regardless of the total quantity you contract to supply.
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Here is an example of one choice set:

If you choose contract A, that means you prefer a contract to sell French beans
50 Ksh/kg if the buyer is an ideal partner (no price renegotiation, no rejection of
produce that meets the quality standard) and purchases standard quality beans.
If you choose contract B, that means you prefer a contract to sell French beans for
50 Ksh/kg if the buyer is a complete stranger and purchases standard quality beans.
If you choose no contract, that means you prefer having no contract than either
contract A or contract B.
Please treat each choice set as independent from the next. This means that
the decision you make in one set should not impact the decision you make in the
next choice set. For any choice set where you prefer contract A or contract B, please
indicate how many acres you would agree to supply under that contract.
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Appendix B: Derivations for Proposition 1
We derive the results for Proposition 1.

Appendix B.1: Submarket g
In the g submarket, the marginal rates of substitution for sellers and buyers are:

dw(q, θg )
=
dθg

∂Ug
∂θg
∂Ug
∂w(q,θg )

dw(q, θg )
=
dθg

=

∂Vg
∂θg
∂Vg
∂w(q,θg )

(r + s)[1 − η(θg )][w(q, θg ) − C(q) − b]
θg [r + s + θg Q(θg )]

(Appendix B.1)

(r + s)η(θg )[Rg (q) − w(q, θg ) + k]
r + s + Q(θg )

(Appendix B.2)

=

Setting Equations (Appendix B.1) and (Appendix B.2) equal to each other and
solving for w(q, θg ), yields:

w(q, θg ) =

[r + s + θg Q(θg )]θg η(θg )[Rg (q) + k] + [r + s + Q(θg )][1 − η(θg )][C(q) + b]
[r + s + θg Q(θg )]θg η(θg ) + [r + s + Q(θg )][1 − η(θg )]
(Appendix B.3)

The payment function is a weighted average of the gain from trade for the buyer,
Rg (q) − (−k), and the seller, C(q) + b. Substituting Equation (Appendix B.3) into
Equation (3.40) and imposing rVg = κ, we find that equilibrium market tightness
must satisfy:

(Zg + Yg )
{[r + s + Q(θg∗ )]κ + (r + s)k} = Yg [Rg (q) − C(q) − b] − Zg k (Appendix B.4)
Q(θg∗ )
where Zg = [r + s + θg∗ Q(θg∗ )]θg∗ η(θg∗ ) and Yg = [r + s + Q(θg∗ )][1 − η(θg∗ )]. Equation
(Appendix B.4) is analogous to the equation that defines θ∗ under perfect contract
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enforcement, Equation (3.23). As before, the optimal market tightness equates the
expected cost of posting a contract with the expected gain from trade.
∂Vg
∂q

for sellers and buyers respectively:

g)
θg Q(θg )[ ∂w(q,θ
− C 0 (q)]
∂Ug
∂q
=
∂q
[r + s + θg Q(θg )]

(Appendix B.5)

g)
Q(θg )[Rg0 (q) − ∂w(q,θ
]
∂Vg
∂q
=
∂q
[r + s + Q(θg )]

(Appendix B.6)

To find the optimal q ∗ , we calculate

∂Ug
∂q

and

For a competitive equilibrium where buyers and sellers are both optimizing utility,
Ug and Vg must be as large as possible. Therefore Equations (Appendix B.5) and
(Appendix B.6) must both equal zero. This occurs when
∂w(q,θg )
.
∂q

∂w(q,θg )
∂q

= C 0 (q) and Rg0 (q) =

Therefore the equilibrium quality requires Rg0 (q ∗ ) = C 0 (q ∗ ). There are no

distortions to contracting for first-best quality in the submarket where buyers behave
as though contracts are perfectly enforced.

Appendix B.2: Submarket m
In the m submarket, the marginal rates of substitution for sellers and buyers are:

dw(q, θm )
=
dθm

∂Um
∂θm
∂Um
∂w(q,θm )

dw(q, θm )
=
dθm

=

∂Vm
∂θm
∂Vg
∂w(q,θm )

(r + 1 − α + αs)[1 − η(θm )][αw(q, θm ) − C(q) − b]
αθm [r + 1 − α + αs + θm Q(θm )]
(Appendix B.7)

=

(r + 1 − α + αs)η(θm )[Rm (q) − αw(q, θm ) + k]
α[r + 1 − α + αs + Q(θm )]
(Appendix B.8)

Setting Equations (Appendix B.7) and (Appendix B.8) equal to each other and
solving for w(q, θm ), yields:
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αw(q, θm ) =

Zm [Rm (q) + k] + Ym [C(q) + b]
Z m + Ym

(Appendix B.9)

∗
∗
∗
∗
where Zm = [r + 1 − α + αs + θm
Q(θm
)]θm
η(θm
) and Ym = [r + 1 − α + αs +
∗
∗
Q(θm
)][1 − η(θm
)]. The payment equation for the m submarket differs from the

payment equation for the g submarket only by replacing Rm (q) for Rg (q), and 1 −
α+αs for s. Substituting Equation (Appendix B.9) into Equation (3.41) and imposing
rVm = 0, we find that equilibrium market tightness must satisfy:

(r + 1 − α + αs)k Zm k
Ym
+
=
[Rm (q) − C(q) − b]
∗ )
Q(θm
Ym
Zm + Ym
To find the optimal q ∗ , we calculate

∂Um
∂q

and

∂Vm
∂q

(Appendix B.10)

for sellers and buyers respec-

tively:
m)
− C 0 (q)]
θm Q(θm )[α ∂w(q,θ
∂Um
∂q
=
∂q
[r + 1 − α + αs + θm Q(θm )]

(Appendix B.11)

m)
0
Q(θm )[Rm
(q) − α ∂w(q,θ
]
∂Vm
∂q
=
∂q
[r + 1 − α + αs + Q(θm )]

(Appendix B.12)

Setting Equations (Appendix B.11) and (Appendix B.12) equal zero, we see that
g)
g)
0
α ∂w(q,θ
(q) = α ∂w(q,θ
= C 0 (q) and Rm
. Optimal quality in the m submarket also
∂q
∂q

0
(q ∗ ) = C 0 (q ∗ ). However, first-best quality levels are higher in submarket
satisfies Rm
0
m than submarket g because Rm
> Rg0 for all q.

Appendix B.3: Linking the Submarkets
Substituting Equations (Appendix B.3) and (Appendix B.4) into Equation (3.35),
and Equations (Appendix B.9) and (Appendix B.10) into Equation (3.36), we find
expressions for rUg and rUm :
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rUg∗

θg∗ η(θg∗ )
=b+
(κ + k)θg∗
∗
1 − η(θg )

∗
rUm
=b+

∗
∗
θm
η(θm
) ∗
kθ
∗
1 − η(θm ) m

(Appendix B.13)

(Appendix B.14)

Because rUg = rUm = rU in equilibrium, we can set Equations (Appendix B.13)
and (Appendix B.14) equal to each other and find a relationship between κ and k:

κ = k[

∗ 2
)
(θm
− 1]
∗
(θg )2

(Appendix B.15)

Feasibility in each submarket requires:
θg∗ η(θg∗ )
](κ + k)θg∗
Rg (q ) − C(q ) ≥ b + [
∗
1 − η(θg )
∗

∗

Rm (q ∗ ) − C(q ∗ ) ≥ b + [

∗
∗
θm
η(θm
)
]kθ∗
∗
1 − η(θm ) m

(Appendix B.16)

(Appendix B.17)

In the g submarket, the gains from trade must cover the fixed costs of announcing
seller type as well as the cost for posting a open contract. q for each submarket is
therefore the value that makes Equations (Appendix B.16) and (Appendix B.17) bind
with equality. If q ∗ < q, the gains from trade are not sufficient to meet the sellers’
reservation payment after accounting for search frictions. The optimal payment in
each submarket follows directly from Equations (Appendix B.16) and (Appendix
B.17).
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